Summary: 152nd Theater Information Operations Group
1. Background. I, COL Samuel E. Licorish, Jr., was appointed on 22 December 2015, as the investigation officer to conduct a formal investigation IAW AR 15-6 into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations involving the 152nd Theater Information Operations Group (TIOG). This investigation examines the specific actions of the Brigade S3, MAJ Donald Smith who allegedly improperly made a threat of physical violence against MAJ Jeremy Reed in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, Assault. It investigates if he improperly required subordinates to prepare and process orders, travel authorizations; and improperly directed the preparation of orders for himself in the absence of a valid mission and appropriate funding in violation of DoD Directive
…show more content…
5500.7-R, The Joint Ethics Regulation, dated 17 November 2011. It further investigates if he worked on orders from his home without a valid telework plan in place in violation of DOD Instruction 1035.01; and improperly handled sensitive information transmitting it over non-government means in violation of AR 380-5, paragraph 5-5.
a. On or about 27 December 2015, I initiated contact with the 152nd TIOG Commander, COL Janet Tsao, introducing myself as the appointed 15-6 investigating officer, based on complaints regarding the command climate within the 152nd TIOG HQ and the 304th IOB, and specific alleged actions by officers, and additional allegations regarding two members of the 152nd TIOG staff. I notified COL Tsao of the complexity of this investigation and requested her full support. COL Tsao and I both concurred that due to the impending holiday leave and pass period, I would delay my visit to Camp Parks, and commence the investigation during the unit’s battle assembly weekend.
b. On Thursday, 07 January 2016, COL Tsao facilitated my visit and I informed her of my initial contact with her Senior Staff Officer / Executive Officer MAJ Jeremy Reed. I verbalized that I would require her presence, as well as that of her full-time support staff to be available for questioning during my visit from 7- 9 January 16, in support of my 15-6 investigation.
c. On 08 January 2016, COL Tsao, requested that I inform her when I completed my interviews with her full-time staff, indicating that she “can see there is a toll on them and want to encourage them.”
2. Findings. Based on the collected sworn statements from 152nd TIOG members, I conclude the following:
a. MAJ Smith allegedly improperly made a threat of physical violence against MAJ Jeremy Reed, in violation of Article 128, UCMJ is unsubstantiated. While there was an incident that included an exchange of face-to-face verbal confrontation, there is no evidence that either party was without fault.
- According to MAJ Jeremy Reed’s a sworn statement on 20160108 (TAB D, EXHIBIT A1) He stated, “When I gestured toward white board in proximity to MAJ Smith, he threatened violence if I came any closer to him or the white board. The threat was made in full view of COL Tsao, yet she made no attempt to quell the situation and I had to remove myself from the hostile environment.”
- According to COL Janet Tsao’s sworn statement, non-punitive counseling was administered to remedy the situation. (TAB D, EXHIBIT A2), She stated, “I verbally counselled both officers to respect one another’s physical boundaries and the need for professional conduct.”
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB D, EXHIBIT A3) MSG Behrens’ stated, “On or about 13 December 2016 I overheard a conversation between MAJ Jeremy Reed, MAJ Donald Smith and COL Janet Tsao that ended with a statement made by MAJ Reed Quote " ...you are now in my space and I am feeling threatened. I'm removing myself from this situation...". At which point he exited the office the conversation was occurring in and entered his own office alone.” “I cannot verify physical actions, occurrences or body language displayed by the involved parties as I did not visually witness the incident other than MAJ Reed leaving the office that the incident occurred in.”
b.
The allegation against MAJ Donald Smith, stating that he improperly handled sensitive information transmitting it over non-government means in violation of AR 380-5, paragraph 5-5 and AR 25-2 para 4-20.f(5)&(6) is substantiated.
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB E, EXHIBIT B1), dated 20160111, “In the September/October time frame I did respond to an email from MAJ Donald Smith where he asked me to send documents that were official Army business to a personal Gmail account. My response was that that was not within Army Regulation and I could not comply. His response was for me to send him the quote from AR 25-2 that prohibited the use of personal email for official Army business, which I did provide.”
- According to MAJ Smith’s oral interview (TAB E, EXHIBIT B2), when asked if he in fact had ever used his personal email to accomplish military duties, he stated, “Absolutely, I sent emails or texts with requests at …show more content…
times.”
