In reality, the line between the two is not especially clear, but that is not a necessary distinction to make for the sake of this argument. In general, international law states that as long as the war has met the requirements for jus ad bellum, meaning that the war being waged is a just one, it is permissible to kill enemy combatants, but not non-combatants (Frowe 108). This is predominantly due to the idea that by being a part of the military, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, one is giving up part of his right to safety from military harm since he now has the capability of harming others (Frowe 115). On the surface, this idea of segregating the uninvolved from those who have the potential to harm makes sense, but many feel that there is an argument to be made for the equality of all life, including both combatants and non-combatants. In fact, when not in the context of war, this way of thinking is generally agreed upon. Even in war, however, this rule of the equality of life can still be applied, even if it is not in the same way. With the exception of the mindset of terrorists, the loss of life is never celebrated, and most states attempt to minimize death, friend and foe alike. With this in mind, it must be noted that while it is undesirable, the loss of combatant life is often unavoidable in order …show more content…
This idea states that in order for the killing of non-combatants to be morally permissible, the goal must be to gain an important military advantage (Frowe 109). Again, this relies on the assumption that the war itself is just. Just wars are generally assumed to be in the interest of saving lives, whether it is the lives of one’s own people or for humanitarian intervention purposes. Therefore, if there is no alternative measure available to gain a military advantage necessary for the war effort and thus necessary for saving lives over all, Just War Theory would allow the killing of non-combatants. The main issue that lies with this line of thinking is that it is hard to tell when there is really no other alternative to killing non-combatants. In the earlier example, it was fairly clear that the only way the man could get to the child in time was to remove the man barring his path. Deeming something as “necessary” for military success, however, can be quite difficult since in war, there are many more factors at play. Another issue might lie in the worth of the military victory itself and how many lives are at risk. This topic is an excellent transition into the third and final condition for the permissibility of killing