Military Tribunals: a Constitutional Issue
After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush used his powers as Commander in Chief and established a means to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States. On November 13, 2001, Bush issued a military order (M.O.) which allowed the President’s to “identify terrorists and those who support them” and bring them to justice by way of “military tribunals.” President Bush argues that it is his duty to “protect the United States and its citizens.” The M.O. makes this possible by delineating the rules and procedures for military tribunals held during the war on terror.
The legality of Bush’s M.O. immediately became the subject of debate upon its publication. For example, the president argues that he is fully authorized to enforce the use of military tribunals based on the historical precedents set in place by former presidents. He also argues that he is permitted to establish tribunals based on his declaration of “a national emergency on September 14, 2001.” The M.O. order states that “this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.” By declaring a state of national emergency, Bush suggests that tribunals are now a matter of “military necessity.” Those subject to the order are defined in subsection 2(a)(1) as someone who “is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda,” as well as someone who meets the following criteria:
“has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy, or [anyone who] has knowingly harbored one or more [of these] individuals”
Nevertheless, the M.O. was highly controversial despite all of the historical precedents, the declaration of a national
The legality of Bush’s M.O. immediately became the subject of debate upon its publication. For example, the president argues that he is fully authorized to enforce the use of military tribunals based on the historical precedents set in place by former presidents. He also argues that he is permitted to establish tribunals based on his declaration of “a national emergency on September 14, 2001.” The M.O. order states that “this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.” By declaring a state of national emergency, Bush suggests that tribunals are now a matter of “military necessity.” Those subject to the order are defined in subsection 2(a)(1) as someone who “is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda,” as well as someone who meets the following criteria:
“has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy, or [anyone who] has knowingly harbored one or more [of these] individuals”
Nevertheless, the M.O. was highly controversial despite all of the historical precedents, the declaration of a national
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