- Per emails from SFC Timothy Lovato, S2 NCOIC and the attached responses from G2 with requested policy (TAB E, EXHIBIT B3), there apparently was a history of violation of AR 25-2. He requests specific guidance from USACAPOC (A), G2, Ms. Catherine Reese.
- On 20160211, MAJ Smith uses his Gmail, (TAB E, EXHIBIT B4) dbsmith2@gmail.com to transmit First Army Multi-COMPO Joint Assessment RC Unit Back-Brief Slides. These slides contain sensitive, an FOUO document with detailed manning numbers, mission specific requirements, training plans, and unit replacements, etc.
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB E, EXHIBIT B5) dated, 20160111, MSG Behrens stated “On multiple occasions I have received requests for both Travel Order and Personnel Order request over text from COL Janet Tsao and/or MAJ Donald Smith.” On 20151014, MAJ Smith uses his Gmail (TAB E, EXHIBIT B5, pg5) - MAJ Smith currently does not hold a Top Security clearance which is a requirement for his current branch (TAB E, EXHIBIT B6). Per email from CPT Andrew Nesbitt, ARCENT Security Officer, MAJ Smith was restricted to only “Secret Level” access due to his current status in JPAS.
- SFC Lovato emailed, directed by COL Tsoa to MAJ Smith (TAB E, EXHIBIT B7), dated 20150529, indicate that MAJ Smith had not yet submitted his PSIP clearance request.
MAJ Smith is mission ineffective if he does not have a valid TS level clearance, in accordance with his Military Intelligence Branch requirements. It is highly questionable as to why MAJ Smith did not begin this PSIP until December 2015, when it was brought to his attention in 29 May 2015. This lapse in time is unacceptable, opening a huge set of questions in regards to his mission, his capability to execute missions without updating his TS clearance, and his ability to maintain important military
protocols.
- According to an email from SFC Lovato, dated 20160107, “SGT Kyra Okazaki the 304th S2 NCO sent the PSIP request for MAJ Don Smith on 18 Dec 15. Email from her to Ms. Jacobs and Ms. Florendo is below” (TAB E, EXHIBIT B8).
c. The allegations against MAJ Smith, stating that he improperly required subordinates to prepare and process orders and travel authorizations, while also lacking a valid mission in violation of DoD Directives 5500.7-R, and worked on orders from home without a valid telework plan is substantiated.
- I requested MAJ Donald Smith’s cooperation in an interview during this investigation, asking that he provide documentation/substantiating documents to verify a valid mission and telework plan (TAB F, EXHIBIT C). He failed to provide documentation or provide a valid explanation, which indicates a lack of a relevant work plan or mission. MAJ Smith is perceived to be very articulate about finding work for the T.I.O.G. command but haven’t been able to provide written proof of a work plan. He stated that he had, “[a chart] with lines of operations”.
- The fact that he does not have a valid telework plan, establishes questionable missions, demonstrating the loose nature of travel requests as executed and requested by MAJ Smith. Per the Travel Order 002669 for 51 days, he has authorization to travel to Shaw AFB, Florida; Fort Bragg, NC; Camp Parks; Columbia, SC; Tampa, FL; Orlando, FL; New York, NY. (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1)
- Per MAJ Jeremy Reed’s email to COL Janet Tsao (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1, p2),
“I wish that I had seen this email before requesting the guidance from our higher as I am trying to ensure that we are operating within the letter and intent of the law, but finish the appropriate order approval soonest. ... I would feel better informed by HHQ’s before approving the order.” Additionally, he states in his email to COL Tsao, “MAJ Smith’s current order for 91 days is a demonstration of inappropriate use of Army funds. … I need to address these concerns with G3 and G8 before I can approve.”
- MAJ Reed inquired about MAJ Smith’s “growing list of TDY locations” and was quieted by COL Janet Tsao (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1 pg2), dated 20160106.COL Tsao’s email response to MAJ Reed’s concerns are as follows, “You are not to contact G3 or G8, or anyone outside of the command on this topic. Take no action,”
- Request for Orders sent by MAJ Smith via text message demonstrates the lack of policy and procedures for this process (TAB F, EXHIBIT C2).
