Clausewitz: Comparing Two Types Of War

The idea of warfare tries to help us discover how we may proceed to physically force or gain material advantage of the opposition at a starting point. However, it is not always considered possible, this theory can teach us how to calculate moral factors, and anticipate the mistakes the enemy will make. Clausewitz’s definition implies that war does not lead to the destruction of the enemy but rather the survival of the enemy to its will. Clausewitz’s definition implies that war does not lead to the destruction of the enemy but rather the survival of the enemy to its will. What Clausewitz is saying is that Public opinion influences military doctrine; military’s will influences public opinion While the Military strategy influences political objectives; government influences military resources.
Clausewitz differentiates between what war looks like in theory. By comparing this theoretical version of war with reality, Clausewitz’s purpose is to identify how and why these two types of war differ. The two types are war in theory and war the reality is war is messy and
destructive while in theory war would look like a planned outline, every detail perfect and without flaws. with the maximum use of force total and zero-sum; fight until the other side is destroyed and devote all resources necessary to win war is unpredictable. while war is not always fought until one side wins, example. U.S. Revolutionary War, war is frequently interrupted and never final.
War ends without completely defeating the enemy because defensive strategies work.
It is easier to prevent the other side from getting what you already have than to acquire something new. In the context of civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorists, non-state actors predominantly engage in defensive strategies that stretch out the length of the war until the state eventually capitulates; continuing the war for a long time is unpopular, costly, and not worth the risk. Offensive strategies are a good way to increase your power or gain territory, but require a lot of resources and risk higher costs to win. The difference between war in theory and war is that the former is fought until the enemy is completely disarmed, but war is often frequently interrupted and ends without completely defeating the enemy. To fight the enemy, Clausewitz argues armies can choose either offensive or defensive strategies of
combat. The strength in his theory lies in that Clausewitz never attempts to impose a set solution. The theory is descriptive of one on one strategic problems, and endeavors to ‘develop human capital… to help develop their own strategic judgment to deal with the ever-changing strategic environment. The most significant weakness was that although Clausewitz could not have foreseen the possibility of nuclear weapons while living in the 19th century, with the advent of nuclear bombs and the like, his theory of absolute war could, in fact become a reality in the 21st century. However, in the present day, an opponent cannot feasibly disarm a nuclear-armed superpower, as mutually assured destruction ensures this. On the other hand, while war was no longer a playable option due to deterrence during the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of more regional and world powers, the international arena began to transform into one ruled by the political will of the nation-states. In conclusion, although there are clearly some contextual issues, given that he gained influence from the political atmosphere of the early 19th century, in the end, Carl von Clausewitz is the war theorist to consult when advice is necessary on war, peace, and politics. As US President George Washington declared, ‘If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are always ready for war,’ demonstrating Clausewitz’s sentiments exactly.