War: A Form or Failure of Diplomacy?

Scholars have long debated whether war is a form of diplomacy, or rather a failure of diplomacy. While scholars such as Clausewitz would argue that war is a policy maker and that the conduct of war should be subordinated to its political goals, other scholars such as Fearon may also suggest that war is a failure of diplomacy and that entities intervene as a last resort. While both points of view are interesting, the definition of “war” and “diplomacy”, the purposes within war and diplomacy, peaceful negotiations within wars, summitries, the states’ interests and the groups of interests within states during war, all contribute to defining war as a form of diplomacy. I will demonstrate the previous aspects by looking at the Cold War, its summit conferences, the U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations with more precisely the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the American-Israel Political Action Committee’s influence in American politics with the views of James D. Fearon, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Thomas C. Schelling and considering their implications.
The definitions of “diplomacy” and “war” have varied through political literature pieces. Diplomacy is often thought of as peaceful or just anything opposite of violence. In reality, it can actually lead to war, prevent it or simply be seen within war. Diplomacy began in the Mesopotamia at least 4,500 years ago. It was a means to communicate between city-states, to conduct certain affairs such as “trade, alliances and fighting” 1. Thus, according to this background, diplomacy can be seen as “the instrument, the key mechanism by which states conduct relations across borders; it is the means to achieve the objectives of foreign policy” 2. This definition would encompass war as a tool of diplomacy used to attain desired policies. Diplomacy is also defined by Schelling as "bargaining: it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are better for both than some of the alternatives" 3. If we take these definitions into application, it is possible to perceive war as an aggressive form of negotiations or bargaining. Thus, a proper definition can be: the manner, whether it be aggressive or peaceful, in which international relations are conducted to obtain foreign policies. It is thus important to acknowledge that diplomacy is an entity that encompasses the state as a whole, including interest groups, bureaucrats, civilians as well as political leaders.
The debate on what constitutes a war has been long running. How many people must die before it is considered a war? Does there even have to be deaths for two conflicting nations to be at war? The guidelines for determining if a conflict is a war have changed a great deal over the years, and are confused more than ever today. This holds true as the United Nations charter forbids war, and thus states usually do not declare conflicts as “war” anymore but rather as interventions, self-defense, or other alternative terms. However, for the purpose of simplicity, war can be defined as simply “nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means” 4. It is a period of organized armed hostility or active military force used with the intent of obtaining foreign policies or reaching an agreement. All factors of this definition are crucial. The military force needs to be “organized”, therefore excluding all randomness or spontaneous violence including riots and demonstrations. The definition goes further as the purpose of warfare is said to be the obtainment of something the states desires, through violence or the threat of violence 5. The use of threats to obtain a desired outcome over negotiations is known as coercive diplomacy 6. Some scholars, such as Schelling, differentiate between coercive diplomacy and brute force. However, coercive diplomacy can still be seen as aggressive and armed hostilities, which would relate back to our definition of war.
If both definitions of diplomacy and war are taken into account, one can see the clear relation of the two. They are both meant to fulfill the interests of the interacting states. When analyzing the interactions of states within a war, it is necessary to look at the state as a whole rather than individuals and their interests within a war 7. Thus we must not look at the objectives of a single military leader or a single army but rather of the states as a whole, as previously mentioned. In fact, often times, people blame the military for war when in reality “…the leading outline of a War are always determined by the Cabinet […], by a political not a military organ” 8. Of course, it is human nature to attempt to solve conflicts, or bring about a foreign policy, peacefully, without the use of violence. However, this is not always possible; sometimes violence, a part of our collective personality, overcomes and humans are forced to use it in attempts to reach a same conclusion. The violent means of obtaining a foreign policy is often times war. Hence, war is one of the pathways of diplomacy and thus ultimately a form of diplomacy as it seeks the same outcome: to reach a solution that is in its entity better for both sides than some other alternative.