- On several occasions, MAJ Smith requested orders for himself, from two different Home of Records (HOR) (TAB F, EXHIBIT C3). On 20151118, he initiated an order with a Tour of Duty packet, under a false HOR, Vero Beach, FL. The following day, 20151119, his orders were published with his 228 10th ST SE #B, Washington, DC, 20003 HOR/residence. Based on these facts, MAJ Smith has intentionally provided misinformation in regards to his HOR and his duty location in attempt to fraud the government by claiming erroneous entitlements and pay based on false mission requirements.
- According to ARCENT Security RFI (Smith Donald-5370, (TAB F, EXHIBIT C4), dated 20160217, they could only account for three (3) visit by MAJ Smith to ARCENT over a one year period (01SEP15 - 01SEP16). His whereabouts is questionable.
3. Recommendations. Pursuant to my investigation, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that MAJ Donald Smith improperly made a threat of physical violence however, it has determined that MAJ Smith has committed a pattern of disciplinary infractions of misconduct which is discreditable involvement with military authorities and conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline. MAJ Smith poses a security risk and places his subordinates in uncomfortable and compromising positions as he continues to disregard national security under conditions and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense in DoD 5200.2-R.; which is ground for discharge from the U.S. Army. Prior to MAJ Smith’s interview, my initial assessment lead me to suspect misconduct, and I felt it was appropriate to advise the respondent of his rights. I read him his rights, verbatim, per Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g), the right to remain silent or to consult with an attorney, etc.
a. I recommend that MAJ Donald Smith be administered a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR) filed in the OMPF, the performance portion.
b. I also, recommend that MAJ Smith must undergo training in regards to Operations Security (OPSEC), Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Information Security. His practice of transmitting military information via his personal Gmail demonstrates a lack of professionalism and a breach in the Army’s policies and procedures, AR 25-2 para 4-20.f (5)&(6).
c. Due to his willful misconduct in regards to the preparing and processing his orders through subordinates and not having a valid mission or telework plan,
I recommend that he be barred and relieved from his duties as the S3 for the 152nd TIOG.
d. Due to the influx of developing information regarding MAJ Donald Smith’s pattern of major infractions, this investigation warrants further research, which may determine if allegations can be verified as to if and why MAJ Smith was escorted from the SCIF at CENTCOM HQs. Also to determine his whereabouts for the alleged mission, duty location(s) and work days and if favoritism exist stemming from previous professional and personal relationship between COL Tsao, MAJ Smith, and WO1 Escobar. MAJ Smith is believed to be unemployed although he stated, that he has a non-profit organization that he manages.
5500.7-R, The Joint Ethics Regulation, dated 17 November 2011. It further investigates if he worked on orders from his home without a valid telework plan in place in violation of DOD Instruction 1035.01; and improperly handled sensitive information transmitting it over non-government means in violation of AR 380-5, paragraph 5-5.
a. On or about 27 December 2015, I initiated contact with the 152nd TIOG Commander, COL Janet Tsao, introducing myself as the appointed 15-6 investigating officer, based on complaints regarding the command climate within the 152nd TIOG HQ and the 304th IOB, and specific alleged actions by officers, and additional allegations regarding two members of the 152nd TIOG staff. I notified COL Tsao of the complexity of this investigation and requested her full support. COL Tsao and I both concurred that due to the impending holiday leave and pass period, I would delay my visit to Camp Parks, and commence the investigation during the unit’s battle assembly weekend.
b. On Thursday, 07 January 2016, COL Tsao facilitated my visit and I informed her of my initial contact with her Senior Staff Officer / Executive Officer MAJ Jeremy Reed. I verbalized that I would require her presence, as well as that of her full-time support staff to be available for questioning during my visit from 7- 9 January 16, in support of my 15-6 investigation.
c. On 08 January 2016, COL Tsao, requested that I inform her when I completed my interviews with her full-time staff, indicating that she “can see there is a toll on them and want to encourage them.”
2. Findings. Based on the collected sworn statements from 152nd TIOG members, I conclude the following:
a. MAJ Smith allegedly improperly made a threat of physical violence against MAJ Jeremy Reed, in violation of Article 128, UCMJ is unsubstantiated. While there was an incident that included an exchange of face-to-face verbal confrontation, there is no evidence that either party was without fault.
