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The Leadership Of Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt

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The Leadership Of Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt
Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt was born in 1931 in Greensboro, NC. He lied about his age and ended up enlisting at the age of 16. He was a hardnosed leader and very determined to accomplish his missions. This was proven during the Korean War where he served under General William Westmoreland. There he was able to overrun the Chinese from a hilltop after several units failed to do so. Because of his actions on gaining this objective, he separated himself from the other leaders in the eyes of General Westmoreland and was nicknamed “Tiger” which stuck with him throughout his career. His peers and senior leaders viewed his behavior differently. Many saw him as a great leader and others thought of him as an egotistical stubborn individual. …show more content…
Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt understood what was asked of him by his commanders and the terrain in which he was to operate in. A few hours before the attack on the mountain was supposed to commence, Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt conducted a final recon by air of the operational area in order to get a good understanding of the environment. This gave him an opportunity to see the terrain and further adjust his plan of action. This initial exposure to and understanding of the operational environment illustrated several issues, the thick vegetation of the jungle and steep ridges leading to the objective. His initial patrols were reporting enemy sighting from the air and through ground movement. Alpha and Charlie Companies were discovering huts that could hold a platoon size element. Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt and his staff began to conclude that his battalion might face an enemy larger than anticipated. In addition, the running estimate led to believe that the base might be bigger than anticipated and that at any time the NVA might decide to defend it. As a result, he requested more reinforcements from brigade while bringing his Bravo Company from the rear forward. The additional company enabled him to adjust his plan so that he can attack the enemy with three companies while leaving one company to defend the …show more content…
Following the aerial reconnaissance, he gathered all the officers at the Firebase Blaze and discussed his findings. Identifying the lack of intelligence illustrated the necessity for the development of a list of critical information required for the patrols. Uniforms, letters, weapons caches, enemy fortifications, and enemy detainees were the best source of information throughout the mission. Planning considerations were evolving as they gathered additional information on the terrain and possible enemy locations. All leaders and those in key positions began to understand the severity of this mission and understood the intent. The patrols initially were used to collect information but quickly evolved towards a search and kill mission. Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt’s vision insisted on addressing the challenges of the terrain and enemies fortified positions by confronting the enemy head on and using a barrage of artillery and close air support fire. This heavy artillery and close air support was tailored to combat the enemies advantage on the mountain. Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt’s description of how he wanted to achieve the intent played a significant role in operation of this battle. It ensured that everyone in the battalion had an understanding of his intent. This allowed him to be able to lead his subordinated during the

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