Alfred Herresem Research Paper

Dr. Alfred Herrhausen, arguably one of the most powerful men in West Germany, left his house in the upscale suburb of Bad Homburg, around 8:30 in the morning on Thursday, 30 November, 1989. His usual security detail consisting of three armored Mercedes-Benz with two guards in the lead and chase vehicle, who were unaware of the deadly danger that lay 550 meters in front of them. A small group of construction workers had been repairing a section of road that Herrhausen’s motorcade passed every day. Unbeknownst to the security detail, the workers had placed a sophisticated explosive device on the roadside with the intent of killing Herrhausen (Akasie, 2998). Shortly after departing the house, Herrhausen would be killed by the device, injuring
only one other person riding in his vehicle. This study will explore the background leading up to the incident and the results of the initial investigation.

Alfred Herrhausen became the chief executive and spokesperson for West Germany’s largest bank, Deutsche Bank, in 1988. Additionally, he was the chairman of the supervisory board of Daimler-Benz, and a close friend and advisor to the West German chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl (Germany’s terrorist plot, 1989). During his tenure at Deutsche Bank, his vision was to push the West German banking system to one of the most powerful in the world. One week before his assassination, he constructed the takeover of a British merchant bank, Morgan Grenfell. As the chairman of the supervisory board at Daimler-Benz, he drove the car manufacturer to diversify into aerospace and the defense industry (Germany’s terrorist plot, 1989). Herrhausen was known for his sharp-wit and outspokenness regarding the power and influence wielded by the German banking system. He was quoted as saying, “My ambition is that we should use our power responsibly (Dr. Alfred Herrhausen; Obituary, 1989).” Unlike many colleagues in the industry, Herrhausen believed in talking plainly about his ambitious plans. During the course of the investigation following Herrhausen’s assassination, the German police believe he had been under surveillance for as long as five weeks. Due to the location of his house and the office where he worked, there were few routes his convoy could have used. The police speculated that shortly after selecting Herrhausen as a target, the Red Army Faction terrorists responsible for executing the attack rented a vehicle to facilitate surveillance. Upon selecting a narrow, wooded section of road where Herrhausen passed daily, the group began preparations for the attack. They dressed as road workers and began cutting into a narrow section of the roadway, which was lined with concrete-filled steel bollards. The selection of the area was important, as it prevented any escape attempts by the motorcade and provided a trigger-point for the arming of the device. As police scoured the area for clues and witnesses, they located a small wooden box containing the detonator. Underneath the box was a piece of paper with the symbol of the RAF, a star-shape superimposed on a Kalashnikov rifle (Target for the Red Army Faction, 1989). The explosive device was constructed of an estimated 44 pounds of TNT behind a metal plate and was placed on a child’s bicycle placed on the side of the road as to not arouse any suspicion. The plate formed into a penetrator and struck Herrhausen’s armored car at its most vulnerable point, the door where Herrhausen was seated. The force of the explosion spun and flipped the car, which landed on its wheels perpendicular to the road. The penetrator pierced the door and hit Herrhausen in the legs, severing both. The rapid blood loss caused him to die within moments of the blast. Herrhausen’s driver, the only other person in the vehicle, sustained only minor injuries from the explosion due to the precise aim of the device. The investigation found that the terrorists had dug into the roadway to place wires leading from a nearby power pole to the bicycle, and had taken the time to ensure the asphalt was replaced and colored to match the road. The trigger used was a light beam that ran across the road, which led the police to believe the terrorists had to arm the device remotely. After the device was placed, the terrorists waited for the lead vehicle to pass the trigger point and armed the beam. As Herrhausen’s vehicle passed through the beam, the device was triggered. The use of a light for a trigger had not been seen before in attacks by the RAF, but led investigators to speculate that another terror organization, the Italian Red Brigade, was involved in the planning of the attack (Banker bomb claim, 1989). Further studies conducted show the precise timing needed to carry out an attack as successful as the one perpetrated by those against Herrhausen. The accuracy needed to target a specific spot on a moving vehicle comes down to precise distance to the target and timing. According to Scotti, a car traveling at 30 miles per hour covers 45 feet in one second (1990). In one tenth of a second, the car moves 4.5 feet, the average length of a car door. The terrorists had to know how fast the car was going in order to calculate where to place the explosive in order to hit the target. Because Herrhausen’s vehicle was armored, the timing of the blast had to be focused at a precise location in order to be effective. Additionally, his car was the second in the convoy, creating another problem with the trigger mechanism. If the first car had tripped the detonator, it would have been the vehicle struck by the explosion. The terrorists must arm the device after the first vehicle passed the beam, but before Herrhausen’s car triggered the signal. Experts estimate that Herrhausen’s motorcade was travelling at approximately 30 miles per hour, with a gap of an estimated 45 feet between vehicles. The speed and distance between the cars gave the terrorists less than one second to arm the bomb. The Red Army Faction selected Alfred Herrhausen because his capitalist ideals went against their beliefs of a socialist society.
As the chairman of Deutsch Bank and confidant to the West German chancellor, he held influence within the government. As the chairman of the board of supervisors of Daimler-Benz, his efforts to expand the company’s interests created a powerful corporation with ties to the aerospace industry, high-technology industry, and defense industry. The RAF hated not just the political system of West Germany, but the economic power it held in Europe (Germany’s terrorist jolt, 1989). Herrhausen’s ties to the West German industrial complex and economic system made him an inviting target for the RAF. Immediately following the assassination, while addressing Parliament, Finance Minister Theo Waigel said the killing was, “an escalation of the irresponsible talk of the dominance of the military-industry complex (Tuohy,
1989).” News of Herrhausen’s assassination quickly spread around the world. Although the RAF took credit for the attack, very little attention was paid to their cause. By some estimates, the RAF had fewer than 30 active members due to arrests and incarcerations of many of its members (Tuohy, 1989). Immediately following the initial investigation, West German Police set up nationwide roadblocks to capture two of the assailants. They had been identified as Christoph Seidler, described as one of the “hard core” members of the group, and Horst Meyer (Tuohy, 1989). Both were believed to be members of a RAF commando group of 15 to 20 people active in West Germany. Many terror experts felt that this incident was the return of the RAF to the forefront of media attention. However, in 1993 the RAF declared a provisional ceasefire in a published statement (van Leeuwen, & Nederlands Instituut voor, 2003). Although the group was successful in assassinating Alfred Herrhausen, their actions did not bring about social change in West Germany.
The RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, was one of the most notorious left-wing terror groups active in Europe during the early 1970s (van Leeuwen, & Nederlands Instituut voor, 2003). During the 1980s, the RAF lost much of its support after murdering a US Soldier in order to get his ID card to enter US facilities in Frankfurt. Anti-terror experts estimate that the RAF was responsible for the killing of over 40 people and injuring approximately 100 during its 30 years in operation (van Leeuwen, & Nederlands Instituut voor, 2003). Tactically, the group achieved its objective of killing Herrhausen. Strategically, they did not achieve their desire to change the economic direction of West Germany nor persuade East Germany and other Eastern-bloc countries to abandon their desire to become more
capitalistic.