- According to MAJ Jeremy Reed’s a sworn statement on 20160108 (TAB D, EXHIBIT A1) He stated, “When I gestured toward white board in proximity to MAJ Smith, he threatened violence if I came any closer to him or the white board. The threat was made in full view of COL Tsao, yet she made no attempt to quell the situation and I had to remove myself from the hostile environment.”
- According to COL Janet Tsao’s sworn statement, non-punitive counseling was administered to remedy the situation. (TAB D, EXHIBIT A2), She stated, “I verbally counselled both officers to respect one another’s physical boundaries and the need for professional conduct.”
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB D, EXHIBIT A3) MSG Behrens’ stated, “On or about 13 December 2016 I overheard a conversation between MAJ Jeremy Reed, MAJ Donald Smith and COL Janet Tsao that ended with a statement made by MAJ Reed Quote " ...you are now in my space and I am feeling threatened. I'm removing myself from this situation...". At which point he exited the office the conversation was occurring in and entered his own office alone.” “I cannot verify physical actions, occurrences or body language displayed by the involved parties as I did not visually witness the incident other than MAJ Reed leaving the office that the incident occurred in.”
b.
The allegation against MAJ Donald Smith, stating that he improperly handled sensitive information transmitting it over non-government means in violation of AR 380-5, paragraph 5-5 and AR 25-2 para 4-20.f(5)&(6) is substantiated.
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB E, EXHIBIT B1), dated 20160111, “In the September/October time frame I did respond to an email from MAJ Donald Smith where he asked me to send documents that were official Army business to a personal Gmail account. My response was that that was not within Army Regulation and I could not comply. His response was for me to send him the quote from AR 25-2 that prohibited the use of personal email for official Army business, which I did provide.”
- According to MAJ Smith’s oral interview (TAB E, EXHIBIT B2), when asked if he in fact had ever used his personal email to accomplish military duties, he stated, “Absolutely, I sent emails or texts with requests at …show more content…
times.”
- Per emails from SFC Timothy Lovato, S2 NCOIC and the attached responses from G2 with requested policy (TAB E, EXHIBIT B3), there apparently was a history of violation of AR 25-2. He requests specific guidance from USACAPOC (A), G2, Ms. Catherine Reese.
- On 20160211, MAJ Smith uses his Gmail, (TAB E, EXHIBIT B4) dbsmith2@gmail.com to transmit First Army Multi-COMPO Joint Assessment RC Unit Back-Brief Slides. These slides contain sensitive, an FOUO document with detailed manning numbers, mission specific requirements, training plans, and unit replacements, etc.
- According to MSG Michael Behrens’s sworn statement (TAB E, EXHIBIT B5) dated, 20160111, MSG Behrens stated “On multiple occasions I have received requests for both Travel Order and Personnel Order request over text from COL Janet Tsao and/or MAJ Donald Smith.” On 20151014, MAJ Smith uses his Gmail (TAB E, EXHIBIT B5, pg5) - MAJ Smith currently does not hold a Top Security clearance which is a requirement for his current branch (TAB E, EXHIBIT B6). Per email from CPT Andrew Nesbitt, ARCENT Security Officer, MAJ Smith was restricted to only “Secret Level” access due to his current status in JPAS.
- SFC Lovato emailed, directed by COL Tsoa to MAJ Smith (TAB E, EXHIBIT B7), dated 20150529, indicate that MAJ Smith had not yet submitted his PSIP clearance request.
MAJ Smith is mission ineffective if he does not have a valid TS level clearance, in accordance with his Military Intelligence Branch requirements. It is highly questionable as to why MAJ Smith did not begin this PSIP until December 2015, when it was brought to his attention in 29 May 2015. This lapse in time is unacceptable, opening a huge set of questions in regards to his mission, his capability to execute missions without updating his TS clearance, and his ability to maintain important military
protocols.
- According to an email from SFC Lovato, dated 20160107, “SGT Kyra Okazaki the 304th S2 NCO sent the PSIP request for MAJ Don Smith on 18 Dec 15. Email from her to Ms. Jacobs and Ms. Florendo is below” (TAB E, EXHIBIT B8).
c. The allegations against MAJ Smith, stating that he improperly required subordinates to prepare and process orders and travel authorizations, while also lacking a valid mission in violation of DoD Directives 5500.7-R, and worked on orders from home without a valid telework plan is substantiated.
