Leading And Managing Change Research Paper
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NORTHCENTRAL UNIVERSITY
ASSIGNMENT COVER SHEET
Name Colonel Robert G. Morris, III USA (Retired)
Management 5016
Dr. Olin O. Oedekoven
Course ID Number
Faculty Mentor
Leading and Managing Change
Final Assignment – Leading and Managing
Change. A Comparison of the Legions of
Course Title
Imperial Rome and the XVIII Airborne
Corps Of The American Army.
Assignment Number/Title
Learner Comments:
Sir, thank you for the opportunity to complete this project. I enjoyed this course and learned a great deal about managing change.
Faculty Comments:
Right down to the last minute I see! Wow – probably the best paper I’ve read for this course. Extremely well done! Best to you this holiday season and perhaps I’ll “see” …show more content…
you again soon in another course.
Dr. Olin Oedekoven
A+
6
Faculty’s Name
Grade Earned
Writing Score
22NOV05
Date Graded
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Running Head: LEADING AND MANAGING CHANGE
Leading and Managing Change – A Comparison and Contrast of the Legions of Imperial Rome with the XVIII Corps of the American Army
Robert G. Morris, III
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
Northcentral University
Leading and Managing Change
MGT 5016
Dr.
Olin O. Odekoven
November 20, 2005
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Abstract
Using selected references, the course textbook, case studies, interviews British, German and American World War II and Gulf War Veterans; and research gained from investigative trips to Europe the Middle East, and Southwest Asia; this paper examines the relationship of leadership and change management, by conducting a comparison and contrast between the Army of Imperial Rome, during the period 60-100 AD, and The Army of the United States, 1944-2000.
It examines both the internal and external forces of change and their impact on the weapons, training, tactics, and the conduct of selected field operations. It argues that only through the application of a systematic process of change, coupled with forceful leadership, can change management ensure battlefield victory and post combat stability. The paper concludes by establishing a distinct correlation between successful battlefield operations, competent, forceful, caring leadership, and well planned and flawlessly executed strategies for change.
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Leading and Managing Change. – A Comparison and Contrast of the Legions of Imperial …show more content…
Rome with the XVIII Airborne Corps of the American Army.
Overview
Any review and comparison of the culture of ancient Rome with modern western culture reveals constants that are readily apparent, even to the most casual of observers. The first is a nations requirement to protect it’s homeland through preparation for offensive and defensive warfare, and the second, is the requirement to successfully manage the internal and external forces of change as a necessary adjunct to the enforcement of national policies that insure survival. The key element in this equation has been, and remains, the ability to rapidly anticipate and manage change. In my view, this has been the major factor separating success from failure when viewing the operational aspects of weapons, tactics, quality of leadership, recruitment, knowledge of terrain, intelligence, the establishment of lines of communication and the re-supply of combat forces in the field. Further, the most outstanding ability of both the Legions of
Imperial Rome and the Airborne Forces of the United States Army was (and is) their remarkable ability to maximize strengths by rapidly reacting to the forces of change, using a change management process that is both tailored and systematic (Connolly, 1998).
The Eight Stage Process of Creating Major Change.
This paper addresses three central issues that characterize victorious armies: the first, is that victorious commanders anticipate and effectively manage change through a systemic process; second, victorious armies and leaders must be highly trained, motivated, and employ a well planned, ordered process of change management that impacts organizational culture; and
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third: those successful change management processes employed by military commanders contain some, if not all, the stages as described by Kotter (1996) in his civilian model .
In reality, the eight stage process as espoused by Kotter (1996), starts with the establishment of a sense of urgency, then directs the creation of a powerful guiding coalition, followed by the development of a vision and a strategy to execute that vision, utilizing appropriate role models. Broad based actions which involve risk taking, coupled with the elimination of barriers and the creation of short term gains are basic tenets of this system. A systematic reinvigoration and refinement of the program by consolidation of gains, closely followed by the anchoring of the new approaches in organizational culture, are the capstones of the process (Kotter, 1996).
There exist other significant issues that must be addressed if change is to be successfully managed. As Kotter (1996) points out, change can be derailed because of a host of reasons which, in reality, must be prudently and thoroughly addressed. These include: An inwardly focused culture, a paralyzing bureaucracy, politics, recalcitrance on the part of organizational members, a lack of positive leadership, and fear.
From a military perspective, these last issues represent not only the principal internal and external forces that inhibit change, but failure on the part of leaders to create appropriate strategies to defeat these forces, have spelled tactical and strategic disaster for the offenders and their cultures.
The Roman Empire and Military – Background
With the advent of the century that witnessed the birth of Christianity, The Roman
Empire was at its zenith. It stretched from Britannia (now Great Britain) in the north, to a line running from northwest to southeast just east of the Rhine River, defining the borders of
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Germania, (Germany), Rastia (Austria), Noricum(Hungary), Thracia, (now Greece and Turkey) totally encompassing Mare Intorium (the Mediterranean Sea). The empire also included Syria
(Syria), Judea (Israel and Palestine), all of North Africa including Arabia Petrecia (Saudi
Arabia), Aegyptus (Egypt), Cyrenaica (Libya), Africa (Tunisia), Mauretania (Morocco),and north again to, and including, Hispania(Spain) (Herndon, Chris, 2002).
Although Rome at its height, occupied the majority of the civilized world, its rise was anything but spectacular. From the early Roman historian Titus Livius (Livy) (29-27 BC/1971), we learned that the empire started as a group of agrarian settlements among the hills surrounding the Tiber river. With the northern incursion and the subsequent settlement by groups of
Etruscans, Rome became a settlement of enterprising people with the skills and abilities to build unify and expand. The first form of government comprised a King with military, political and religious power. It also contained a council (senate) of elders (patres); a consultave assembly
(comitia curiata) and a city government. The government then transitioned from a Republic with the Senate as the controlling body, to the Imperial period whereby sole power and control was retained by an Emperor.
As a city, Rome was faced with the task of defending herself from intrusive and warlike neighbors. The earliest evidence of an Army reveals that it was patterned after the Greek
Hoplite model with the manpower pool coming from the richest classes who could afford the purchase of a spear, sword and the italic shield (scutum). In battle, the army was organized as follows: 10 centuries of medium spearman, 10 centuries of lighter spearmen, 10 centuries of skirmishers and 15 centuries of slingers (Connolly, (1998)
Although the methods of recruitment remained basically unchanged, the Roman Army continued to evolve in terms of weapons organizations and tactics. Roman leaders were masters
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at improvisation and according to Warry (1980); they adopted their battle tactics to the terrain and type of enemy they were fighting. At the conclusion of battle, a review was conducted with great emphasis placed on performance in combat, tactics, and weapons employment.
Cowardness was likewise forcefully dealt with by decimation. This was a process whereby a unit was assembled and one man in ten was selected to be beaten or stoned to death by his fellow soldiers whose lives had been placed in danger (Cowan, 2003). Military reforms over the first
500 years occurred gradually, however it was the appointment of Gaius Marius as First Council that provides the first evidence of a structured change process such as that espoused by Kotter
(1996).
