SUSTENANCE CONCEPT AND EXECUTION OF BANGLADESHI FORCE IN LIBERATION WAR
SUSTENANCE CONCEPT AND EXECUTION OF BANGLADESHI FORCE IN LIBERATION WAR
Strategic Concept for Sustenance
1. Pakistani Forces. Pakistan’s broad sustenance concept was dependence on external help. On 28 April 1971, Henry Kissinger, the Foreign Secretary of the USA submitted the strategic estimate to President Nixon where he highlighted three options. The last option included an effort to help West Pakistan by economic, food and military assistance, which was approved by the president and that set the broad strategic sustenance concept for West Pakistan.
2. Indian Forces. Although Indian army was capable of producing military hardware in 1971 but they were not prepared for large scale operations against Pakistan in the East. As there was no forecast of war immediately by the intelligence agency, budget provided to the defence services was just sufficient to keep them in a reasonable state of readiness.
3. Bangladesh Forces. When the war broke out, Bangladesh Forces had very limited logistic capability. The concept mainly relied on mustering of the civil resources as much as possible in support of the own force and denying the same to the enemy.
4. Analysis. To support a major campaign, total dependence on a foreign country may not be a viable option. Although, strategically Pakistan dependent on USA, but during the crucial phase of the war the much expected assistance did not materialise. Therefore, Self dependence on defence production and allocation of adequate budget is necessary to support a major campaign.
Operational Concept for Sustenance
5. Pakistan Army. The operational instruction number 3 of 1971 issued on 15 July 1971 contemplated strong point and fortress concept of defence. The sustenance plan was to keep the strong points and fortresses self sufficient at least for thirty days. Accordingly, Pakistani forces planned for decentralization of logistics.
6. Indian Army. Operational concept of Indian Army was to
Strategic Concept for Sustenance
1. Pakistani Forces. Pakistan’s broad sustenance concept was dependence on external help. On 28 April 1971, Henry Kissinger, the Foreign Secretary of the USA submitted the strategic estimate to President Nixon where he highlighted three options. The last option included an effort to help West Pakistan by economic, food and military assistance, which was approved by the president and that set the broad strategic sustenance concept for West Pakistan.
2. Indian Forces. Although Indian army was capable of producing military hardware in 1971 but they were not prepared for large scale operations against Pakistan in the East. As there was no forecast of war immediately by the intelligence agency, budget provided to the defence services was just sufficient to keep them in a reasonable state of readiness.
3. Bangladesh Forces. When the war broke out, Bangladesh Forces had very limited logistic capability. The concept mainly relied on mustering of the civil resources as much as possible in support of the own force and denying the same to the enemy.
4. Analysis. To support a major campaign, total dependence on a foreign country may not be a viable option. Although, strategically Pakistan dependent on USA, but during the crucial phase of the war the much expected assistance did not materialise. Therefore, Self dependence on defence production and allocation of adequate budget is necessary to support a major campaign.
Operational Concept for Sustenance
5. Pakistan Army. The operational instruction number 3 of 1971 issued on 15 July 1971 contemplated strong point and fortress concept of defence. The sustenance plan was to keep the strong points and fortresses self sufficient at least for thirty days. Accordingly, Pakistani forces planned for decentralization of logistics.
6. Indian Army. Operational concept of Indian Army was to