Devis V. Davis Case Summary

"The Essence of the Epoche"
In the Supreme Court ruling of Davis v. Davis, Justice Daughtrey created an epoche of the law when she, unlike previous judges, based her decision on the recognition of a new category more relevant to the case rather than relying on one previously established. She casts aside conventional thoughts and residual knowledge by declaring the case to present a "question of first impression" which will require the court to act through common law. Although Justice Daughtrey relates other statutes, cases, and constitutions to the case, she refuses to follow any precedent established by similar situations. Establishing Davis v. Davis to be a case of "first impression" because it lacks a controlling contract or statute, Justice Daughtrey begins to introduce facts regarding the case: Mr.
and Mrs.
Davis have been married for nine years. Mr. Davis is thirty years of age, and Mrs. Davis is twenty-eight years of age. Together, the couple earns roughly $35,500 annually, with Mr. Davis earning $17,500 and Mrs. Davis earning $18,000. Mrs. Davis is currently a resident of the state of Florida. The couple desired a family, but were deterred by Mrs. Davis's five tubal pregnancies and a surgical treatment that rendered it impossible for her to conceive naturally. Having suffered considerable trauma and pain from attempts to conceive, it was concluded Mrs. Davis's only option to conceive was through in vitro fertilization. In 1985, the couple became familiar with and participated in an in vitro fertilization program. After six failed attempts to conceive through in vitro fertilization, the Davis' suspended their involvement in the program and opted to obtain a child through adoption. When adoption attempts failed, the couple returned to the in vitro fertilization program. In 1988, Mrs. Davis learned of a new cryopreservation program, and, after discussing the information with Mr. Davis, again reentered the program with the
intent of producing a child. The court found Mrs. Davis to have suffered many painful, tiring, and emotionally stressful procedures in her efforts to become a mother. The court further found that Mr. Davis, who donated sperm to the process, also spent many stressful hours waiting for news that he was indeed a father. In December of 1988, nine embryos were successfully created. After the implantation of two failed, the Davis's placed the remaining seven embryos in storage for future implantation purposes. After filing for divorce, the Davis's were faced with this dilemma: who, if anyone, should receive the embryos in the divorce? After summarizing the facts of the case, Justice Daughtrey introduced the opinions of the lower courts, emphasizing the pre-existing legal categories associated with divorce: 1) custody of children; and 2) dividing ownership of property. By doing so, Justice Daughtrey indicates that the lower courts instantly place the embryos in question within the pre-existing categories. This established, Justice Daughtrey delivered the previous decisions before expressing her distaste for both. The trial court, particularly Judge Young, viewed the embryos as children rather than property, and placed custody with Mrs. Davis as it was in the best interest of the "children or intended children." Judge Young further held that Mrs. Davis held temporary custody for the sole reason of future implantation, at which time all issues of support, visitation, and final custody issues would be addressed by the Court. The Court of Appeals however, disagreed. In Judge Franks' opinion, the embryos fit the category of property rather than custody of children. He then proceeded to vest control of the embryos to both Mr. and Mrs. Davis, thereby reinstating the position of the parties before the lawsuit.
After delivering the lower courts' decisions, Justice Daughtrey relates both to her own view of the case. She also reiterates that there is not an applicable statute or contract between Mr. and Mrs. Davis, thereby influencing control of the court's decision. It is at this very moment in the trial that Justice Daughtrey commits an epoche. Here, she disregards the decisions of the lower courts, refusing to allow the previously established categories of divorce, human being, custody, or property to explain the embryos in question. Instead, she creates a new term for the embryos, referring to them as "entities" which lack both legal and anticipatory knowledge. By refusing to rely on conventional explanations, Justice Daughtrey creates a new legal category: preembryo. Justice Daughtrey further explains that preembryos are neither persons nor property, but rather occupy a temporary category entitling them to "special respect because of their potential for human life." She also asserts that any interest by the appellate or the appelle is not true property interest, but instead an interest in the nature of ownership. Justice Daughtrey concluded that "disputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be resolved, (1) first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. (2) If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. (3) If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed. (3)(a) Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question. (3)(b) If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered. (3)(c) However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail. (4) But the rule does not contemplate the creation of an automatic veto, and in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we would not wish to be interpreted as so holding." Thus, with her decision, Justice Daughtrey looked beyond traditional and conventional knowledge and thereby created an epoche of the law.