The Military Reforms of Marius – 102 BC
Elected as First Counsel (Supreme Commander) by the Senate, Marius began preparations to fight the Cinbi. This Germanic Tribe threatened the northern border of the
Roman Empire which then constituted Spain and Switzerland. The move into Spain rather than
Italy, allowed Marius to commence a training program that was based on careful evaluation of enemy tactics matched to results required. These included:
The change in the legionnaire’s primary offensive weapon from the Pilum
(Offensive spear) to a more lightweight model that include the addition of a small weight to enhance its armor piercing capability. The construction was also changed so that the head was attached by a rivet. When impaled in an enemy, the head and pike separated, with the pike immobilizing him.
The addition of a supply train to the Legions’ field organization. A pack mule was issued to each section of 8 men (Contubernium) to carry loads previously borne
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by the individual soldier. This transformed the Legion into a fast moving light infantry unit.
The introduction of the “Moving Ambush” using light Cavalry and terrain to mask their position. This, coupled with the use of light infantry to rapidly close with the enemy, was particularly effective against the Germanic Tribes in later campaigns.
The reorganization of the Legion into ten cohorts, with every cohort containing 2 maniples with two centuries each for a total of six centuries, each commanded by a centurion. Total manpower was 4,800 men. The rank of the centurion ranged from the Priums Pius (most senior centurion whose position was left front in the battle formation) to Hastate Posterior (most junior – right rear).
The use of a Scutum (Shield) constructed of wood and leather, glued together and attached with an iron boss to deflect blows;
The introduction of the Caliga (Heavy Sandal with a sole 20 millimeters thick), studded with iron hobnails with a one piece upper and stuffed with cloth for use in winter, was especially important
The introduction of intense physical and tactical training programs, so that his
Legions could move at top speed all day.
Increased emphasis on unit morale, integrity and cohesion, starting with the 8 man section.
The directive that required every soldier be self reliant by requiring him to prepare his rations, carry cooking utensils, saw, hatchet, sickle and 3 days rations.
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The introduction of a new helmet with ear flaps, mail body armor; the eagle as the sole standard of the Legion, and the use of Standard-Bearers to carry flags and other unit symbols.
These reforms in tactics, organization, weapons and accouterments were the direct result of a change process that closely resembled that as espoused by Kotter almost two thousand years later, in that Marius:
Created urgency by associating his reforms with the outcome of impending battles and associating the need for victory with the alarms raised by the Senate.
Created a strong guiding coalition by selecting his commanders very carefully, and empowering them to do what was necessary to achieve desired results.
Developed an effective vision and strategy that was both short range (tactical) and long range (strategic) by establishing standards of technical and tactical proficiency required for victory and equating standards to institutional change.
Effectively communicated his vision through personal contact, effectively using esprit, élan, and subordinate commanders.
Empowered broad based action by removing obstacles and empowering subordinates
Maximized short term wins by the use of games and celebrations when tough training was completed.
Stressed the widespread use of after reviews, self sufficiency in the field, and visits to lower subordinate units to gain feedback. His commanding presence created credibility, however his continued action to improve the welfare of his men were, in my view, the critical vehicles which created the opportunity for
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more changed initiated by the Legionnaires themselves. Most importantly, these changes were anchored in the culture of the Roman Army and they served it well for the next 400 years.
These reforms were also used and improved by Caius Julius Caesar and are well documented in his memoirs of the Gallic Wars (Caesar, 58-52 BC/1982). During this time,
Caesars Legions conquered Espana, Gaul, and Germania and twice invaded Britannia. This was followed by a short civil war in which he subdued the armies of Pompey, and marched on Rome.
Three of his actions are of particular interest for this study of change management:
The offensive tactics used in his campaigns against the Germanic tribes in
Germania, and hostile tribes in Britannia and Spain. These included: The use of the Roman Navy, the introduction of the use of amphibious operations, and the introduction of seaborne soldiers (Marines) as a necessary adjunct to the successful conduct of those operations.
The use of Siege Works, not only to protect his army in the offense, but also to protect it from attackers, by canalizing forces into kill zones where the invaders could be destroyed with minimal loss to his force.
The evolving command structure of the Legion. By 55 BC, the command structure had evolved so that the Legion was self sustaining. The Legion was commanded by a Legatus Legionis or Senior Senator who was in is mid thirties.
He was assisted by a Tribunis Laticlavius (Apprentice Commander) who would later command a Legion. These were assisted by the Tribunus Angusticlavius
(Senior Staff Officers) and the 3rd in command the Praefectus Castrorum (Camp
Commander).
Most important for both the Legion and for the evolvement of
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western civilization, the Legions contained surveyors, engineers, armorers, physicians, medics, clerks, architects musicians and laborers. These combined changes made the Roman Army a very formidable force and one that was to expand the empire to the very limits of civilization (Warry, 1980).
Strategic Change Management of Caesar Augustus
The assassination of Julius Caesar led to an internal power struggle between the eastern and western halves of the Roman World. Marc Antony together with Cleopatra (eastern), and
Caesars heir, Octavian (western). By 31 BC, a final battle was fought at Actium, and Octavian triumphed. Octavian was then recognized by the Senate as the first emperor, and was named
Caesar Augustus (Cowan, 2003).
Armed with a great vision for Rome, Augustus:
Reduced the Army from 60 to 28 Legions.
Created a professional Army, wisely choosing to allow the best Legions of
Caesars Army to remain. One of these - the 10th would continue to make history, first in Belgium and later in England (Collins, 2002).
Executed a massive resettlement program which provided for his veterans for life
Reduced the mandatory period of service to 16 years
Organized the veterans into Vexilla Venaratorium or Legions Corps of Veterans units that could be called up for emergency service to age 60.
Ordered clear terms of service, rates of pay and pensions making the legions dependant on him for pay and retirement.
As previously stated, the Army became the major force that created the forces of change in the lands were subjugated by the Empire. The major tactical unit of the Army became the
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Century rather than the Cohort, and the Centurion, the primary tactical commander during battle.
Commanders, recognizing that future campaigns would be arduous and lengthy, subjected recruits to 4 month training process that were physically and mentally demanding. Legions were required to march 29 km in under 5 hours and 35 km at the quick step with a full load of weapons and a 30 lb pack in under 5 hours. Battle formations including movement from March posture to battle posture and vise versa were also drilled until they became second nature.
Additionally, the tesudo (the tortoise-requiring the men to form a shell with their shields to protect against missle attack) was drilled. The men trained with weapons until they became proficient marksman. They practiced survey, introduced the use of light and heavy Artillery in a fire support role, built roads bridges and towns and practiced building camp fortifications while on the march (Peterson, 1992).
Operations in Germania and the Varian Disaster – AD 9
By 12 BC, the total focus of the Roman government became the subjugation of the
German tribes east of the Rhine River. To lead these operations, Augustus chose his nephew
Drusus and invested him with a Field Marshall’s appointment (5 star rank) and ten legions including the 14th (Legio XVIIII-later to earn the title Nero’s Killing Machine), and the 17th, 18th and 19th Legions.