Based on these definitions, we can begin to analyze certain examples and conflicting views over the relation between war and diplomacy. The Cold War is a prime example of how war can be seen as a form of diplomacy. While the United States and Soviet Russia maintained coercive diplomatic relations, while there were threats of danger everyday in citizen’s lives across Europe and the United States, and while there was an arms race, people who define war as a military armed violence would not perceive this 44 year period as a war between the two states, as there was never any direct armed conflict between the Soviet and American armies. Yet the danger was real and according to our definition, this hostile period was in fact a war. It was an ideological clash where both states would not, or could not, come to terms on peaceful negotiations, referred to by Fearon as an “issue of indivisibility” 9. The United States’ main interest was to contain communism while Soviet Russia’s objective was to spread communism. Peaceful negotiations were therefore not an option, but the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was clearly a dilemma. War was therefore a tool to attain both states’ respective interests.
While it is true that there were no direct military contact between the USSR and the U.S., there was indirect “brute force” 10 used within the Cold War, or proxy wars, in Afghanistan, Angola, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. If we take the example of the Korean War, the Soviet Union never entered directly the war but they did aid North Korea in their fight against the US-led United Nations troops. It is even suspected that the USSR sent pilots to aid the Communists. Schelling would argue, thus, that the conflict, the war between the United States and Soviet Russia was a “unilateral, ‘undiplomatic’ recourse to strength” 11.
Now that the Cold War has been defined as a war, for both sides of the argument, through coercive diplomacy as well as indirect brute force, we can examine the American and Soviet relations within the 1947-1991 time frame. In 1948, the U.S. Secretary of State Georges Marshall launched the Marshall Plan in order to aid their European allies in recovering economically after World War II. This program was extended to the Soviet Union and its allies. Although the United States knew that the Soviet Union would never accept the program under these terms, there was still political communication between the states, although it was foul play and hostile. A clearer example of true peaceful cooperation was seen with the Glassboro Summit Conference in June 1967. American President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met at Hollybush Mansion to discuss the increasing crisis in the Middle East with the Israeli-Arab Six Days War, but also to discuss the U.S.-Soviet arms race. They failed to reach an agreement on the arms race but this was just another tool of diplomatic relations within the Cold War. Easy access to communication between states is crucial to diplomacy. Even during wartime, it is seen that communication is essential in the relation of the two entities, even in times of strained relations 12.
As seen with the Glassboro Summit Conference, summit conferences can be highly profitable to relations, even in times of hostilities. These conferences are used to conduct peaceful diplomatic relations in times of war as well as in times of peace. They can be successful in achieving a bargain or just simply serve the purpose of a peaceful environment in which officials can discuss. Summitries often times occur during or after wars. For example, there were the Yalta Conference, the Tehran Conference and the Potsdam Conference, the three big conferences during World War II, as well as in the summitries between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan in the late 1980s. These conferences hold many advantages as they offer the possibility to establish good personal relations between leaders as well as to bargain during times of wars or after times of war 13. As certain scholars argue that diplomacy is a peaceful way of communication and thus war is a failure of diplomacy, it is seen with the Cold War and summit conferences that “the conduct of diplomacy [does not] rule out war or that war automatically ends diplomatic relations” 14. Rather war is another form of diplomacy that is kept throughout state relations.
Another interesting factor seen in wars is the interests of groups within the states. It has been seen in the past that oil firms have influenced policymaker to maintain peaceful relations with certain countries, such as Saudi Arabia in this example, or to destabilize enemies like Iraq under Saddam Hussein in order to maintain a stable and efficient economy 15. The reasoning behind the influence of these groups of interest on politicians to wage war is that these military and economic actors could benefit from war; a clear example such a group would be armed manufacturers 16. Thus, indirectly, firms affect diplomacy, which may result in war. The reasoning of Americans behind the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the more recent Iraq War is the state’s interest. The Carter Doctrine as President Carter warned that any attempt by foreigners to invade and control the Persian Gulf region would be seen as a direct threat to the United States and thus they would use military force to stop them from doing so 17. The United States made alliances with Saudi Arabia in order to maintain their interests. These interest were crucial to the United States as they are dependent on a large amount of oil supplies, whether it be for civilians or for military purposes, provided largely by Saudi Arabia.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait for the oil and claimed it as the 19th province of Iraq, U.S. President Georges W. Bush saw this as a threat to Saudi Arabia and mobilized forces there to protect their allies and indirectly protect their interests. There were plans proposed as mobilized troops increased in number such as the Soviet-Iraq peace plan and the UN resolution but they opposed one another and neither state saw the benefit in their enemies’ proposals 18. This resulted in war, as a peaceful means of negotiations was not enabled. War was the extension of the negotiations as there was an indivisibility issue in hand. War, in these cases, benefited the United States’ best interest. Schelling would argue that the failure to reach an agreement within bargaining range means a failure of diplomacy 19. Yet when one analyses negotiations met within bargaining range, there are always losses and gains. In the case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, each side desired total gain of the territory and oil supply in Saudi Arabia. The war was waged, as a peaceful settlement was not reached; yet, the outcome, even though it was outside of the so-called “bargaining range”, was still one where states had losses and gains, just like a peaceful agreement would have done.
