Introduction
Opponents and proponents of Three Strikes Laws argue vehemently for its effectiveness in deterring crime, and, conversely, for its ineffectiveness and economic imprudence. This study proposes to sift through the relevant constitutional amendments and examine the sentence structure of the law vis-à-vis fairness and justice. In short, does a Three Strikes Law sentencing structure achieve its goals without exceeding its authority?
Goals of Sentencing
The goals of sentencing, like the goals of the penal system itself, have shifted since the nascent days of our current system of justice. Today, most legal analysts recognize five goals of sentencing. Deterrence is a theory based on fear of consequences (MOJ 3.2, 1998). General deterrence is the belief that a harsh penalty for a particular crime will dissuade others in society from committing that crime. Specific deterrence is the belief that imposing a harsh sentence upon a particular individual will discourage him/her from every offending again.
Incapacitation is the theory that a person cannot commit a crime if he/she is incarcerated. Selective incapacitation is recommends harsh sentencing for recidivist offenders and those who have committed particularly heinous crimes. Collective incapacitation recommends a lengthy sentence for those who commit a particular type of crime.
Rehabilitation is based on the belief that people commit crimes as a result of environmental or historical influences. The theory of rehabilitation attempts to take these factors and the individual person who committed the crime into consideration for sentencing.
Retribution is a punitive theory that is a “just desserts” or “eye for an eye” approach.
Restitution places the victim squarely at the center of the sentencing phase of a crime. Restitution sentencing promotes the idea that the person convicted of a crime should make reparations (money restitution, an apology, etc.)
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