Druses divided this force into two main groups and operated out of two main bases. The base of the Army of the Upper Rhine, (AUR) was located at the mouth of the Main River and was named Moguntiacum (now Mainz). The Army of the Lower Rhine (ALR) was based at
Vetera (now Xanten in Holland). Employing both amphibious and land operations, Drusus struck deep into Germania, defeating the tribes of Chauci, Cherusi, and Chatti. At the height of the campaign, Druses was stricken with gangrene and died. Shortly thereafter, his brother
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Tiberius arrived to assume command, subsequently defeating all enemies. A treaty was signed which permitted Roman soldiers and merchants to cross the Rhine for commerce, and in return, the tribes were provided protection from all enemies, Officers of the Tribal army were permitted into the auxiliaries of Rome and to command them. The King of the major tribe concerned, the
Cherusi, gave one son to the AUR and one to ALR. The son who was posted to the Army of the
Lower Rhine was knighted and given the Roman name Arminius. Proud and rebellious, he would later betray the governor and hand the Roman Army its worst defeat in over 100 years.
(Collins, 2005)
The signing of the treaty did not bring the peace that Augustus anticipated. During the period 4- 6 AD, having had to fight to consolidate the new territory into a manageable province, it was clear that operations had to be mounted to contain major revolts in Germany and
Yugoslavia. The German tribal Chief Morobodus signed a second treaty with Rome reducing pressure in Germania, and allowing the Roman Government to send Legions to Yugoslavia to quell the rebellion there. However, the people of Germania, interpreting the treaty as weakness and a lack of will on the part of the Senate, watched these events carefully, and commenced preparations to overthrow Roman Rule.
The new Roman governor, Publius Quinctilius Varus was known as a tough administrator. Arriving from a well organized, rich province, he incorrectly assumed that his administrative methods would work as well as they had in the past. Ignoring the requirement to employ a well ordered process of change as a tool to gain the desired strategic ends; Varius choose to inflict the province to an iron rule. During the first few years of his tenure he was almost proven right, however Arminius was quietly working to institute a well organized process of change maximizing his knowledge of weapons, tactics and the terrain. Varius, responding to a
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Senatorial decree, commenced operations inside Germania to permanently subjugate the troublesome Germanic tribes.
Having spent the summer of AD 9 deep inside northern Germania, Varius, his three legions plus attached auxiliary, were preparing to depart for their main lodgments on the Rhine.
Prior to their departure, Arminius persuaded him to alter his route of March, ostensibly to quell a fictitious uprising. The new route took the legions through difficult wooded country known as the Teutobergwald, near modern day Osnabruck, just south of Bremen. Varius compounded his previous errors, by allowing his German Auxiliary (cavalry, archers and slingers) to depart to enlist more men. Totally ignoring all previous lessons learned, the Legions traveled at the relaxed march with their baggage trains, servants, women and children. Shortly after reaching the woods, the weather made a turn for the worse and high winds, biting cold and rain made forward movement next to impossible. Moving into terrain that was bounded by heavy marshes, a river and steep wooded hills to front, the Germans struck the Roman column with the full force of a planned ambush. Varius choose to continue forward and over a three day period he and his
25,000 men women and children, save for a few (less than 100) disappeared from the face of the earth (Clunn, 2005). In typical Germanic fashion, Varius’ head was cut off and sent back to
Augustus who, when told of his loss, beat his head against the wall and proclaimed, “Quinctilius
Varus, give me back my Legions!” (Clunn, 2005).
The legions were never reformed and it would take 6 years before Roman Legions under the command of Germanicus, grandson of Druses, would avenge the Varius disaster and return two of the three golden Eagles to Rome and the Emperor Tiberius (Collins, 2005). 1929 years later, this region would again be witness to a great battle against Germany, and as in AD 9, the
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outcome of this battle would depend on the successful management of the forces of change and the execution of a detailed strategy of change management.
The XVIII Airborne Corps and Operation Market-Garden, the Airborne Invasion of Holland –
September, 1944.
By 1944, the Second World War was in its fifth year. Technology brought about changes that brought new levels of destruction and methods of waging war. Two of these were: 1.) The introduction of the multi-engined aircraft, and 2.) The development/use of these aircraft to transport men directly onto the battlefield.
Although hampered by lack of budget and short sightedness at the strategic level (Chant,
1978/1982), the development and use of airborne forces in the United States Army in WWII closely followed the structured change management program as espoused by Kotter. Forward thinkers such as General Lewis Brereton ( Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army);
Colonel James Gavin, (who would form and command the first Airborne Troops employed by the army in WWII – the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and later the 82nd Airborne Division in 1944); and General Maxwell D. Taylor, (Division Artillery Commander of the 82nd and later, the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division); all established a sense of urgency, arguing that vertical envelopment would help the Army avoid the bloodletting that had decimated allied forces in WWI. They shared a vision and empowered a very close knit, powerful team to make that vision a reality. They enlisted the aid of General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, who obliterated any obstacles that blocked forward movement. These men were risk takers, who by definition, empowered broad based action. Although the first use of US Paratroops in Sicily had its drawbacks, short term gains were realized, opening the way for planning to be conducted for
Operation Neptune, The Airborne Invasion of Europe. Following that success, additional gains
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were consolidated while simultaneously anchoring this new development in the culture of the
American Army (Devlin, 1979).
By late 1944, it was clear that Germany was going to lose the war. Russian forces were closing in from the east, and Allied forces from the south and west. Multiple options presented themselves for the invasion and final destruction of Germany, and after much debate, an
Airborne assault to secure bridgeheads over the Maas, Waal and lower Rhine (Market), followed by an armored thrust to secure the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem (Garden) was decided upon.
Attacking forces would cross the Rhine, execute a 90 degree turn to the right and race for the industrial heartland of Germany and then Berlin. The mission assigned to the XVIII Airborne
Corps was multifaceted and complicated. The two Airborne Divisions of the Corps would seize and hold the bridges over the Queen Wilhelmina and Zuid Canals at Son and Vegel (U.S. 101st) and the bridges over the River Maas and Waal Rivers at Grave and Nijmegen (U.S. 82nd). The
British were to take and hold the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem (Br 1st Airborne).
The previous structured change management plans executed earlier by the Americans ensured mission success, however, the failure of the British to execute a like plan to manage change, spelled disaster for the British forces at Arnhem. Specifically: American Paratroopers jumped with their weapons and their Generals jumped with their men; British units jumped with equipment cases, forcing paratroopers to land and then locate their weapons containers on the drop zone, and British Generals went in via Glider, often some distance from the tactical units they controlled. This failure to plan or pay attention to the forces of change by the British Army leadership coupled with a gross underestimation of the German Army, and particularly, the crack divisions of the Waffen SS, insured the failure at Arnhem and guaranteed that the war would drag on into 1945 (Ryan, 1974).
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In my view, the elements of the change management plan that insured successes for the
Americans were their hands-on approach and their ability to take appropriate risks and consolidate gains. These were the hallmark of leaders at every level of command from platoon thru division. These leaders took care of their men, fought with them, protected them and died with them. It was a performance of leadership that replicated the performance of the Roman forces in Judea almost two thousand years before, and amply illustrating the success of a structured change management process.
The 3rd, 7th, 10th, and 22nd Legions in the Jewish Revolt and occupation of Judea, Syria and
Mesopotamia (Iraq) AD 66-70.
As with the tribes in Germania 60 years before, the people of Judea, Syria and
Mesopotamia had historically been rebellious and troublesome. Having learned and applied the hard lessons gained through the experience in Germania, Roman leaders vowed never again to experience such defeat at the hands of an enemy. The Emperors guidance was clear: any rebellion must be crushed swiftly and completely. By the time The Senate directive had been received, the change management plan initiated by Marius had matured. Enlistments and training were focused first by region, with additional training provided, so that Legions could be moved rapidly from one end of the empire to the other, and arrive ready to continue training to fight and win. A good example was the rapid deployment and nature of advance of the forces to quell the Jewish uprising that occurred in AD 66.
