Summary: The Effect Of Cross-Examination On Eyewitness Testimony

Running head: Eyewitness Testimony 1

The Effect of Cross-Examination on Eyewitness Testimony

Abstracts
Cross-examination increases the likelihood of eyewitness error. Preceding research indicates that while being cross-examined children alter a lot of their originally correct responses. An experiment conducted by Maras & Valentine (2011) describes in which the result of cross-examination on accurateness of adult eyewitness testimony was explored. There were twenty-two student participants who were placed into a co-witness condition, which resulted in memory agreement and recalled less accurately than witnesses in the control condition or individual condition. Following a 4 week
postponement all participants were cross-examined by a trainee barrister, similar to a prosecutor. Subsequently there was no difference in accurateness among the two experimental groups with regard to cross-examination. Witnesses in both conditions made numerous alterations to their preceding reports by changing both originally accurate and inaccurate responses.

According to Elizabeth Loftus, a leading expert on human memory, eyewitness memory as, “a person 's episodic memory for a crime or other dramatic event that he or she has witnessed.” Often times there is a significant amount of emphasis with regard to the accuracy of an eyewitness because erroneous eyewitness testimony can have a severe outcome such as wrongful incarceration. Eyewitness testimony is the evidence provided in court by a person who witnessed a crime, with a view to identifying the perpetrator. Eyewitness testimony is a compelling device used within the realm of the criminal justice system, because it is a promptly conventional type of substantiation of the facts that sanction guilty verdicts. It is without doubt that eyewitnesses to a crime are one of the most important people to the police when trying to get a conviction but we must remember that sometimes they can be un-reliable. However an extensive amount of research has confirmed that eyewitness memory can be exceedingly plastic.
The memory of an eyewitness can be distorted by suggestive information attained after the pertinent episode was observed (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Wright & Loftus, 1998), by the method of inquiry that a witness experiences (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975) or by a constant bombardment of questions (Odinot, Walters, & Lavender, 2009). Evidence has shown that eyewitnesses have also been prejudiced by ambiguous information attained during inquiry (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) or dialogue with a co-witness (Gabbert, Memon, & Allen, 2003). Maras & Valentine (2011) pointed out that the cognitive interview was developed to avoid memory distortion and elicit accurate information from the eyewitness. Maras & Valentine (2011) indicate that there has been a vast quantity of investigation regarding interviewing of eyewitnesses there has been comparatively modest exploration on the results of the cross-examination in court on the dependability of eyewitness testimony. The method of questioning generally used in cross-examination include question formats that can regulate the comprehensiveness and accurateness of the answer; including leading questions, use of negatives, closed questions, either/or questions, yes/no questions and multiple questions (Kebbell, Deprez, & Wagstaff, 2003; Kebbell, Hatton, & Johnson, 2004; Perry, McAuliff, Tam, Claycomb, Dostal, & Flanagan, 1995; Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003). According to Maras & Valentine (2011) there are a number of essential discrepancies between an investigative interview and cross-examination. The authors also specify a large amount research presumes that the interview being conducted is with a cooperative witness who is trying to recollect as truthfully as possible. In a characteristic study project, deceptive details are initiated in a small fraction of questions in a post event questionnaire or interview. In comparison, cross-examination is expected to comprise of effective persuasion and an effort to deteriorate the witness’ self-assurance. It is possible for a witness to face straightforward defiance to the accurateness of their report, and have a supplementary explanation put to them. Moreover, cross-examination may possibly be anticipated to be unfavorable to a witness testimony as a result of aspects which we know enhance a witnesses’ impressionability, such as a an extended postponement between witnessing the event and cross-examination (Read, Connolly, Toglia, Ross, & Lindsay, 2007) and the professed prominent standing and influence of the cross-examiner (Roper & Shewan, 2002). The question arises of whether the effect is due to the vulnerability of children’s testimony or whether cross-examination would adversely affect the accuracy of adult eyewitness testimony. The purpose of the research performed by Maras & Valentine (2011) was to determine if the reduction of the accurateness of a child’s testimony was directly correlated with cross examination or to determine if cross examination would negatively influence the accurateness of an adult’s eyewitness testimony by utilizing a cost-effective legitimate situation. The authors initially had the student participant witnesses watch a video. The co-witness paradigm, developed by Gabbert et al., 2003 was utilized to expose a number of the witnesses to deceptive information. According to Patterson & Kemp, 2006, dialogue with a co-witness can offer a compelling sway on testimony, and a plausible source of misleading information for the adult participants. Following a four week period of postponement every witness was questioned by an apprentice barrister, similar to a prosecutor. The authors mislead the barristers to believe that it would be beneficial to their client if all the witnesses altered their testimony on four crucial elements, which were completely different amid the two versions of the video used. The barristers were not informed that there were in fact two differing versions of the video; however they were informed by the authors that each of the witness had the chance to converse about the occurrence with a co-witness. Maras & Valentine (2011) hypothesized that the witnesses would integrate deceptive facts into the account of their own memory if they experienced deceptive information from their co-witness. The authors’ primary focus was to assess if cross-examination influenced the accurateness of the testimony of the adult witnesses. Furthermore, the authors’ theorized that if the adult witnesses had not experienced deceptive information they would be less probable to alter their testimony under cross examination than those collaborators in the co-witness condition since the substitute explanation offered by the barrister would be divergent and they would not have a reasonable ascription for presuming that they were erroneous. Because of the methodology a prospect was afforded by Maras & Valentines (2011) to investigate whether under questioning witnesses are more so probable to concede by making an omission error (i.e. agreeing that they did not see something that in fact they did see) or a commission