Who Is A Representative Representative Democracy?
The term "democracy" first appeared in ancient Greek political and philosophical thought in the city-state of Athens during the classical antiquity. Led by Cleisthenes, Athenians established what is generally held as the first democracy in 508–507 BC. Cleisthenes is referred to as “the father of Athenian democracy” (Wikipedia).
From around the 10th century, democracy entered a second historical phase whose centre of gravity was Europe. After some facts such as the rebirth of towns, the rise of the first parliaments, and the conflicts unleashed by self-governing councils and religious disagreement within the Christian Church, democracy came to be understood as representative democracy. During the 18th century, the notion of a representative …show more content…
democracy began to be used in France, England and the new American republic, especially by constitution makers and influential political writers when referring to a new type of government. In true democracy, one acts through deputies who are authorized by election. The mission of the elected by the people and the authority, constitute the public power (John Keane, 2009).
Representative democracy was a new way of thinking about democracy, by which was characterized a type of government in which people, understood as voters were faced with a choice between at least two alternatives and were free to elect others who then act in defense of their interests and represent them by deciding matters on their behalf.
People have been ambivalent about the real meaning of the democracy and about who was entitled to represent whom and what had to be done when representatives disregarded those whom they were supposed to represent. But there was the belief that good government was government by representatives. Representative democracy supported the freedom to express one’s opinion which was not only among the represented themselves, but also between representatives and those whom they are supposed to represent (John Keane, 2009). It was said to introduce competition for power that in turn people who were elected representatives were able to try their political competence before others. The earliest champions of representative democracy represented practical expression of a simple reality: it wasn’t possible for all of the people to be involved all of the time, even if they were so preoccupied in the business of government. According to this expression, people must entrust the task of government to representatives who are chosen at regular elections and not to those who are chosen more infrequently (Sonia Alonso, John Keane, Wolfgang Merkel,
2011).
The changes leading to the formation of representative democracy were neither inevitable nor politically unchallenged. Representative democracy was born of many and different power conflicts, many of them bitterly fought in opposition to ruling groups, whether they were church hierarchies, landowners or imperial monarchies, often in the name of ‘the people’. The exact meaning of ‘the people’ tended to be controversial throughout the era of representative democracy. There were new terms of democracy corresponded to the many kinds of struggles by groups for equal access to governmental power that resulted, sometimes by design and sometimes by simple accident, in institutions, ideals and ways of life that had no precedent. Also was founded the invention of ‘civil societies’ on new social habits, customs and associations that citizens used to keep distance from government by liberty of the printing press, publicly circulated petitions, and finally contracts and constitutional conventions called to draw up new constitutions (John Keane, 2009).
This period unleashed a ‘great democratic revolution’ in favor of political and social equality. This revolution often suffered from setbacks and reversals, especially in Europe, where it was mainly to collapse in the early decades of the twentieth century. There have been many struggles for the democratic revolution with events that doubted the anti-democratic prejudices of the rich and powerful, who argued that inequalities among people were ‘natural’. New groups, like slaves, women and workers, won the franchise. Representation was eventually democratized, stretched to include all of the population. (John Keane, 2009).
As far as income is concerned, since the early 1970s, the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between political democracy and income inequality has been subjected many times. Most studies have focused on whether a country's level of political democracy has a negative effect on the extent of income concentration in the hands of the few, controlling the level of development. Results showed that on the one hand, there was support for the hypothesis of a negative effect of democracy on income inequality. On the other hand, there was both support and lack or of support for it across different samples and in some cases there was no support at all. Of course, if democracy and inequality are related, the causal influence could be in the direction that inequality could have a negative effect on democracy. According to equation models, which include a control for economic development, Rubinson and Quinlan find evidence only of a negative effect of inequality on level of democracy (EN Muller, 1988).
During the past two decades, the European Union has developed into an agent of international democracy promotion in its neighborhood. The EU was supposed as a community of democracies and recognized the need to strengthen its own democratic views. Some of its external policies had also been regarded as a contribution to democratization. However, most of its external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and the principle of not meddling with the domestic systems of third countries (Sandra Lavenexa, Frank Schimmelfennig, 2011).
The EU democracy promotion has three models, two that reflect main approaches to external democracy promotion and a third model that is more germane to the EU as a framework for regional integration. The first model is linkage. It consists of activities that deal with the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the democratic opposition and other civil society actors. The second model is leverage. This approach induces democratic reforms via political conditionality. Finally, the third model is the governance which promotes democratic principles through policy-specific, functional cooperation with third countries (Sandra Lavenexa, Frank Schimmelfennig, 2011).
Leverage is reaching its limits because its ineffectiveness appears over-determined in the neighborhood countries. The EU's lack of consistency, determinacy, and credibility has high political costs on the part of the partner governments. Linkage however is not an alternative. The contributions to this special issue have not systematically assessed the linkage model but the heterogeneous evidence confirms the expectation of low impact. Democratic governance promotion is vulnerable to contrary economic and strategic interests and costs, and susceptible to superficial implementation such as leverage but is not a cure for everything.
