Summary: a Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms
Artikel: A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms
Problem:
When a team of individuals produce a single output the problem arises on how to contribute the reward so that every individual is equally rewarded. This article examines three different mechanisms to deal with this issue:
1. Markets
Markets deals with the control problem through precise measurement and reward of individual contributions.
2. Bureaucrats
Bureaucrats rely on a mixture of close evaluation with socialized acceptance of common objectives.
3. Clans
Clans rely on a relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals.
Introduction:
Controls (by Tannenbaum)=sum of interpersonal influence relations in an organization
Controls (Ezioni)= control is equivalent to power
Controls (Weber)= a problem in creating and monitoring rules through a hierarchical authority system
Main questions in article:
1) What are the mechanisms through which an organization can be managed so that it moves towards its objectives?
2) How can the design of these mechanisms be improved, what are the limits of each design?
An example: The parts supply division
Purchasing department: buys 100.000 items (p.a.) from 3.000 suppliers purchased by 22 employees on 3 management levels.
• Purchasing officer
- send out request to 3 manufacturers and adds information on reliability,... and the order
• Supervisor
- Consults agents if they need help and reminds workers that they are not allowed to accept presents
Warehousing operations: 1.400 employees (incl. 150 manager)
• Pickers and packers (worker)
• Supervisor (manager)
- Formal authority (written rules)
- Informal authority (personality)
Three mechanisms:
1. Market mechanism --> purchasing function
Agents and supervisory employ market mechanism: to minimize cost for the company by picking the best price on the markets. In a market prices
Problem:
When a team of individuals produce a single output the problem arises on how to contribute the reward so that every individual is equally rewarded. This article examines three different mechanisms to deal with this issue:
1. Markets
Markets deals with the control problem through precise measurement and reward of individual contributions.
2. Bureaucrats
Bureaucrats rely on a mixture of close evaluation with socialized acceptance of common objectives.
3. Clans
Clans rely on a relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals.
Introduction:
Controls (by Tannenbaum)=sum of interpersonal influence relations in an organization
Controls (Ezioni)= control is equivalent to power
Controls (Weber)= a problem in creating and monitoring rules through a hierarchical authority system
Main questions in article:
1) What are the mechanisms through which an organization can be managed so that it moves towards its objectives?
2) How can the design of these mechanisms be improved, what are the limits of each design?
An example: The parts supply division
Purchasing department: buys 100.000 items (p.a.) from 3.000 suppliers purchased by 22 employees on 3 management levels.
• Purchasing officer
- send out request to 3 manufacturers and adds information on reliability,... and the order
• Supervisor
- Consults agents if they need help and reminds workers that they are not allowed to accept presents
Warehousing operations: 1.400 employees (incl. 150 manager)
• Pickers and packers (worker)
• Supervisor (manager)
- Formal authority (written rules)
- Informal authority (personality)
Three mechanisms:
1. Market mechanism --> purchasing function
Agents and supervisory employ market mechanism: to minimize cost for the company by picking the best price on the markets. In a market prices