Summer Negotiation Simulation

As mentioned above, during the last negotiation simulation there were three groups or teams. Each team represented a South American country. For this exercise the country of Brazil, wanting more action and less declaration of political will, convened a working group consisting of three countries: Venezuela, Peru and Colombia. The sole purpose of generating these countries together was to generate a solution to water quality concerns. Cooperation was a key element within this negotiation, as working together to build a single water treatment plant would yield the largest cost savings. However, there was an additional incentive. The groups that could successfully partner would be awarded extra credit on their grade. Furthermore, a team
could secure a larger amount of extra credit if they could garner the largest share of savings. Ultimately one team had to be left out as a full-fledged coalition between all three teams went unrewarded. The characteristics of the game stressed the impact of high stakes terms on relationships between bargainers, expectation of reciprocity and the art of concessions. The characteristic function calculated the cost savings to be the highest when all three countries formed a coalition, at the same time, as mentioned above, there was no additional incentive (zero extra credit points) for full cooperation.
Outside the negotiation simulation all participants have an association with one another that lies in the middle of the relationship spectrum between stranger and friend (Shell, 2006, p. 67), known as a working relationship. Between some participants, this relationship leans more to friendship. Research has shown that there is an inverse relationship between relationship and bargaining intensity. The closer the relationship the more a bargainer will soften their style to minimize conflict and engage in equality norms (Shell, 2006, pp. 66-67). Nevertheless, very high stakes can spur the competitive spirit in close friends or associates (Shell, 2006, p.
73).
The characteristic function presented Colombia (my country of representation) as an actor with potential power. We realized that the degree of cost savings directly depended on our country’s presence within the coalition; therefore, to produce the most cost savings, Colombia would have to be a member of the resulting coalition. Our strategy was to use a cooperative approach to persuade one of the other countries into a coalition. Unfortunately, our group was slightly late to the negotiations which afforded the other two teams some privacy time to talk. I was worried that our tardiness may have placed us at a disadvantage, but as we joined the conversation, both teams expressed the desire to form a three-way coalition.
I believe the primary driver for this resolution was the removal of the “high-stakes” aspect. With a high degree of certainty, I know that every participants’ competitive senses were heightened with the extra incentive, for when it comes to grades our class tends to be overachievers. Within my group, the extra credit prompted us to place more scrutiny on the different players and strategized ways to provide individual cues that would prompt others in their group to follow, i.e. social proof (Shell, 2006, p. 105). Our competitive drive lessened with the high stakes removal and completely dissolved with the three-way coalition proposal. It is argued that coalitions form based on equality.
Participants within a coalition expect payoff amounts to be proportional to what resources are contributed (Gamson, 1961). The formation of a coalition within this simulation was straightforward, and unexpectedly, so was the allocation of coast savings (an even three-way split). Everyone appeared satisfied with the agreement, except myself. I saw an opportunity to enhance the agreement and ensure a productive bargaining relationship. Due to these three countries’ agreement to forged a working association, it is important to address unnoticed exploitation. Failure to correct unfair treatment can foster resentment leading to the collapse of the relationship and coalition (Shell, 2006, p.
51). Research has proven that people are very sensitive to the notions of equity and fairness (Shell, 2006, p. 51), which can trigger the norm of reciprocity. Stable relationships and reliable interactions, built upon reciprocity norms, duties owed to another because of prior actions or agreements, are sources of personal satisfaction (Shell, 2006, p. 59). I proposed a question to Peru, inquiring why they were willing to take an even split, when they were not the worst offenders in terms of pollution. Initially, I was a single voice, however, my other teammates chimed in to further push the question. It broke the social proof, as the team representing Venezuela joined in. The acknowledgment of a potentially imbalanced and unfair allocation opened the discussion of concessions. Concessions are often necessary but parties providing them can go unappreciated and unreciprocated (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2014, p. 269). Prior to concession discussions, our group was unevenly reaping most of the cost savings. The primary goal for Colombia to offer concessions was two-fold: 1. To reinforce the relationship by presenting ourselves as trustworthy and 2. To reciprocate and acknowledge Peru’s and Venezuela’s gestures of goodwill (Lewicki et al., 2014, p. 269). During the discussion, my team labeled our concessions, emphasizing the benefits to the two countries to further affirm our reciprocal intent and agreed to imminent concession installments as they arise in the future. The art of concessions is primed to ensure that concessions made, are not ignored or exploited, yet in this instance, my team used the maneuvers to solidify our position within the coalition. This simulation was the first negotiating exercise involving bargaining with more than one party’s interest at the table, moreover, although it was removed, the high-stakes element made it more exciting and tense. At the time, I did not understand why the initial goal of this negotiation was to break from the simple “go-to” result (three-way coalition), however I realize that forcing a two-way partnership explores more of the complexities entailed within forming a coalition, specifically the behavioral ones. Coalition bargaining is a powerful tool within negotiation as it helps achieve all three forms of leverage (Shell, 2006, p. 105), and leverage is what negotiators strive for to reach an agreement on their terms.