The Roman Forces consisted of well acclimated troops, highly trained in the observance of strict water, ration, and march discipline. The advance guard consisted of contingents of lightly armed infantry and cavalry to scout ahead as a precaution against ambushes. These were followed by the lead Legion serving as the force vanguard. The surveyors, engineers and supply
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personnel were next, and armed and trained to fight as Infantry if necessary. The Commanding
General with bodyguard followed next, following the Legionary Cavalry, heavy artillery, rams and towers. The Main Body was comprised of the Senior Officers leading the individual
Legions. The rear guard consisted of auxiliary cohorts composed of light and heavy infantry.
Last came the camp followers and slave traders. Although extremely conservative, the formation did allow for rapid movement. More importantly, it allowed for rapid conversion from the march to combat formation to defeat an enemy. This was to prove invaluable when required to fight the widespread guerrilla warfare encountered. Following the defeat of these forces and those encountered during the second uprising, the Romans conquered the most inhospitable region of the Empire, occupying not only Judea but for the next 400 years, Syria and
Mesopotamia as well. (The Editors Of Time-Life Books, 1994)
The XVIII Airborne Corps - The Attack And Defeat of Iraq - 1991.
The close of the Second World War brought chaos and instability to the Middle East.
World War II signaled the end of the old order; British colonialism was dead and the subjugated races of the region demanded independence (Snyder, L, 1960). With the departure of the
British, two major unresolved issues that were to have dire consequences for the United States remained: 1). the final disposition of the fledging Jewish State, and 2). the control and management of the regions oil reserve.
Following three major wars between the Arab States and Israel, the XVIII Airborne
Corps formed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) consisting of the 82nd and 101st
Airborne Divisions, a Marine Amphibious Force, and supporting naval ships and aircraft.
Lieutenant General Volney Warner, the Corps commander, was a forward thinking strategist who understood the implications of the mission and developed a long range vision for the Corps,
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which he forcefully put in action. The concept was to move a Battalion Task force (equating to a
Roman Cohort) followed by a Division Ready Brigade (About the size of a Roman Legion) anywhere in the world ready to fight in 36 hours. Almost immediately, re-supply and political challenges occurred, in that the United States had no allies in the region willing to provide staging and/or re-supply areas. A solution presented itself in 1980, when the Corps was tasked to provide Muti-National Force Observers to the Sinai on rotation. Under the auspices of the
United Nations, Egypt agreed to provide staging areas for a series of exercises under the code name “Bright-Star”.
Based on data obtained from these exercises and deployments, Strategic Planning teams wrote and exercised a series of plans whose objective was to deploy the Corps units to the region on no-notice. The next few years saw improvements in training and refinement of the plans such that by 1990, the overall change process as originally envisioned by General Warner, and nurtured by his successors, was firmly matured and in place. The last addition to the Corps plan was the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to provide the reinforcement and offensive firepower required to sustain and consolidate gains as a result of offensive operations.
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Corps received an execute order to move to
Southwest Asia, conduct operations in the defense of Saudi Arabia and be immediately prepared to conduct offensive operations to destroy the Iraqi Army and restore the government of Kuwait.
The commanders of the major units of the Corps were all forward thinking Airborne/Air Assault
Officers who had had extensive experience with this change management plan, and when given the opportunity to execute, did so flawlessly. Like the Roman deployment, arrival in theater was immediately followed by a program of demanding training, additionally; lessons learned of past campaigns were studied and extensively applied.
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By January 1991, the Corps was honed and ready. The 24th Infantry Divisions order of
March and attack into Iraq in some aspects resembled the successful Roman attacks into
Germania, Judea and Mesopotamia almost two thousand years before.
The 1991 attack
achieved what was thought to be the impossible, as it launched a Corps of Light Infantry numbering 75,000 plus an attached Division of 39,000 Men and 9000 Vehicles into the rear of an
Army of 475,000 Men.
Total victory was achieved in less than 100 hours, due in large part, to a managed process of changed imitated some 12 years before by leaders that were tough, resourceful, forward thinking, and demanding of high standards. (Craddock, B 1992)
Conclusions.
Extensive and detailed plans for change management must be made a permanent part of any organizational strategy if it is to survive and win.
Strategically, change planning must at minimum, be embedded in organizational culture. This fact is amply illustrated by the changes originated by Marius, Julius
Caesar and Caesar Augustus, which are still in use today.
Organizational leaders must be forward thinking, savvy risk takers, demanding of high standards, and have care and compassion for their subordinates. This leadership component is absolutely critical, as good leadership can salvage bad plans but no amount of good planning can be saved by poor leadership.
Soldiers thrive on charismatic and fair leadership of their officers. It is
utilization of these principles that good leadership executes successful change management plans. Caesar, Antony, Germanicus, and Vespasian are perfect examples from the past. These men were followed in the 20th Century by Generals Taylor and Gavin
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in World War II, and McCaffery (24th ID), Peay, (101st Airborne) and Johnson
(82nd Airborne) in Desert Storm.
With few modifications, the structured change management program as espoused by Kotter (1995) is equally adaptable to both military and non-military organizations. My research also revealed that failure to properly execute a coherent strategy for change can have dire and far reaching consequences for the western world. General Fuller (2001), in his book Decisive Battles of the Western World agrees:
“Had Germany been for four centuries thoroughly Romanized, one culture, not two would have dominated the western world. There would have been no Franco-German problem, no Charlemagne, no Louis XIV, No Napoleon, no Kaiser Wilhelm II and no
Hitler.
In 1985 while conducting research for a leadership study, I heard the same words from
SS BrigadeFuherer Heinz Harmel, Division Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division
(Freundsberg):
“Bobby, my division was victorious over the British in the fight for Arnhem Bridge.
Because of that victory, Germany has been a divided country for over 40 years. Had I lost, the
Allies could have bounced the Rhine, vaulted the Siegfried line, and cut across the North
German Plain capturing Berlin. My country would have then been saved from the barbaric occupation of the Russians. It was my failure to recognize and act on change that caused my country all of this pain. Now you Americans must succeed where I failed.” Heinz Harmel
(personal communication, April 4, 1986) stressing the importance of strategic change
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management and the strategic results gained by his Division at Arnhem. In my view, the parallels are astounding.
Leaders contemplating a change strategy would do well to heed the words of Vegietius and Josephus:
“He, who desires peace, let him prepare for war. He, who wants victory, let him train soldiers diligently. He, who wishes a successful outcome, let him fight with strategy, not at random. No one dares challenge or harm one who he realizes will win if he fights
(Reeve, 2004).
“It is no wonder that this vast empire of theirs has come to them as a prize of Valour, not fortune” (Josephus, 1980)
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References
Fuller, J. (2001). Decisive Battles of the Western World and their influence upon History: from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to Waterloo. London: Orion.
Snyder, L. (1960). The War A Concise History. Mew York: Simon and Schuster.
Caesar, J. (1982). Caesar The Gallic Wars (2nd Ed.) (J. Gardner, Trans.). London: Penguin
Books. (Original work published 58-52 BC)
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The Armies Of Rome. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
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Legion. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons.
