Summary Of Hiroshima Was A War Crime
In the article “Hiroshima was a War Crime” written by Shigetoshi Iwamatsu explains his views concerning the United States use of the atomic bombs on Japanese cities during the end of WWII. In the author’s opinion the use of atomic weapons was a war crime. According to West’s Encyclopedia of American Law a war crime is defined as “Acts that violate the international laws, treaties, customs, and practices governing military conflict between belligerent states or parties.” Iwamatsu supports his opinion that the bombing was a war crime under two view points. Iwamatsu viewed the brutal nature of atomic weapons as an act of genocide. The second point of view is that the surrender of Japan was imminent, making the bombing an unnecessary action.
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In the planning the U.S. leadership knew that the invasion of Japan and subsequent fight that would ensue, costing an estimated loss of 1,000,000 lives of U.S. servicemen would be necessary to end the war (Bender and Leone 1983, 118). The Japanese had already refused all reasonable peace offers. Their War Minister, Anami, issued the statement that Japanese honor required the fight to the bitter end in defense of Japan was the only acceptable action for the Japanese to follow. Japanese forces still were estimated to be over 2,000,000 troops and 10,000 kamikaze planes (Bender and Leone 1983, 119-120). Acknowledging the ferocity and the brutality capable of the honor bound Japanese soldiers, hard lessons learned from the battles on Iwo Jima and Okinawa the U.S. knew the invasion of Japan would be extremely costly (Bender and Leone 1983, 122). While the bombing of the two cities creating an estimated death toll of 120,000 civilians was horrible, the alternative would have been much worse. If the invasion had happened not only would the 3,000,000 plus lives combined forces be at risk, but civilian lives would also be in danger as collateral damage during combat. In Germany 1,500,000 -3,000,000 civilian casualties occurred during conventional aerial bombings (Overy 2013,
In the planning the U.S. leadership knew that the invasion of Japan and subsequent fight that would ensue, costing an estimated loss of 1,000,000 lives of U.S. servicemen would be necessary to end the war (Bender and Leone 1983, 118). The Japanese had already refused all reasonable peace offers. Their War Minister, Anami, issued the statement that Japanese honor required the fight to the bitter end in defense of Japan was the only acceptable action for the Japanese to follow. Japanese forces still were estimated to be over 2,000,000 troops and 10,000 kamikaze planes (Bender and Leone 1983, 119-120). Acknowledging the ferocity and the brutality capable of the honor bound Japanese soldiers, hard lessons learned from the battles on Iwo Jima and Okinawa the U.S. knew the invasion of Japan would be extremely costly (Bender and Leone 1983, 122). While the bombing of the two cities creating an estimated death toll of 120,000 civilians was horrible, the alternative would have been much worse. If the invasion had happened not only would the 3,000,000 plus lives combined forces be at risk, but civilian lives would also be in danger as collateral damage during combat. In Germany 1,500,000 -3,000,000 civilian casualties occurred during conventional aerial bombings (Overy 2013,