- I requested MAJ Donald Smith’s cooperation in an interview during this investigation, asking that he provide documentation/substantiating documents to verify a valid mission and telework plan (TAB F, EXHIBIT C). He failed to provide documentation or provide a valid explanation, which indicates a lack of a relevant work plan or mission. MAJ Smith is perceived to be very articulate about finding work for the T.I.O.G. command but haven’t been able to provide written proof of a work plan. He stated that he had, “[a chart] with lines of operations”.
- The fact that he does not have a valid telework plan, establishes questionable missions, demonstrating the loose nature of travel requests as executed and requested by MAJ Smith. Per the Travel Order 002669 for 51 days, he has authorization to travel to Shaw AFB, Florida; Fort Bragg, NC; Camp Parks; Columbia, SC; Tampa, FL; Orlando, FL; New York, NY. (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1)
- Per MAJ Jeremy Reed’s email to COL Janet Tsao (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1, p2),
“I wish that I had seen this email before requesting the guidance from our higher as I am trying to ensure that we are operating within the letter and intent of the law, but finish the appropriate order approval soonest. ... I would feel better informed by HHQ’s before approving the order.” Additionally, he states in his email to COL Tsao, “MAJ Smith’s current order for 91 days is a demonstration of inappropriate use of Army funds. … I need to address these concerns with G3 and G8 before I can approve.”
- MAJ Reed inquired about MAJ Smith’s “growing list of TDY locations” and was quieted by COL Janet Tsao (TAB F, EXHIBIT C1 pg2), dated 20160106.COL Tsao’s email response to MAJ Reed’s concerns are as follows, “You are not to contact G3 or G8, or anyone outside of the command on this topic. Take no action,”
- Request for Orders sent by MAJ Smith via text message demonstrates the lack of policy and procedures for this process (TAB F, EXHIBIT C2).
- On several occasions, MAJ Smith requested orders for himself, from two different Home of Records (HOR) (TAB F, EXHIBIT C3). On 20151118, he initiated an order with a Tour of Duty packet, under a false HOR, Vero Beach, FL. The following day, 20151119, his orders were published with his 228 10th ST SE #B, Washington, DC, 20003 HOR/residence. Based on these facts, MAJ Smith has intentionally provided misinformation in regards to his HOR and his duty location in attempt to fraud the government by claiming erroneous entitlements and pay based on false mission requirements.
- According to ARCENT Security RFI (Smith Donald-5370, (TAB F, EXHIBIT C4), dated 20160217, they could only account for three (3) visit by MAJ Smith to ARCENT over a one year period (01SEP15 - 01SEP16). His whereabouts is questionable.
3. Recommendations. Pursuant to my investigation, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that MAJ Donald Smith improperly made a threat of physical violence however, it has determined that MAJ Smith has committed a pattern of disciplinary infractions of misconduct which is discreditable involvement with military authorities and conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline. MAJ Smith poses a security risk and places his subordinates in uncomfortable and compromising positions as he continues to disregard national security under conditions and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense in DoD 5200.2-R.; which is ground for discharge from the U.S. Army. Prior to MAJ Smith’s interview, my initial assessment lead me to suspect misconduct, and I felt it was appropriate to advise the respondent of his rights. I read him his rights, verbatim, per Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g), the right to remain silent or to consult with an attorney, etc.
a. I recommend that MAJ Donald Smith be administered a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR) filed in the OMPF, the performance portion.
b. I also, recommend that MAJ Smith must undergo training in regards to Operations Security (OPSEC), Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Information Security. His practice of transmitting military information via his personal Gmail demonstrates a lack of professionalism and a breach in the Army’s policies and procedures, AR 25-2 para 4-20.f (5)&(6).
c. Due to his willful misconduct in regards to the preparing and processing his orders through subordinates and not having a valid mission or telework plan,
I recommend that he be barred and relieved from his duties as the S3 for the 152nd TIOG.
d. Due to the influx of developing information regarding MAJ Donald Smith’s pattern of major infractions, this investigation warrants further research, which may determine if allegations can be verified as to if and why MAJ Smith was escorted from the SCIF at CENTCOM HQs. Also to determine his whereabouts for the alleged mission, duty location(s) and work days and if favoritism exist stemming from previous professional and personal relationship between COL Tsao, MAJ Smith, and WO1 Escobar. MAJ Smith is believed to be unemployed although he stated, that he has a non-profit organization that he manages.