The Atomic Bombing of Pearl Harbor

On May 7th Germany had surrendered unconditionally but the war with Japan raged on in the pacific. The Americans were war weary. They had seen the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Kamikaze attacks, and horrible casualties in Okinawa and Iwo Jima. There had been reports on things like the Bataan death march. Newspaper photos had shown American POWs beheaded by Japanese soldiers. Ending the war and preventing further loss of life is all that mattered at this point.

With the surrender of Germany at the beginning of May 1945 to bring the war against Japan to a speedy end with the least loss of men and material there was four potential courses of action:

1. Continue strategic bombing and blockade until Japan surrenders.
2. Invade Japan.
3. Redefine “unconditional surrender” in such a way to induce Japanese Government to surrender.
4. Frighten Japan into surrendering with revolutionary weapons (i.e. the atomic bomb).

Dropping atomic bombs, Little Boy and Fat Man, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was legitimate and necessary to defeat Japan because it was the quickest and most effective option to induce Japan to surrender, prevent further destruction of the Japanese mainland, and save American lives.

In August 1940, after German Bombers bombed London, and in retaliation Churchill ordered an attack on Berlin. The steady escalation of bombing cities and their noncombatant populations followed. The progressive, and systematic block-by-block bombing of Dresden until, to quote Churchill: “the enemy became a nation of troglodytes, scratching in the ruins.”[1] Mark Selden points out: “[this] provoked the last significant public discussion of the bombing of women and children to take place during World War 2…the Allied air commanders have made the long awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of the great German population centers as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler’s doom.”[2] And in the Japan the full brunt of this airpower would be felt. From newly captured bases in Tinian and Guam, the United States gained a tremendous capacity to attack Japan. Japanese cities were within effective range of the B-29 bombers and were virtually defenseless against sustained air attack. The United States threw the full weight of its airpower into strategic bombing campaigns in an effort to force surrender.

On the night of March 9-10, 1945, 334 B-29s flew low over Tokyo from the Marianas.[3] It is estimated that 87,793 people died in the raid, and 40,918 were injured.[4] 16 square miles of Tokyo were destroyed.[5] This was the highest amount of death and destruction caused by a single bombing mission to date in the war. The raids continued relentlessly and by July as much as 60% of the ground area of the country’s largest cities had been burnt out. Despite such widespread destruction, it did not diminish Japan’s commitment to continue the war. Sir James Butler points out that although Japan wanted to end the war, there was however a belief in Japan that unconditional surrender would be equivalent to national extinction.[6]

Unconditional surrender implied they would have to relinquish their occupied territories (Korea and Manchuria) and face foreign military occupation. Military occupation posed a threat to the person of the Emperor and the imperial system they wished to preserve. It is important to bear in mind that at this point in time the Japanese thought all that awaited them was an allied land invasion (not the atomic bomb). They knew the Americans must invade in order to secure victory, and in such and eventuality, they could be repelled. Fixed defenses, kamikaze aircraft, suicide boats, and suicide anti tank units. Max Hastings points out “[Japan] believed that their ability to exact a huge blood price from their enemy [in a land invasion] before succumbing represented a formidable bargaining chip.”[7] This mistaken presumption gave them the idea they still had time to talk, probe, and negotiate for favorable terms of surrender.

With Japan tenaciously resisting the devastating affects of the bombing campaigns, and no answer to the question of how long they would continue to resist, it became evident that reliance on air and naval power could prolong the conflict indefinitely. In General Arnold’s diary he noted MacArthur believed “…that bombing can do a lot to end the war but in final analysis doughboys will have to march into Tokyo.”[8] The Joint Chiefs begun working on plans to invade Japan, starting with the island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) then Honshu (Operation Cornet). However there was a lack of agreement between the army and navy planners as to whether an invasion was desirable and necessary.

To capture Iwo Jima, and Okinawa had been the bitterest fight in the whole Pacific Campaign. The heavy casualties incurred on both sides made the prospect of invading Kyushu and Honshu, facing larger forces, very bleak. Losses in the Kyushu campaign were expected to exceed those at Okinawa. Estimates ranged between 500,000 and 1 million American casualties.[9] Also in the policy paper drafted by the Joint Chiefs, highlighted “that there was no recorded instance of Japanese military units surrendering in the entire war.” “Therefore there was no guarantee that a Japanese government would surrender or, even if one did, that Japan’s armed forces would comply with that surrender.”[10] Essentially the main fear was not the prospect of defeat but the prospect of no organized capitulation, which would leave no alternative to annihilation.[11]

In spite of these protests, MacArthur could not bring himself to adopt the siege strategy mindset.[12] MacArthur pointed out in response to the fear that American casualties might be on the scale of those in Okinawa, that operations in Kyushu would be a very different.[13] There would be more room to maneuver, and that casualties might not exceed 31,000.[14] These claims however were later found to be a product MacArthur’s desire that and invasion should take place, one that he would command.[15] “Richard Fran has wrote: ‘It is almost impossible not to believe that MacArthur’s resort to falsehood was motivated in large measure by his personal interest in commanding the greatest amphibious assault in history.’”[16] Although it is unthinkable that the United States would have accept the blood-cost of invading Kyushu, up until the last day of the war MacArthur and his men continued to prepare Operation Olympic.

Further reason an invasion seemed unnecessary was the Allies stranglehold of the island. From the American island positions around Japan, there were enough airfields to conduct bombing campaigns if further bombing attacks were needed, and all sea approaches were under American control. Effectively, time was on the Allies side. Japan was cut off and could be left to ‘die on the vine.’[17] Nevertheless evidence indicates the American public did not have patience to continue the war without an invasion.[18] Some 5.2 million American’s were serving overseas, of which 1.2 million were in the Pacific.[19] Mothers and wives of European veterans felt that their husbands and sons had experienced enough war. Conscious of growing public pressure for action in the Pacific, maintaining a tight blockade with continual bombing while waiting for Japan to capitulate due to starvation or otherwise was difficult to justify before a war weary public opinion.[20]