Summary Of Can Empirical Knowledge Have A Foundation

Laurence BonJour is an American philosopher who is best known for his work in epistemology. In his work, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation,” he argues against foundationalism by and ultimately concludes that “strong foundationalism is untenable as a solution to the regress problem” (6). He explores externalism, a view that holds that rational explanations are found through observing objective features that exist in the world; as well as givenism, the view that one can understand facts without having evidence or beliefs regarding those facts. In this paper, I will define foundationalism and outline BonJour’s anti-foundationalist views, and I will analyze his response to externalism and the regress problem.
Foundationalism is a view
Therefore, one can only believe in something to be true if, and only if, there is a good reason to do so—that is, that there is a rational explanation as to why the belief is true, and the explanation must be based on reason and have evidence to support its factuality. If one accepts a belief without having a rational reason to believe that it is true, then that belief cannot be accepted as a truth; BonJour goes as far as saying that to do so would be “epistemically irresponsible” and that the belief would unjustified, and that being epistemically responsible is the foundation of justification
If F, the feature that allows a belief to be a basic one, exists, then B must possess this F; additionally, other beliefs that have F must have a high likelihood of being true themselves; and belief B has a high likelihood of being true if B is to be justified (5-6). However, BonJour also holds that one must be aware of and understand the justification of B in order for B to be a basic belief, going against foundationalist thinking again, because an epistemically responsible person cannot simply believe in B without being in “cognitive possession” of the justification argument that B has F, making B reasonably likely to be true