Coastal Area Incident, How Did Lin He Gui Do It?

3. Coastal area incident, how did Lin He Gui do it, what did he say.

1) How did Lin He Gui do it.

After the incident, I received this report:

a. Political commissar informed Wei Ming and other Publishing unit to breakout to the north. Our north side is ocean. At that time, Wei Ming and other comrades had made a reasonable judgment that was it possible for the Political Commissar to arrange comrades from other area to aid them at the north.

b. A headquarter guard, Huang Jin Long from West Kalimantan was instructed to lead a few dozens of local cadres and training class students (mostly women comrades and sick and weak members) to move to the east towards Sadong River.

c. According to Zhang De Wen, Political Commissar instructed him and
Political Commissar opined that after the February 24th incident, our armed forces had been effectively retained (include or mainly refer to the broke out troop led by Zhang De Wen whoagainst his instruction). The troop had also being expanded from the coastal area to all the main areas within the division, proving his returned and worked in the FirstDivision in mid 1968. He had achieved a “strong and reliable result”. The February 24th struggle led by him was a victory. He said, “although we had suffered substantial sacrifices and losses, it was secondary when compared to the victory and
According to those local cadres that were directly under the leadership of the Political Commissar, “underestimating the enemy and carelessness” was a standard criticism made by the Political Commissar on them. This comment was very common among the local cadres. It was a comment applicable to any situation. Usage of this comment was always appropriate, creating happiness to everyone without hurthing anybody.It would be perfect to add another humble saying of “lacking experience”.

The Political Commissar added, during the early stage of the anti siege, “it was inevitable to have some confusion and passivity. The consequences of confusion and passivity waere to endure more beatings and losses.” He had left the coastal area swiftly and safely during the “early stage”. He had no knowledge of the condition of our comrades who were instructed by him to “stay back and wait”. We did not know what he meant by “some confusion and passivity” that resulted in more beatings and losses.

c. The issues of organizing large-scale training classes and setting up a base at the coastal