Connolly, P. (1998). Greece and Rome At War. London: Greenhill Books.
Cowan, R. (2003). Roman Legionary 58 BC - AD 69. Oxford: Osprey.
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Craddock, B. (1992). Operation Desert Storm Attack Plan Oplan 91-3. (Available from 25th
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Odekoven, O. (2004). Syllabus, Management 5016 Leading and Managing Change. (Available from Northcentral University, 505 West Whipple Street, Prescott, Arizona 86301)
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1
NORTHCENTRAL UNIVERSITY
ASSIGNMENT COVER SHEET
Name Colonel Robert G. Morris, III USA (Retired)
Management 5016
Dr. Olin O. Oedekoven
Course ID Number
Faculty Mentor
Leading and Managing Change
Final Assignment – Leading and Managing
Change. A Comparison of the Legions of
Course Title
Imperial Rome and the XVIII Airborne
Corps Of The American Army.
Assignment Number/Title
Learner Comments:
Sir, thank you for the opportunity to complete this project. I enjoyed this course and learned a great deal about managing change.
Faculty Comments:
Right down to the last minute I see! Wow – probably the best paper I’ve read for this course. Extremely well done! Best to you this holiday season and perhaps I’ll “see” …show more content…
you again soon in another course.
Dr. Olin Oedekoven
A+
6
Faculty’s Name
Grade Earned
Writing Score
22NOV05
Date Graded
Leading and Managing Change
2
Running Head: LEADING AND MANAGING CHANGE
Leading and Managing Change – A Comparison and Contrast of the Legions of Imperial Rome with the XVIII Corps of the American Army
Robert G. Morris, III
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
Northcentral University
Leading and Managing Change
MGT 5016
Dr.
Olin O. Odekoven
November 20, 2005
Leading and Managing Change
3
Abstract
Using selected references, the course textbook, case studies, interviews British, German and American World War II and Gulf War Veterans; and research gained from investigative trips to Europe the Middle East, and Southwest Asia; this paper examines the relationship of leadership and change management, by conducting a comparison and contrast between the Army of Imperial Rome, during the period 60-100 AD, and The Army of the United States, 1944-2000.
It examines both the internal and external forces of change and their impact on the weapons, training, tactics, and the conduct of selected field operations. It argues that only through the application of a systematic process of change, coupled with forceful leadership, can change management ensure battlefield victory and post combat stability. The paper concludes by establishing a distinct correlation between successful battlefield operations, competent, forceful, caring leadership, and well planned and flawlessly executed strategies for change.
Leading and Managing Change
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Leading and Managing Change. – A Comparison and Contrast of the Legions of Imperial …show more content…
Rome with the XVIII Airborne Corps of the American Army.
Overview
Any review and comparison of the culture of ancient Rome with modern western culture reveals constants that are readily apparent, even to the most casual of observers. The first is a nations requirement to protect it’s homeland through preparation for offensive and defensive warfare, and the second, is the requirement to successfully manage the internal and external forces of change as a necessary adjunct to the enforcement of national policies that insure survival. The key element in this equation has been, and remains, the ability to rapidly anticipate and manage change. In my view, this has been the major factor separating success from failure when viewing the operational aspects of weapons, tactics, quality of leadership, recruitment, knowledge of terrain, intelligence, the establishment of lines of communication and the re-supply of combat forces in the field. Further, the most outstanding ability of both the Legions of
Imperial Rome and the Airborne Forces of the United States Army was (and is) their remarkable ability to maximize strengths by rapidly reacting to the forces of change, using a change management process that is both tailored and systematic (Connolly, 1998).
The Eight Stage Process of Creating Major Change.
This paper addresses three central issues that characterize victorious armies: the first, is that victorious commanders anticipate and effectively manage change through a systemic process; second, victorious armies and leaders must be highly trained, motivated, and employ a well planned, ordered process of change management that impacts organizational culture; and
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third: those successful change management processes employed by military commanders contain some, if not all, the stages as described by Kotter (1996) in his civilian model .
In reality, the eight stage process as espoused by Kotter (1996), starts with the establishment of a sense of urgency, then directs the creation of a powerful guiding coalition, followed by the development of a vision and a strategy to execute that vision, utilizing appropriate role models. Broad based actions which involve risk taking, coupled with the elimination of barriers and the creation of short term gains are basic tenets of this system. A systematic reinvigoration and refinement of the program by consolidation of gains, closely followed by the anchoring of the new approaches in organizational culture, are the capstones of the process (Kotter, 1996).
There exist other significant issues that must be addressed if change is to be successfully managed. As Kotter (1996) points out, change can be derailed because of a host of reasons which, in reality, must be prudently and thoroughly addressed. These include: An inwardly focused culture, a paralyzing bureaucracy, politics, recalcitrance on the part of organizational members, a lack of positive leadership, and fear.
From a military perspective, these last issues represent not only the principal internal and external forces that inhibit change, but failure on the part of leaders to create appropriate strategies to defeat these forces, have spelled tactical and strategic disaster for the offenders and their cultures.
The Roman Empire and Military – Background
With the advent of the century that witnessed the birth of Christianity, The Roman
Empire was at its zenith. It stretched from Britannia (now Great Britain) in the north, to a line running from northwest to southeast just east of the Rhine River, defining the borders of
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Germania, (Germany), Rastia (Austria), Noricum(Hungary), Thracia, (now Greece and Turkey) totally encompassing Mare Intorium (the Mediterranean Sea). The empire also included Syria
(Syria), Judea (Israel and Palestine), all of North Africa including Arabia Petrecia (Saudi
Arabia), Aegyptus (Egypt), Cyrenaica (Libya), Africa (Tunisia), Mauretania (Morocco),and north again to, and including, Hispania(Spain) (Herndon, Chris, 2002).
Although Rome at its height, occupied the majority of the civilized world, its rise was anything but spectacular. From the early Roman historian Titus Livius (Livy) (29-27 BC/1971), we learned that the empire started as a group of agrarian settlements among the hills surrounding the Tiber river. With the northern incursion and the subsequent settlement by groups of
Etruscans, Rome became a settlement of enterprising people with the skills and abilities to build unify and expand. The first form of government comprised a King with military, political and religious power. It also contained a council (senate) of elders (patres); a consultave assembly
(comitia curiata) and a city government. The government then transitioned from a Republic with the Senate as the controlling body, to the Imperial period whereby sole power and control was retained by an Emperor.
As a city, Rome was faced with the task of defending herself from intrusive and warlike neighbors. The earliest evidence of an Army reveals that it was patterned after the Greek
Hoplite model with the manpower pool coming from the richest classes who could afford the purchase of a spear, sword and the italic shield (scutum). In battle, the army was organized as follows: 10 centuries of medium spearman, 10 centuries of lighter spearmen, 10 centuries of skirmishers and 15 centuries of slingers (Connolly, (1998)
Although the methods of recruitment remained basically unchanged, the Roman Army continued to evolve in terms of weapons organizations and tactics. Roman leaders were masters
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at improvisation and according to Warry (1980); they adopted their battle tactics to the terrain and type of enemy they were fighting. At the conclusion of battle, a review was conducted with great emphasis placed on performance in combat, tactics, and weapons employment.