Similarly to economic interest groups, ethnic interest groups also influence policy making as well. This is seen predominantly in the United States with groups such as American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC). AIPAC has had strong influence on the United States involvement in conflicts with Israeli enemies within the Arab world 20. Ethnic groups looking out for certain relations, firms seeking for profits, military actors seeking prestige or benefits all influence foreign policy, and sometimes see benefits to waging war, thus they influence war 21. Thus, in these terms, war would not be seen as a failure of diplomacy but rather something sought for by particular interest groups within a state. They would be means to diplomacy as the foreign policies shaped at the end of the war are beneficial to interest groups, and thus the state as a whole.
Some scholars would argue that war is a failure of diplomacy rather than a form of diplomacy. They point out how states fail to locate a bargaining range that all sides would have preferred to war. However, war could be perceived as an alternative method, another path of diplomacy to reach a bargain. In that case, war appears to be “not so much a contest of military strength as a bargaining process – dirty, extortionate, and often quite reluctant bargaining on one or both – nevertheless a bargaining process” 22. And so we can see that they are rather compliments of each other. War is a form of diplomacy just like diplomacy is a form of war. As Randolph Bourne put it: “Diplomacy is a disguised war” 23. War may be brutal and ugly but it remains crucial to the development of humans and their interactions. Diplomatic relations between states can be maintained in numerous ways 24. War is just another way, another tool, another instrument of diplomacy.

-------------------------------------------------
References

1 Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, “Theoretical Background: 
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution,” Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, http://www.passia.org/seminars/97/Diplomacy/2.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2012).
2 (ibid)
3 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence,” in Essential Readings in World Politics (3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 338.
4 Carl Von Clausewitz, “War as an Instrument of Policy,” in Essential Readings in World Politics (3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 334.
5 Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake and Kenneth A. Schultz, World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), 86.
6 Frieden, A-2 Glossary.
7 Von Clausewitz, 335.
8 Von Clausewitz, 336.
9 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” in International Organization (Vol. 49, No.3, 1995), 382.
10 Schelling, 339.
11 (ibid)
12 John Dinger, “This Day in Diplomacy: U.S.-Soviet Summit at Glassboro, New Jersey,” U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman
Press Statement, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/970623a.html (accessed Nov. 9, 2012).
13 “The Conferences,” WWII Behind Closed Doors, http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/episode-2/ep2_big_three_meet.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2012).
14 Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, “Theoretical Background: 
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution,” Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, http://www.passia.org/seminars/97/Diplomacy/2.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2012).
15 Frieden, 132.
16 Frieden, 144.
17 Frieden, 131.
18 Mitchell Bar, “The Gulf War,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html (accessed Nov. 10, 2012).
19 Schelling, 340.
20 Frieden, 148.
21 Frieden, 149.
22 Schelling, 341.
23 Randolph Bourne, "War is the Health of the State," The State (1918), http://www.antiwar.com/bourne.php (accessed Nov. 12 2012).
24 Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, “Theoretical Background: 
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution,” Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, http://www.passia.org/seminars/97/Diplomacy/2.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2012).

References: 4 Carl Von Clausewitz, “War as an Instrument of Policy,” in Essential Readings in World Politics (3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007), 334. 5 Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake and Kenneth A. Schultz, World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), 86. 9 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” in International Organization (Vol. 49, No.3, 1995), 382. 13 “The Conferences,” WWII Behind Closed Doors, http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/episode-2/ep2_big_three_meet.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2012). 18 Mitchell Bar, “The Gulf War,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html (accessed Nov. 10, 2012). 23 Randolph Bourne, "War is the Health of the State," The State (1918), http://www.antiwar.com/bourne.php (accessed Nov. 12 2012). 24 Dr Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution,” Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, http://www.passia.org/seminars/97/Diplomacy/2.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2012).