It may seem obvious that he would give such an answer, hence the name of the book, however, I had trouble following how scholars could account for practice. The logic of practice appears to be very fleeting for it “can only be grasped in action, in the temporal movement that disguises it by detemporalizing it,” and is ingrained in its own unconsciousness, for “it is unaware of the principles that govern it and the possibilities they contain” (92). I understand that Bourdieu is seeking to critique those theorists who attempt to theorize a type of logic that cannot be explained through theoretical discursions and who also effectively construct theories of practice, dramatically altering the nature of practice in order to understand its place in the ‘objective’ worldview. However, if practice has its own logic and disregards logical logic, how exactly can scholars come to account for it if at any time one comes close to it, it disintegrates? On page 92, I interpreted the last paragraph as a rectification for incorporating the logic of practice, however, I was not satisfied with his answer. He states, “Probably the only way to give an account of the practical coherence of practices and works is to construct generative models…and to devise diagrams which…quickly and directly manifest the objective systematicity of practice and which, when they make adequate use of properties of space…may even have the merit of speaking directly to the body schema” (92-3). Here, the logic of practice can become quantifiable through recreating simulations of the practice. However, even if this is an authentic proposition, Bourdieu immediately dismisses it because “one has to be aware that these theoretical replications transform the logic of practice simply by making it explicit” (93). Through explicitness, practice becomes diluted into theory, which is the antithesis of the logic of practice. To be clear,
It may seem obvious that he would give such an answer, hence the name of the book, however, I had trouble following how scholars could account for practice. The logic of practice appears to be very fleeting for it “can only be grasped in action, in the temporal movement that disguises it by detemporalizing it,” and is ingrained in its own unconsciousness, for “it is unaware of the principles that govern it and the possibilities they contain” (92). I understand that Bourdieu is seeking to critique those theorists who attempt to theorize a type of logic that cannot be explained through theoretical discursions and who also effectively construct theories of practice, dramatically altering the nature of practice in order to understand its place in the ‘objective’ worldview. However, if practice has its own logic and disregards logical logic, how exactly can scholars come to account for it if at any time one comes close to it, it disintegrates? On page 92, I interpreted the last paragraph as a rectification for incorporating the logic of practice, however, I was not satisfied with his answer. He states, “Probably the only way to give an account of the practical coherence of practices and works is to construct generative models…and to devise diagrams which…quickly and directly manifest the objective systematicity of practice and which, when they make adequate use of properties of space…may even have the merit of speaking directly to the body schema” (92-3). Here, the logic of practice can become quantifiable through recreating simulations of the practice. However, even if this is an authentic proposition, Bourdieu immediately dismisses it because “one has to be aware that these theoretical replications transform the logic of practice simply by making it explicit” (93). Through explicitness, practice becomes diluted into theory, which is the antithesis of the logic of practice. To be clear,