Cowardness was likewise forcefully dealt with by decimation. This was a process whereby a unit was assembled and one man in ten was selected to be beaten or stoned to death by his fellow soldiers whose lives had been placed in danger (Cowan, 2003). Military reforms over the first
500 years occurred gradually, however it was the appointment of Gaius Marius as First Council that provides the first evidence of a structured change process such as that espoused by Kotter
(1996).
The Military Reforms of Marius – 102 BC
Elected as First Counsel (Supreme Commander) by the Senate, Marius began preparations to fight the Cinbi. This Germanic Tribe threatened the northern border of the
Roman Empire which then constituted Spain and Switzerland. The move into Spain rather than
Italy, allowed Marius to commence a training program that was based on careful evaluation of enemy tactics matched to results required. These included:
The change in the legionnaire’s primary offensive weapon from the Pilum
(Offensive spear) to a more lightweight model that include the addition of a small weight to enhance its armor piercing capability. The construction was also changed so that the head was attached by a rivet. When impaled in an enemy, the head and pike separated, with the pike immobilizing him.
The addition of a supply train to the Legions’ field organization. A pack mule was issued to each section of 8 men (Contubernium) to carry loads previously borne
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by the individual soldier. This transformed the Legion into a fast moving light infantry unit.
The introduction of the “Moving Ambush” using light Cavalry and terrain to mask their position. This, coupled with the use of light infantry to rapidly close with the enemy, was particularly effective against the Germanic Tribes in later campaigns.
The reorganization of the Legion into ten cohorts, with every cohort containing 2 maniples with two centuries each for a total of six centuries, each commanded by a centurion. Total manpower was 4,800 men. The rank of the centurion ranged from the Priums Pius (most senior centurion whose position was left front in the battle formation) to Hastate Posterior (most junior – right rear).
The use of a Scutum (Shield) constructed of wood and leather, glued together and attached with an iron boss to deflect blows;
The introduction of the Caliga (Heavy Sandal with a sole 20 millimeters thick), studded with iron hobnails with a one piece upper and stuffed with cloth for use in winter, was especially important
The introduction of intense physical and tactical training programs, so that his
Legions could move at top speed all day.
Increased emphasis on unit morale, integrity and cohesion, starting with the 8 man section.
The directive that required every soldier be self reliant by requiring him to prepare his rations, carry cooking utensils, saw, hatchet, sickle and 3 days rations.
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The introduction of a new helmet with ear flaps, mail body armor; the eagle as the sole standard of the Legion, and the use of Standard-Bearers to carry flags and other unit symbols.
These reforms in tactics, organization, weapons and accouterments were the direct result of a change process that closely resembled that as espoused by Kotter almost two thousand years later, in that Marius:
Created urgency by associating his reforms with the outcome of impending battles and associating the need for victory with the alarms raised by the Senate.
Created a strong guiding coalition by selecting his commanders very carefully, and empowering them to do what was necessary to achieve desired results.
Developed an effective vision and strategy that was both short range (tactical) and long range (strategic) by establishing standards of technical and tactical proficiency required for victory and equating standards to institutional change.
Effectively communicated his vision through personal contact, effectively using esprit, élan, and subordinate commanders.
Empowered broad based action by removing obstacles and empowering subordinates
Maximized short term wins by the use of games and celebrations when tough training was completed.
Stressed the widespread use of after reviews, self sufficiency in the field, and visits to lower subordinate units to gain feedback. His commanding presence created credibility, however his continued action to improve the welfare of his men were, in my view, the critical vehicles which created the opportunity for
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more changed initiated by the Legionnaires themselves. Most importantly, these changes were anchored in the culture of the Roman Army and they served it well for the next 400 years.
These reforms were also used and improved by Caius Julius Caesar and are well documented in his memoirs of the Gallic Wars (Caesar, 58-52 BC/1982). During this time,
Caesars Legions conquered Espana, Gaul, and Germania and twice invaded Britannia. This was followed by a short civil war in which he subdued the armies of Pompey, and marched on Rome.
Three of his actions are of particular interest for this study of change management:
The offensive tactics used in his campaigns against the Germanic tribes in
Germania, and hostile tribes in Britannia and Spain. These included: The use of the Roman Navy, the introduction of the use of amphibious operations, and the introduction of seaborne soldiers (Marines) as a necessary adjunct to the successful conduct of those operations.
The use of Siege Works, not only to protect his army in the offense, but also to protect it from attackers, by canalizing forces into kill zones where the invaders could be destroyed with minimal loss to his force.
The evolving command structure of the Legion. By 55 BC, the command structure had evolved so that the Legion was self sustaining. The Legion was commanded by a Legatus Legionis or Senior Senator who was in is mid thirties.
He was assisted by a Tribunis Laticlavius (Apprentice Commander) who would later command a Legion. These were assisted by the Tribunus Angusticlavius
(Senior Staff Officers) and the 3rd in command the Praefectus Castrorum (Camp
Commander).
Most important for both the Legion and for the evolvement of
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western civilization, the Legions contained surveyors, engineers, armorers, physicians, medics, clerks, architects musicians and laborers. These combined changes made the Roman Army a very formidable force and one that was to expand the empire to the very limits of civilization (Warry, 1980).
Strategic Change Management of Caesar Augustus
The assassination of Julius Caesar led to an internal power struggle between the eastern and western halves of the Roman World. Marc Antony together with Cleopatra (eastern), and
Caesars heir, Octavian (western). By 31 BC, a final battle was fought at Actium, and Octavian triumphed. Octavian was then recognized by the Senate as the first emperor, and was named
Caesar Augustus (Cowan, 2003).
Armed with a great vision for Rome, Augustus:
Reduced the Army from 60 to 28 Legions.
Created a professional Army, wisely choosing to allow the best Legions of
Caesars Army to remain. One of these - the 10th would continue to make history, first in Belgium and later in England (Collins, 2002).
Executed a massive resettlement program which provided for his veterans for life
Reduced the mandatory period of service to 16 years
Organized the veterans into Vexilla Venaratorium or Legions Corps of Veterans units that could be called up for emergency service to age 60.
Ordered clear terms of service, rates of pay and pensions making the legions dependant on him for pay and retirement.
As previously stated, the Army became the major force that created the forces of change in the lands were subjugated by the Empire. The major tactical unit of the Army became the
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Century rather than the Cohort, and the Centurion, the primary tactical commander during battle.
Commanders, recognizing that future campaigns would be arduous and lengthy, subjected recruits to 4 month training process that were physically and mentally demanding. Legions were required to march 29 km in under 5 hours and 35 km at the quick step with a full load of weapons and a 30 lb pack in under 5 hours. Battle formations including movement from March posture to battle posture and vise versa were also drilled until they became second nature.
Additionally, the tesudo (the tortoise-requiring the men to form a shell with their shields to protect against missle attack) was drilled. The men trained with weapons until they became proficient marksman. They practiced survey, introduced the use of light and heavy Artillery in a fire support role, built roads bridges and towns and practiced building camp fortifications while on the march (Peterson, 1992).
Operations in Germania and the Varian Disaster – AD 9
By 12 BC, the total focus of the Roman government became the subjugation of the
German tribes east of the Rhine River. To lead these operations, Augustus chose his nephew
Drusus and invested him with a Field Marshall’s appointment (5 star rank) and ten legions including the 14th (Legio XVIIII-later to earn the title Nero’s Killing Machine), and the 17th, 18th and 19th Legions.
