development changed the focus for militaries on both sides of the Cold War, away from conventional bombers and towards atmospheric weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles. In just a matter of days the government changed its focus from protecting itself from enemy fighter jets and bombers to protecting itself from missiles sent from outside the atmosphere. the Arrow was designed to carry air-to-air nuclear-tipped missiles to destroy Soviet bomb attacks over the Canadian North. But the costs of development kept mounting the original production estimate of $2 million per aircraft rose to $12 million. At the same time, demand for the interceptors fell as the world entered the age of the long-range missiles. Faced with the skyrocketing costs, and the inability to sell the Arrow to Europe or the US, Diefenbaker cancelled the project.
It's a day that would soon become known as "Black Friday." At 11:00 a.m. on Feb. 20, 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker stands before the House of Commons and makes the unexpected announcement that the Arrow and Iroquois engine programs are terminated immediately. Members of Parliament greet the announcement with stunned silence. CBC Radio reporters Norman DePoe and Tom Earle are on hand to witness the announcement and get a first-hand explanation from Prime Minister Diefenbaker. A key reason for cancelling the Arrow was the mounting cost of the program. Though the Arrow was an expensive plane, critics of the cancellation later argued that development could have been completed for the cost of the cancellation fees alone. The Arrow program was cheaper than purchasing the Bomarc, SAGE and replacement interceptors from the United States. It was cancelled a month before the end of the six month review period Diefenbaker gave the program. The decision to cancel the Avro Arrow means $400 million wasted tax dollars, instant unemployment for thousands of workers, and a defence department turned upside down. Yet the leaders of the two main opposition parties do not oppose the decision.
After four years of work by 14,000 people, the first Avro Arrow is wheeled out of a hangar in Malton, Ont.
on Oct. 4, 1957. A huge crowd is on hand to marvel at the sleek white craft. But the Arrow's timing turns out to be disastrous: the Soviet Union launches the Sputnik satellite the same day, diverting attention from the Arrow and prompting some Canadians to begin rethinking the country's approach to strategic defence. Avro Canada lost some of its support from the government as well as some of its funding since many Canadians had no idea of what the CF-105 was capable of. Sputnik was the world's first artificial satellite. It was the size of a basketball and weighed 83 kilograms. While it didn't really "do" anything other than beep, it caught the West off guard. Many feared the Soviets could use the same rocket technology to launch ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons from Europe to North America. Sputnik began the space race and led directly to the creation of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). At the unveiling of the Arrow, Defence Minister George Pearkes said that although we are entering the missile age, the era of manned aircraft was not over. He said that aircraft and missiles complement each other, and aircraft have the advantage of introducing human judgement into battle. Unlike missiles, aircraft can turn back. Later, Pearkes was instrumental in the cancellation of the Arrow …show more content…
program.
Because of the CF-105 high production price and low frequency usage very few countries in the world wanted to purchase it.
An alternative weapon, the Bomarc, could do the same job at a much lower cost to Canada. On August 28th, 1958 the Hon. George Pearkes, Minister of Defence, presented Cabinet with the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile proposal from the U.S. This was accepted as a viable substitute for the Arrow at a very much lower cost to Canada. At that time, Pearkes recommended the cancellation of the Arrow program. The Bomarc was a ground-launched, winged missile that homed in on a radar signal bounced off an incoming enemy. It was an anti- aircraft, not an anti-missile weapon as some members of Cabinet seemed to believe. Its range and performance were roughly the same as the Arrow's. The complete weapons system consisted of the Bomarc with a nuclear warhead and a ground radar and communications system. There were many different options for protecting against missiles that countries can choose, the Avro Arrow wasn’t worth its price when you compared it to how many times it would be used. The program was too costly, this appears to have been the major excuse for the cancellation. As described above, the Arrow was an economically efficient design. It was not a cheap aircraft, but then very little modern military hardware is cheap. Diefenbaker's claim was that the Arrow program would have cost two billion dollars by 1964 for 169 aircraft or 12 million for each aircraft and
that this was too much.
The legend of the Arrow is the story of a near perfect machine, a supersonic aeroplane created by Canadian engineers, technicians and skilled workers only to be willfully destroyed by Canadian politicians in 1959. This destruction included not only the cancellation of the project, but also the destruction of all visible evidence that the aircraft had ever existed. After more than thirty years, the story of the Arrow has refused to die. One would expect the memory of the event to remain vivid in the minds of those who worked on the project, but there has been a surprisingly wide general interest as well. To date, there have been six nonfiction books, two fiction books, a play and dozens of articles written about the Arrow. After export efforts again failed, the project was cancelled on 20 February 1959. A.V. Roe bitterly fired 14,000 employees; the government ordered all plans and prototypes destroyed; and many Canadians bemoaned the devastation of Canada's aircraft industry.