Before reading this I had never really thought about what it would be like to experience someone else’s subjective experiences, let alone if it was impossible or possible. I had already loosely thought of myself as a dualist and Nagel helped further solidify my beliefs into the direction of dualism. I find his argument very convincing because how can something like ‘subjective character of experience’ possibly be explained in physical terms. You can argue that mental states are the same as brain states but subjective experience doesn’t have a place in that argument. The quote shows Nagel’s thought that physicalism needs something more to properly explain the mind-body problem. How can I know how another organism experiences experience? I am convinced that currently you can’t, though I haven’t extensively researched the subject, I have not seen any viable counter points to the issue. I can agree that this subject needs more thought before physicalism could ever begin to explain such a phenomenon . In this paper I have identified Nagel’s argument against the metaphysical position of physicalism. Nagel shows throughout his paper that he would more align his beliefs in the direction of dualism than he would any other metaphysical position. Nagel believes physicalism can never explain something like ‘subjective character of experience’ because it requires a subjective view point for each experiencers experience. I am convinced of the argument Nagel has given and would be interested in further researching his
Before reading this I had never really thought about what it would be like to experience someone else’s subjective experiences, let alone if it was impossible or possible. I had already loosely thought of myself as a dualist and Nagel helped further solidify my beliefs into the direction of dualism. I find his argument very convincing because how can something like ‘subjective character of experience’ possibly be explained in physical terms. You can argue that mental states are the same as brain states but subjective experience doesn’t have a place in that argument. The quote shows Nagel’s thought that physicalism needs something more to properly explain the mind-body problem. How can I know how another organism experiences experience? I am convinced that currently you can’t, though I haven’t extensively researched the subject, I have not seen any viable counter points to the issue. I can agree that this subject needs more thought before physicalism could ever begin to explain such a phenomenon . In this paper I have identified Nagel’s argument against the metaphysical position of physicalism. Nagel shows throughout his paper that he would more align his beliefs in the direction of dualism than he would any other metaphysical position. Nagel believes physicalism can never explain something like ‘subjective character of experience’ because it requires a subjective view point for each experiencers experience. I am convinced of the argument Nagel has given and would be interested in further researching his