Druses divided this force into two main groups and operated out of two main bases. The base of the Army of the Upper Rhine, (AUR) was located at the mouth of the Main River and was named Moguntiacum (now Mainz). The Army of the Lower Rhine (ALR) was based at
Vetera (now Xanten in Holland). Employing both amphibious and land operations, Drusus struck deep into Germania, defeating the tribes of Chauci, Cherusi, and Chatti. At the height of the campaign, Druses was stricken with gangrene and died. Shortly thereafter, his brother
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Tiberius arrived to assume command, subsequently defeating all enemies. A treaty was signed which permitted Roman soldiers and merchants to cross the Rhine for commerce, and in return, the tribes were provided protection from all enemies, Officers of the Tribal army were permitted into the auxiliaries of Rome and to command them. The King of the major tribe concerned, the
Cherusi, gave one son to the AUR and one to ALR. The son who was posted to the Army of the
Lower Rhine was knighted and given the Roman name Arminius. Proud and rebellious, he would later betray the governor and hand the Roman Army its worst defeat in over 100 years.
(Collins, 2005)
The signing of the treaty did not bring the peace that Augustus anticipated. During the period 4- 6 AD, having had to fight to consolidate the new territory into a manageable province, it was clear that operations had to be mounted to contain major revolts in Germany and
Yugoslavia. The German tribal Chief Morobodus signed a second treaty with Rome reducing pressure in Germania, and allowing the Roman Government to send Legions to Yugoslavia to quell the rebellion there. However, the people of Germania, interpreting the treaty as weakness and a lack of will on the part of the Senate, watched these events carefully, and commenced preparations to overthrow Roman Rule.
The new Roman governor, Publius Quinctilius Varus was known as a tough administrator. Arriving from a well organized, rich province, he incorrectly assumed that his administrative methods would work as well as they had in the past. Ignoring the requirement to employ a well ordered process of change as a tool to gain the desired strategic ends; Varius choose to inflict the province to an iron rule. During the first few years of his tenure he was almost proven right, however Arminius was quietly working to institute a well organized process of change maximizing his knowledge of weapons, tactics and the terrain. Varius, responding to a
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Senatorial decree, commenced operations inside Germania to permanently subjugate the troublesome Germanic tribes.
Having spent the summer of AD 9 deep inside northern Germania, Varius, his three legions plus attached auxiliary, were preparing to depart for their main lodgments on the Rhine.
Prior to their departure, Arminius persuaded him to alter his route of March, ostensibly to quell a fictitious uprising. The new route took the legions through difficult wooded country known as the Teutobergwald, near modern day Osnabruck, just south of Bremen. Varius compounded his previous errors, by allowing his German Auxiliary (cavalry, archers and slingers) to depart to enlist more men. Totally ignoring all previous lessons learned, the Legions traveled at the relaxed march with their baggage trains, servants, women and children. Shortly after reaching the woods, the weather made a turn for the worse and high winds, biting cold and rain made forward movement next to impossible. Moving into terrain that was bounded by heavy marshes, a river and steep wooded hills to front, the Germans struck the Roman column with the full force of a planned ambush. Varius choose to continue forward and over a three day period he and his
25,000 men women and children, save for a few (less than 100) disappeared from the face of the earth (Clunn, 2005). In typical Germanic fashion, Varius’ head was cut off and sent back to
Augustus who, when told of his loss, beat his head against the wall and proclaimed, “Quinctilius
Varus, give me back my Legions!” (Clunn, 2005).
The legions were never reformed and it would take 6 years before Roman Legions under the command of Germanicus, grandson of Druses, would avenge the Varius disaster and return two of the three golden Eagles to Rome and the Emperor Tiberius (Collins, 2005). 1929 years later, this region would again be witness to a great battle against Germany, and as in AD 9, the
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outcome of this battle would depend on the successful management of the forces of change and the execution of a detailed strategy of change management.
The XVIII Airborne Corps and Operation Market-Garden, the Airborne Invasion of Holland –
September, 1944.
By 1944, the Second World War was in its fifth year. Technology brought about changes that brought new levels of destruction and methods of waging war. Two of these were: 1.) The introduction of the multi-engined aircraft, and 2.) The development/use of these aircraft to transport men directly onto the battlefield.
Although hampered by lack of budget and short sightedness at the strategic level (Chant,
1978/1982), the development and use of airborne forces in the United States Army in WWII closely followed the structured change management program as espoused by Kotter. Forward thinkers such as General Lewis Brereton ( Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army);
Colonel James Gavin, (who would form and command the first Airborne Troops employed by the army in WWII – the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and later the 82nd Airborne Division in 1944); and General Maxwell D. Taylor, (Division Artillery Commander of the 82nd and later, the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division); all established a sense of urgency, arguing that vertical envelopment would help the Army avoid the bloodletting that had decimated allied forces in WWI. They shared a vision and empowered a very close knit, powerful team to make that vision a reality. They enlisted the aid of General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, who obliterated any obstacles that blocked forward movement. These men were risk takers, who by definition, empowered broad based action. Although the first use of US Paratroops in Sicily had its drawbacks, short term gains were realized, opening the way for planning to be conducted for
Operation Neptune, The Airborne Invasion of Europe. Following that success, additional gains
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were consolidated while simultaneously anchoring this new development in the culture of the
American Army (Devlin, 1979).
By late 1944, it was clear that Germany was going to lose the war. Russian forces were closing in from the east, and Allied forces from the south and west. Multiple options presented themselves for the invasion and final destruction of Germany, and after much debate, an
Airborne assault to secure bridgeheads over the Maas, Waal and lower Rhine (Market), followed by an armored thrust to secure the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem (Garden) was decided upon.
Attacking forces would cross the Rhine, execute a 90 degree turn to the right and race for the industrial heartland of Germany and then Berlin. The mission assigned to the XVIII Airborne
Corps was multifaceted and complicated. The two Airborne Divisions of the Corps would seize and hold the bridges over the Queen Wilhelmina and Zuid Canals at Son and Vegel (U.S. 101st) and the bridges over the River Maas and Waal Rivers at Grave and Nijmegen (U.S. 82nd). The
British were to take and hold the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem (Br 1st Airborne).
The previous structured change management plans executed earlier by the Americans ensured mission success, however, the failure of the British to execute a like plan to manage change, spelled disaster for the British forces at Arnhem. Specifically: American Paratroopers jumped with their weapons and their Generals jumped with their men; British units jumped with equipment cases, forcing paratroopers to land and then locate their weapons containers on the drop zone, and British Generals went in via Glider, often some distance from the tactical units they controlled. This failure to plan or pay attention to the forces of change by the British Army leadership coupled with a gross underestimation of the German Army, and particularly, the crack divisions of the Waffen SS, insured the failure at Arnhem and guaranteed that the war would drag on into 1945 (Ryan, 1974).
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In my view, the elements of the change management plan that insured successes for the
Americans were their hands-on approach and their ability to take appropriate risks and consolidate gains. These were the hallmark of leaders at every level of command from platoon thru division. These leaders took care of their men, fought with them, protected them and died with them. It was a performance of leadership that replicated the performance of the Roman forces in Judea almost two thousand years before, and amply illustrating the success of a structured change management process.
The 3rd, 7th, 10th, and 22nd Legions in the Jewish Revolt and occupation of Judea, Syria and
Mesopotamia (Iraq) AD 66-70.
