what money can't buy
In the chapter “Incentives” of book “What Money Can’t Buy” written by Michael
J. Sandel, he points out the population control refer to two examples: China’s one- child policy and tradable procreation permits. Sandel responds that tradable procreation
permits, which was put forward by the economist Kenneth Boulding in 1964, is
preferable in economic standpoint. Each woman had one (or two) certificate to have
an extra child. If a family wants an extra child, they can buy the certificate from other
woman. It makes win-win in which buyers have rights to have extra children while
sellers gain a new source of income. Even though those who don’t sell rights, they won’t
be worse off since they still have one child (71). However, treating children as a luxury
good is unfair that only those who are able to pay can have this good. What’s worse,
buying rights to have children is pretty same with buying kids after they have been born
from others, it’s bribery that corrupting parenthood by promoting a gainful relationship
toward children (71). Also, Sandel states a fact that people should pay the fine 200,000
yuan (about $31,000) if they want an extra child (69). The authorities treat the fine as
penalty that preserves the stigma rather than a fee. Because the one-child policy didn’t
work on the rich people even who were celebrities, the authorities worried that affluent
parents felt nothing to pay for having extra children (70).
Sandel explains the concept of the one-child police in China. People should pay
200,000 yuan (about $31,000) fine for having a extra child and he thinks it’s a system of
fixed quota (70). Besides, Sandel discusses the blurry line between a fine and a fee. The
authorities rejected to treat the fine for violating the one-child policy as a fee because
they insisted that the fine is not a big deal for affluent offenders. Regarding the fine as a
penalty is good to remind
J. Sandel, he points out the population control refer to two examples: China’s one- child policy and tradable procreation permits. Sandel responds that tradable procreation
permits, which was put forward by the economist Kenneth Boulding in 1964, is
preferable in economic standpoint. Each woman had one (or two) certificate to have
an extra child. If a family wants an extra child, they can buy the certificate from other
woman. It makes win-win in which buyers have rights to have extra children while
sellers gain a new source of income. Even though those who don’t sell rights, they won’t
be worse off since they still have one child (71). However, treating children as a luxury
good is unfair that only those who are able to pay can have this good. What’s worse,
buying rights to have children is pretty same with buying kids after they have been born
from others, it’s bribery that corrupting parenthood by promoting a gainful relationship
toward children (71). Also, Sandel states a fact that people should pay the fine 200,000
yuan (about $31,000) if they want an extra child (69). The authorities treat the fine as
penalty that preserves the stigma rather than a fee. Because the one-child policy didn’t
work on the rich people even who were celebrities, the authorities worried that affluent
parents felt nothing to pay for having extra children (70).
Sandel explains the concept of the one-child police in China. People should pay
200,000 yuan (about $31,000) fine for having a extra child and he thinks it’s a system of
fixed quota (70). Besides, Sandel discusses the blurry line between a fine and a fee. The
authorities rejected to treat the fine for violating the one-child policy as a fee because
they insisted that the fine is not a big deal for affluent offenders. Regarding the fine as a
penalty is good to remind