error (i.e. to erroneously comply by agreeing they saw something that they did not actually see). Research on memory submission from co-witness dialogue has shown that a co-witness who reported something a witness did not see can be more significant than a co-witness who reported not noticing a detail that the witness did see (Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006). The research methodology use by the authors’ also allowed a test of whether under cross-examination witnesses are more likely to agree with a implication concerning a nonessential detail than to a detail about the central action of the event. Eyewitnesses are more probable to be deceived by guiding questions about a nonessential detail than a central event (e.g. Coxon &Valentine, 1997; Wright & Stroud, 1998). There were thirty students who participated in the study for course credit. And of the thirty students who participated in the study eight partakers were unsuccessful in completing the cross-examination stage and were disqualified from the analyses. Date was obtained for a total of 22 participants of which 18 were female and 4 were male, ranging in age from 18 to 44. The design also included random assignment to either the eyewitness or co-witness conditions. In the eyewitness condition, participants viewed differing viewpoints, either from a room or from a door. And within the co-witness condition, the participants viewed differing viewpoints in the preceding manner. The author had the participants watch a video of a simulated crime event, which was used by Gabbert et al. (2003). Those who participated in the co-witness condition viewed differing accounts of the simulated crime event concurrently in twosomes, and were guided to consider that they were viewing the same video clip as their co-witness. After viewing the video of the simulated crime event all of the witnesses completed a questionnaire. While the eyewitnesses in the control condition completed the questionnaire independently, participants in the co-witness condition completed the same questionnaire with their co-witness, and were asked to discuss the event together and provide the most accurate collaborative answer in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was the same as that used by Gabbert et al. (2003), which contained a free-recall question asking witnesses to recall all they could about the sequence of events and actions from the video, followed by eight specific questions followed by an additional final question asking participants whether or not they could provide any evidence of guilt or innocence from what they had witnessed in the video. All of the participants subsequently completed an unrelated filler task for 30 minutes before completing another recall questionnaire individually. The participants were asked to complete the questionnaire as accurately as possible as if they were real witnesses providing information about what they had seen personally. This questionnaire, which was termed by the authors’ as the witness ‘statement’, asked for a free-recall account of the video, followed by a further eight questions. Four of these questions referred to the four critical details. The other four questions were about unrelated (neutral) details. Two of the critical questions probed for information only available from the perspective a video. Two questions probed for information that was only available from the perspective B video. After a postponement of about 4 weeks witnesses returned for the cross-examination stage. The results indicated that seventy-three percent of participants in the co-witness condition integrated at least one item that could only have been acquired from their co-witness into their statement and responses to critical questions made at the end of the initial experimental session. In contrast, none of the witnesses in the control condition integrated these details into their statement. There was a significant association between experimental condition and the number of unseen critical items reported. Under cross-examination a majority of witnesses altered an answer from their statement on at least one of the critical questions by fully conceding to the barrister that an alternative answer was correct. Recollection of the event was more precise with participants in the individual condition than in the co-witness condition. There was a correlation between time of recall and experimental condition. According to Maras & Valentine (2011) testimony recollection was more precise amongst those participants who viewed the video independently compared to those who had a chance to talk to a co-witness. The authors also found that cross-examination minimized the accurateness of participants in the individual condition, but had no result on the accurateness of witnesses who had been exposed to deceptive information. The authors’ also found that recollection was more precise by participants in the individual condition than in the co-witness condition. There was a major correlation between cross-examination and reduction of the accurateness of testimony. The most important variation was that the participants in the individual condition scored better following cross-examination. The authors’ found the greatest effect size was the relation among experimental condition and initial accuracy. Those witnesses who participated in the individual condition were more likely to changer correct answers than incorrect answers, and there was also an inclination for the eyewitnesses in the co-witness condition to change correct answers to incorrect answers. At the end of the study, Maras & Valentine (2011), found no difference between the individual and the co-witness conditions with regard to agreement under cross-examination. The authors’ also found no difference between the individual and co-witness conditions with regard to changes to critical questions.
These conclusions offered additional evidence of the co-witness as a rather influential cause for suggestion on eyewitness testimony. The data replicated the effects formerly detailed in the literature of memory conformity (Gabbert et al., 2003; Patterson & Kemp, 2006). The experiment conducted by Maras & Valentine (2011) also found absolutely no proof to substantiate the notion that witnesses were more likely to make commission errors or omission errors under cross-examination. The findings of the study demonstrated that after a postponement of only four 4 weeks eyewitness testimony can be surprisingly tenuous and that cross examination is tremendously successful in influencing witness testimony. The findings of the study conducted by Maras & Valentine (2011) demonstrate that young adults are exceedingly probable to change their answers under cross-examination. Moreover, the authors’ established that exposure to deceptive information showed a considerable decline in the accurateness of the testimony of young adults as a result of cross-examination. The authors’ go on to say that even with favorable circumstances cross examination diminished correct eyewitness memory. The authors’ also determined that witnesses who had been exposed to deceptive information demonstrated no divergence in the number of right and wrong responses they altered.

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