Introduction:
This question raises the issues of the constitutional position of the judiciary and the significance of judicial independence for the operation of the rule of law. We will consider recent changes to the leadership of the judiciary and the process of judicial appointment.
Judges are expected to be personally independent in the sense that they must decide cases purely on the strict application of the law to the evidence presented, irrespective of personal preference or any interest in the outcome. They must be fearless in their judgment, demonstrating moral courage as well as legal accuracy. Judicial independence also refers to the institutional independence of the judiciary so that the judiciaries are separate from the influence of the executive and the legislature.
Changes introduced by the CRA 2005:
Role of Lord Chancellor:
The Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 introduced profound changes to the leadership of the judiciary, to the position of the final court of appeal and to the appointment of judges.
The modern position, prior to the constitutional changes in 2005, was that the Lord Chancellor was the head of the judiciary and the most senior judge in the English court structure. But the Lord Chancellor was a political appointment made by the current serving Prime Minister and once appointed the Lord Chancellor had a seat in the Cabinet, with responsibility for running the government department that deals with the operation of the justice system – the Lord Chancellor’s Department (renamed the Department for Constitutional Affairs in 2003 and renamed again in 2007 the Ministry of Justice). In addition to being the head of the judiciary and a member of the government, the Lord Chancellor also had a ceremonial role in the legislature being the ‘Speaker of the House of Lords’, the upper chamber of Parliament.
The position of the Lord Chancellor did not raise significant constitutional concerns until after the passing of the HRA