1980. The Pinto caught on with consumers, and sales of the vehicle were high. However, serious problems quickly arose regarding the design of the Pinto. The gas tank on the vehicles was placed directly behind the rear axle instead of above it, with only nine inches of space between the gas tank and axle. Bolts were also placed close to the gas tank, increasing the risk that they could puncture the tank in an accident. Additionally, the fuel filler pipe design created a high probability that the pipe would disconnect from the tank and cause gasoline to spill out in rear-end collisions. Ford designed the gas tank with hopes of creating additional trunk space. …show more content…
Ford began to voluntarily recall the Ford Pinto in 1978. However, later in the year three girls were killed after a rear-end collision caused their Ford Pinto to burst into flames. The victims’ families would not receive notice of the recall until 1979. The prosecutor from Elkhart County, Indiana, sued Ford for reckless homicide.
To this day the Ford Pinto case remains controversial. Many believe the Ford Pinto design made it riskier in rear-end collisions. However, controversy exists over just how many rear-end collisions involved Ford Pintos, and how many of those accidents resulted in the vehicles catching fire. Ford used statistics from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System to indicate that Ford Pintos were
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involved in 1.9 percent of fatal accidents, and less than half were the results of rear-end collisions.
Ford claimed that its vehicles were not any less safe than other cars and that it had done everything it was supposed to do in the recall. Ford was found not guilty to these charges due to lack of evidence. A California appeals court upheld the Grimshaw verdict, although the amount of punitive damages was reduced to $3.5 million.
COST-BENEFIT …show more content…
In deciding whether to institute a recall, Ford instituted a cost-benefit analysis. In its own defense,
Ford claimed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required the company to use such an analysis and that it excuses the company when the costs of making the product change exceed the societal benefit. Where Ford’s argument crumbled was how it determined the costs of failing to implement the change.
Ford justified that making the design change would cost approximately $11 per vehicle. At 11 million vehicles and 1.5 million trucks, the estimated costs would approximate $137 million. Ford estimated that making the design change would result in 180 fewer burn deaths, 180 fewer serious burn injuries, and 2,100 fewer burned vehicles. At an estimate of $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 per vehicle, Ford calculated that the societal benefits of the design change would equal $49.5 million—much less than the costs of making the change. Ford engineers later indicated that management was not approached about the issue due to a company culture of firing bearers