As with the tribes in Germania 60 years before, the people of Judea, Syria and
Mesopotamia had historically been rebellious and troublesome. Having learned and applied the hard lessons gained through the experience in Germania, Roman leaders vowed never again to experience such defeat at the hands of an enemy. The Emperors guidance was clear: any rebellion must be crushed swiftly and completely. By the time The Senate directive had been received, the change management plan initiated by Marius had matured. Enlistments and training were focused first by region, with additional training provided, so that Legions could be moved rapidly from one end of the empire to the other, and arrive ready to continue training to fight and win. A good example was the rapid deployment and nature of advance of the forces to quell the Jewish uprising that occurred in AD 66.
The Roman Forces consisted of well acclimated troops, highly trained in the observance of strict water, ration, and march discipline. The advance guard consisted of contingents of lightly armed infantry and cavalry to scout ahead as a precaution against ambushes. These were followed by the lead Legion serving as the force vanguard. The surveyors, engineers and supply
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personnel were next, and armed and trained to fight as Infantry if necessary. The Commanding
General with bodyguard followed next, following the Legionary Cavalry, heavy artillery, rams and towers. The Main Body was comprised of the Senior Officers leading the individual
Legions. The rear guard consisted of auxiliary cohorts composed of light and heavy infantry.
Last came the camp followers and slave traders. Although extremely conservative, the formation did allow for rapid movement. More importantly, it allowed for rapid conversion from the march to combat formation to defeat an enemy. This was to prove invaluable when required to fight the widespread guerrilla warfare encountered. Following the defeat of these forces and those encountered during the second uprising, the Romans conquered the most inhospitable region of the Empire, occupying not only Judea but for the next 400 years, Syria and
Mesopotamia as well. (The Editors Of Time-Life Books, 1994)
The XVIII Airborne Corps - The Attack And Defeat of Iraq - 1991.
The close of the Second World War brought chaos and instability to the Middle East.
World War II signaled the end of the old order; British colonialism was dead and the subjugated races of the region demanded independence (Snyder, L, 1960). With the departure of the
British, two major unresolved issues that were to have dire consequences for the United States remained: 1). the final disposition of the fledging Jewish State, and 2). the control and management of the regions oil reserve.
Following three major wars between the Arab States and Israel, the XVIII Airborne
Corps formed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) consisting of the 82nd and 101st
Airborne Divisions, a Marine Amphibious Force, and supporting naval ships and aircraft.
Lieutenant General Volney Warner, the Corps commander, was a forward thinking strategist who understood the implications of the mission and developed a long range vision for the Corps,
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which he forcefully put in action. The concept was to move a Battalion Task force (equating to a
Roman Cohort) followed by a Division Ready Brigade (About the size of a Roman Legion) anywhere in the world ready to fight in 36 hours. Almost immediately, re-supply and political challenges occurred, in that the United States had no allies in the region willing to provide staging and/or re-supply areas. A solution presented itself in 1980, when the Corps was tasked to provide Muti-National Force Observers to the Sinai on rotation. Under the auspices of the
United Nations, Egypt agreed to provide staging areas for a series of exercises under the code name “Bright-Star”.
Based on data obtained from these exercises and deployments, Strategic Planning teams wrote and exercised a series of plans whose objective was to deploy the Corps units to the region on no-notice. The next few years saw improvements in training and refinement of the plans such that by 1990, the overall change process as originally envisioned by General Warner, and nurtured by his successors, was firmly matured and in place. The last addition to the Corps plan was the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to provide the reinforcement and offensive firepower required to sustain and consolidate gains as a result of offensive operations.
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Corps received an execute order to move to
Southwest Asia, conduct operations in the defense of Saudi Arabia and be immediately prepared to conduct offensive operations to destroy the Iraqi Army and restore the government of Kuwait.
The commanders of the major units of the Corps were all forward thinking Airborne/Air Assault
Officers who had had extensive experience with this change management plan, and when given the opportunity to execute, did so flawlessly. Like the Roman deployment, arrival in theater was immediately followed by a program of demanding training, additionally; lessons learned of past campaigns were studied and extensively applied.
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By January 1991, the Corps was honed and ready. The 24th Infantry Divisions order of
March and attack into Iraq in some aspects resembled the successful Roman attacks into
Germania, Judea and Mesopotamia almost two thousand years before.
The 1991 attack
achieved what was thought to be the impossible, as it launched a Corps of Light Infantry numbering 75,000 plus an attached Division of 39,000 Men and 9000 Vehicles into the rear of an
Army of 475,000 Men.
Total victory was achieved in less than 100 hours, due in large part, to a managed process of changed imitated some 12 years before by leaders that were tough, resourceful, forward thinking, and demanding of high standards. (Craddock, B 1992)
Conclusions.
Extensive and detailed plans for change management must be made a permanent part of any organizational strategy if it is to survive and win.
Strategically, change planning must at minimum, be embedded in organizational culture. This fact is amply illustrated by the changes originated by Marius, Julius
Caesar and Caesar Augustus, which are still in use today.
Organizational leaders must be forward thinking, savvy risk takers, demanding of high standards, and have care and compassion for their subordinates. This leadership component is absolutely critical, as good leadership can salvage bad plans but no amount of good planning can be saved by poor leadership.
Soldiers thrive on charismatic and fair leadership of their officers. It is
utilization of these principles that good leadership executes successful change management plans. Caesar, Antony, Germanicus, and Vespasian are perfect examples from the past. These men were followed in the 20th Century by Generals Taylor and Gavin
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in World War II, and McCaffery (24th ID), Peay, (101st Airborne) and Johnson
(82nd Airborne) in Desert Storm.
With few modifications, the structured change management program as espoused by Kotter (1995) is equally adaptable to both military and non-military organizations. My research also revealed that failure to properly execute a coherent strategy for change can have dire and far reaching consequences for the western world. General Fuller (2001), in his book Decisive Battles of the Western World agrees:
“Had Germany been for four centuries thoroughly Romanized, one culture, not two would have dominated the western world. There would have been no Franco-German problem, no Charlemagne, no Louis XIV, No Napoleon, no Kaiser Wilhelm II and no
Hitler.
In 1985 while conducting research for a leadership study, I heard the same words from
SS BrigadeFuherer Heinz Harmel, Division Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division
(Freundsberg):
“Bobby, my division was victorious over the British in the fight for Arnhem Bridge.
Because of that victory, Germany has been a divided country for over 40 years. Had I lost, the
Allies could have bounced the Rhine, vaulted the Siegfried line, and cut across the North
German Plain capturing Berlin. My country would have then been saved from the barbaric occupation of the Russians. It was my failure to recognize and act on change that caused my country all of this pain. Now you Americans must succeed where I failed.” Heinz Harmel
(personal communication, April 4, 1986) stressing the importance of strategic change
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management and the strategic results gained by his Division at Arnhem. In my view, the parallels are astounding.
Leaders contemplating a change strategy would do well to heed the words of Vegietius and Josephus:
“He, who desires peace, let him prepare for war. He, who wants victory, let him train soldiers diligently. He, who wishes a successful outcome, let him fight with strategy, not at random. No one dares challenge or harm one who he realizes will win if he fights
(Reeve, 2004).
“It is no wonder that this vast empire of theirs has come to them as a prize of Valour, not fortune” (Josephus, 1980)
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