From around the 10th century, democracy entered a second historical phase whose centre of gravity was Europe. After some facts such as the rebirth of towns, the rise of the first parliaments, and the conflicts unleashed by self-governing councils and religious disagreement within the Christian Church, democracy came to be understood as representative democracy. During the 18th century, the notion of a representative …show more content…
democracy began to be used in France, England and the new American republic, especially by constitution makers and influential political writers when referring to a new type of government. In true democracy, one acts through deputies who are authorized by election. The mission of the elected by the people and the authority, constitute the public power (John Keane, 2009).
Representative democracy was a new way of thinking about democracy, by which was characterized a type of government in which people, understood as voters were faced with a choice between at least two alternatives and were free to elect others who then act in defense of their interests and represent them by deciding matters on their behalf.
People have been ambivalent about the real meaning of the democracy and about who was entitled to represent whom and what had to be done when representatives disregarded those whom they were supposed to represent. But there was the belief that good government was government by representatives. Representative democracy supported the freedom to express one’s opinion which was not only among the represented themselves, but also between representatives and those whom they are supposed to represent (John Keane, 2009). It was said to introduce competition for power that in turn people who were elected representatives were able to try their political competence before others. The earliest champions of representative democracy represented practical expression of a simple reality: it wasn’t possible for all of the people to be involved all of the time, even if they were so preoccupied in the business of government. According to this expression, people must entrust the task of government to representatives who are chosen at regular elections and not to those who are chosen more infrequently (Sonia Alonso, John Keane, Wolfgang Merkel,
2011).
The changes leading to the formation of representative democracy were neither inevitable nor politically unchallenged. Representative democracy was born of many and different power conflicts, many of them bitterly fought in opposition to ruling groups, whether they were church hierarchies, landowners or imperial monarchies, often in the name of ‘the people’. The exact meaning of ‘the people’ tended to be controversial throughout the era of representative democracy. There were new terms of democracy corresponded to the many kinds of struggles by groups for equal access to governmental power that resulted, sometimes by design and sometimes by simple accident, in institutions, ideals and ways of life that had no precedent. Also was founded the invention of ‘civil societies’ on new social habits, customs and associations that citizens used to keep distance from government by liberty of the printing press, publicly circulated petitions, and finally contracts and constitutional conventions called to draw up new constitutions (John Keane, 2009).
This period unleashed a ‘great democratic revolution’ in favor of political and social equality. This revolution often suffered from setbacks and reversals, especially in Europe, where it was mainly to collapse in the early decades of the twentieth century. There have been many struggles for the democratic revolution with events that doubted the anti-democratic prejudices of the rich and powerful, who argued that inequalities among people were ‘natural’. New groups, like slaves, women and workers, won the franchise. Representation was eventually democratized, stretched to include all of the population. (John Keane, 2009).
As far as income is concerned, since the early 1970s, the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between political democracy and income inequality has been subjected many times. Most studies have focused on whether a country's level of political democracy has a negative effect on the extent of income concentration in the hands of the few, controlling the level of development. Results showed that on the one hand, there was support for the hypothesis of a negative effect of democracy on income inequality. On the other hand, there was both support and lack or of support for it across different samples and in some cases there was no support at all. Of course, if democracy and inequality are related, the causal influence could be in the direction that inequality could have a negative effect on democracy. According to equation models, which include a control for economic development, Rubinson and Quinlan find evidence only of a negative effect of inequality on level of democracy (EN Muller, 1988).
During the past two decades, the European Union has developed into an agent of international democracy promotion in its neighborhood. The EU was supposed as a community of democracies and recognized the need to strengthen its own democratic views. Some of its external policies had also been regarded as a contribution to democratization. However, most of its external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and the principle of not meddling with the domestic systems of third countries (Sandra Lavenexa, Frank Schimmelfennig, 2011).
The EU democracy promotion has three models, two that reflect main approaches to external democracy promotion and a third model that is more germane to the EU as a framework for regional integration. The first model is linkage. It consists of activities that deal with the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the democratic opposition and other civil society actors. The second model is leverage. This approach induces democratic reforms via political conditionality. Finally, the third model is the governance which promotes democratic principles through policy-specific, functional cooperation with third countries (Sandra Lavenexa, Frank Schimmelfennig, 2011).
Leverage is reaching its limits because its ineffectiveness appears over-determined in the neighborhood countries. The EU's lack of consistency, determinacy, and credibility has high political costs on the part of the partner governments. Linkage however is not an alternative. The contributions to this special issue have not systematically assessed the linkage model but the heterogeneous evidence confirms the expectation of low impact. Democratic governance promotion is vulnerable to contrary economic and strategic interests and costs, and susceptible to superficial implementation such as leverage but is not a cure for everything.