Ssb Defense
editor-in-chief
“T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .
T
he Indian Armed Forces inherited a very robust tradition of jointness, thanks to their large scale participation in World War II. That was the era of Admin Boxes in Burma where military garrisons cut off by Japanese infiltrating columns were kept supplied from the air and given fire support by the Royal Indian Air Force. No wonder, after independence, the British leadership heavily emphasised jointness, built the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). We thus started with a peak of jointness and synergy from which we could only retreat and come down.
The pre-1962 era was an unmitigated disaster for jointness and synergy. That came back by degrees in 1965 and we saw another peak in the 1971 War – which turned out to be a classic Tri-Service Campaign. We needed to formalise this synergy. We subsequently went in for the Defence Planning Staff and later the National Security Council. Post-Kargil War we raised the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) sans the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It still has rendered yeoman service by synergising our Long Term Integrated Perspective Plans of the Three Services and formalising our Joint Amphibious Forces and Special Forces Doctrines. It is now working on Joint Sub-Conventional Warfare, Joint Space and Joint Maritime Forces Doctrines. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) have proved to be viable and effective structures with the ANC earning it’s spurs in the major Tsunami, when we surprised the world with our support to neighbouring countries in severe distress.
The road ahead
Where do we go from here? Jointness and Synergy are the very key to success on the modern battlefield. A major power like India now needs to formalise and synergise the National Security Process. This must begin with the periodic enunciation of a National Security
“T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .
T
he Indian Armed Forces inherited a very robust tradition of jointness, thanks to their large scale participation in World War II. That was the era of Admin Boxes in Burma where military garrisons cut off by Japanese infiltrating columns were kept supplied from the air and given fire support by the Royal Indian Air Force. No wonder, after independence, the British leadership heavily emphasised jointness, built the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). We thus started with a peak of jointness and synergy from which we could only retreat and come down.
The pre-1962 era was an unmitigated disaster for jointness and synergy. That came back by degrees in 1965 and we saw another peak in the 1971 War – which turned out to be a classic Tri-Service Campaign. We needed to formalise this synergy. We subsequently went in for the Defence Planning Staff and later the National Security Council. Post-Kargil War we raised the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) sans the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It still has rendered yeoman service by synergising our Long Term Integrated Perspective Plans of the Three Services and formalising our Joint Amphibious Forces and Special Forces Doctrines. It is now working on Joint Sub-Conventional Warfare, Joint Space and Joint Maritime Forces Doctrines. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) have proved to be viable and effective structures with the ANC earning it’s spurs in the major Tsunami, when we surprised the world with our support to neighbouring countries in severe distress.
The road ahead
Where do we go from here? Jointness and Synergy are the very key to success on the modern battlefield. A major power like India now needs to formalise and synergise the National Security Process. This must begin with the periodic enunciation of a National Security