Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards. Second, the board wanted to force more objectivity into the performance evaluation system. Some board members believe that too many subjective bonus awards were being made, providing managers with bonuses even in years where their entity did not perform well. One effect of allowing subjective judgments was that bonus awards were only loosely correlated with the realized operating performances. Another effect was a lot of misspend time, as managers engaged in “politicking”. They tried to convince their evaluators that they had performed well, even though the results were disappointing. The board members in favor of change thought that a new incentive system should place sharp limits on the use of subjectivity in granting bonus awards.
