The Problem Of Evil

If God gave you the chance to ask him one single question and he promised to give you an answer, what would you ask him? Most people might respond with the question; “Why is there so much pain and suffering in the world?” (Deasy, 2015, Class 9). This seems the most obvious and relevant question one might ask God given the extensive and widespread cases of apparently gratuitous evil we witness on a daily basis. Such pointless evils that no greater good could ever come from (Augustine, 2015). A question as such leaves us to one of the most important and controversial topics in the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil (Davies, 2013, p. 208). The problem as such is ultimately a debate between theists and atheists about the grounds for belief
He wants to make a positive case for why atheism is true or rather why it is more reasonable to believe atheism over theism (Horn & Rowe). Although Rowe admits that the theists position is logically consistent, that it is logically possible that God has good reason for allowing evil in the world, he argues that the existence of evil counts against the theists position (Horn). The evidential argument is therefore, a probabilistic one, it lowers the probability that God exists (Deasy). According to Rowe, it is highly unlikely that there are reasons that justify the enormous amount of pointless evil and suffering we observe in the world on a daily basis (Horn). Thus, the evil we observe seems more likely to be compatible with an absent God rather than a present God who is purposefully inactive (Horn). His argument proceeds in simple terms as follows; 1. Probably, pointless evils exist, 2. If God exists there would be no pointless evils, 3. Therefore, God probably does not exist
The second premise is generally accepted by both theists and non-theists so it is the first premise where the controversy lies. Theists must therefore reject the first premise and hold that God does have justifying reasons for permitting pointless evils if they are to reject Rowe’s argument (Rowe, 2004, p.5). There would have to be either some out-weighing good that could not be realized by God without permitting this evil or else an evil that was equally as bad or worse that could not be prevented without allowing the instance of pointless evil to occur (Rowe, 2004, p.5).
To make the issue more concrete, Rowe presents us with two specific examples of what he refers to as “pointless” or natural evils. When referring to such ‘pointless’ evils Rowe is simply talking about evils from which no greater good seems to or could ever result (Augustine) and by natural evils he is talking about evils that are not caused by humans, things such as hurricanes, earthquakes, cancer, etc. that kill millions of humans and animals each year (Horn). He asks us to consider two