Therapeutic Externalism Analysis

The Perceived Constraint of Semantic Externalism
One of the more well-known arguments against Putnam’s usage of semantic externalism is his oversight of context. Imagine a situation where a person has only recently transformed into a BIV. In this instance, the BIV would be able to refer to things from the external world, as it possesses a causal link to said things. In this way, the statement “I am a BIV” can refrain from committing self-refutation while accounting for semantic externalism. This objection however, has certain limitations. Namely, its justifications fail in the case where the BIVs have always been BIVs.
Another possible solution to Putnam’s argument is to reject semantic externalism altogether. This debate however, extends into the broader realm of
externalism versus Internalism, which I will not touch upon in this essay.
The Self-Ascription Problem
Rory Madden proposes that by Putnam’s standards, the BIVs would have a problem of performing self-reference. While his argument is much more intricate and comprehensive, I will attempt to present a simplified version of his account. One of the blunders of Putnam, in Madden’s view, is the assumption that the language of BIVs can only refer to virtual things. For example, consider the statement “I am a human” as articulated by a BIV. According to Putnam, the word “human” as expressed by a BIV would refer to something different than what we mean when we say “human.” It should then be obvious, that the BIV is wrong when it asserts itself to be human. It is intuitive however, that the BIV is indeed human. This implies that the scope of BIVs’ language is not limited to virtual objects. However, as Madden rationalizes, “once one begins to question the general assumption that [the BIVs’] words refer only to virtual objects one tends to undermine the original argument that ‘I am a BIV’ is self-defeating in the sense explained.”
Putnam & Begging the Question
Suppose I am trying to prove that I am not a BIV, Putnam’s argument would be begging the question. Putnam claims that what I would refer to as a tree is intrinsically different from what a BIV would refer to as a “tree.” “In short, the brains in a vat are not thinking about real trees when they think ‘there is a tree in front of me’ because there is nothing by virtue of which their thought ‘tree’ represents actual trees.” The problem is that if I myself was actually a BIV, then what I am referring to would not be an actual tree wither, despite what I myself believe. To summarize, Putnam assumes that whoever is participating in this thought experiment (e.g. me) is in the actual physical world already, when the point of this experiment is to show that we are not BIVs. Hence this experiment has an implicit problem of begging the question.
Conclusion
Putnam argues that semantic externalism will facilitate the successful rejection of the BIV hypothesis by virtue of making the statement, “I am a BIV,” self-refuting.
He concludes that “once we see that the qualitative similarity […] between the thoughts of the BIVs and the thoughts of someone in the actual world by no means implies sameness of reference, it is not hard to see that there is no basis at all for regarding the brain in a vat referring to external things.” Madden’s argument for self-ascription shows however, that it is necessary to allow the proposition that BIVs can refer to external objects, if one wants to maintain that BIVs are capable of self-reference. Moreover, semantic externalism fails in the context where BIVs have somehow accessed the external world. Lastly, I am of the opinion that Putnam’s argument performs the fundamental error of begging the question. That is, presuming the participant of the experiment to already reside in the external world when the purpose of the experiment is to test this in the first place. It is with these objections in mind (as I cannot perceive how Putnam can respond to these objections) do I declare Putnam’s argument against BIVs as
inadequate.