The Brain-In-Vat Hypothesis Summary

G.E. Moore attempts to answer the sceptical challenge presented by the Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis, in this essay I will assess whether Moore offers an adequate response presented by the hypothesis or not. The brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is essentially questioning whether there is an external world and how we can be sure of this. My thesis is that G.E. Moore’s ‘proof of an external world’ does offer an adequate response to the sceptical challenge presented by the Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis.

The Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis is more comparable to a thought experiment than a hypothesis, it aims to illustrate Cartesian scepticism. It starts off by imaging that you have been subjected to an experiment conducted by some scientists. Your brain has been
The sceptic might argue that in order to have knowledge and know ‘I have two hands’, you need proof of it and Moore does not prove his premises ‘here is a hand, here is another hand’ to be true. Therefore, the second condition (the premises must be true) is not met and Moore does not offer and adequate proof of the external world because his response is not convincing enough. In order to prove that he really held up his hands and that his hands really exist, Moore would need to prove that we aren’t dreaming. "Here's one hand, here's another". I do not believe that I can do it. In order to do it, I should need to prove ... as Descartes pointed out, that I am not now dreaming. But how can I prove that I am not? I have, no doubt, conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now dreaming. I have conclusive evidence that I am awake; but that is a very different thing from being able to prove it. I could not tell you what all my evidence is; and I should require to do this at least, in order to give you a proof (Moore, 1939). Even Moore believes that proving he is not dreaming cannot be done. All we can do is know that individually we are holding up our own hands without proving to anyone and
His arguments seem acceptable to those who aren’t sceptics but from a sceptical point of view, Moore’s proof seems hardly convincing. We can never know if we have hands therefore we can never know that we are not brains-in-vats. Moore’s argument provides no contradiction but surely there is a fallacy. Moore simply assumes that there he has hands, and by this assumption he comes to the conclusion that there is an external world, and that we aren’t brains-in-vats. It is argued that Moore’s proof is just a cop out because it really comes down to him trusting his faith in the existence of his hands. It is viewed that Moore believes knowledge and faith are equal but in reality they are just very