Who Is Against Consequentialism

PHIL 432
Anscombe on consequentialism

Anscombe is against the notion of consequentialism (refers to classical utilitarianism). Consequentialism is the view that there’s no moral difference between the results of an action, which was brought intentionally and actions that was foreseen but not intended. In this essay I will establish Anscombe’s notion of post Sedgwickian consequentialism and why she refers to the Ethicist philosophers such as Moore and Ross as consequentialists.

For Anscombe, intention is a very important aspect of moral philosophy. Anscombe’s objection to consequentialism is, if the consequences/results of actions are the only important aspects, then anything would be permitted for the achievement of those results. For
Moore establishes that “pleasure is not the sole good” (PE, 146). He says, “right,” means nothing but “cause of a good result” (PE, 147). By this claim, Moore asserts that the end always justifies the means and that an action cannot be bad if it produces a good result. In other words, what is morally “right” is an action, which causes the greatest good in the universe than any other possibility (PE, 148). For example, if we say that there’s no such case that murder could produce the greater good in the universe, then we are declaring that it is a duty not to murder. Furthermore, Moore mentions that these events are not “self-evident and cannot be taken as ethical premises” since they could be refuted by other investigations of causes and effects (PE, 149). Therefore, since our human causal knowledge is too incomplete, and we can never make sure which action will produce the greatest good, we do not have any reason to assume that an action is our duty (PE, 149). With that beaning said, Moore adds on that there could still be a possibility in which we can find out which outcome will be more likely to produce the greatest good to determine duties and its best to conform to the rules which are “generally useful and practiced” (PE, 164). However, duties
Unlike Moore, Ross objects to ideal utilitarianism. First, he questions the notion of what makes “right” actions right. As we have already established, Moore mentions that “right”, “is productive of the greatest possible good”(R&G,8). He asserts that “right” is meant to imply moral value and an act cannot be right since one implies “moral obligation” and the other refers to a “quality” that the character of an act has. Second, Ross assets that that morally good does not imply a duty and the only acts that are morally good are ones that are acted upon with good motives (R&G, 4). In other words, the motive of an action is duty. The reason one might feel obligated to act such and such is not because of the obligation but because of the motivation. Ross believes that utilitarianism is reductive and simplistic and it overlooks our complicated relationships with other people since it is too general and abstract. He also believes that ideal utilitarian does not do the concept of duty “full justice” (which is the duty to produce the greater good), (R&G, 22). The reason why he thinks so is because it’s not explicit who is the “greater good” for. Is the good produced for the individual himself, his friends, the community, and all humanity or for divine power? I believe that It doesn't make a