The indirect approach was a fast turning movement that did not sacrifice manpower. One Corp would pin down the enemies front while the second Corp under the screening of cavalry would move around utilizing the terrain as much as possible to hide the Corps advance on the flanks of the enemy; with the goal of cutting of the lines of communication and reinforcements and at the same time attacking the enemy from the rear ("French Army : Military : History : Wars," n.d.) While the principle doctrine of the Russian army is traced to Alexander Suvorov as noted in some of his maxims. “The offensive is the main weapon of war”, “Achieve Rabidity in attack, use the bayonet”, “fight in the field, not in fortifications; confuse the enemy.” This principled approach translated into a Russian soldier that was reluctant to give ground and indoctrinated to press the attack ("Russian Military History: The Origins of Russian Military Doctrine,"
The indirect approach was a fast turning movement that did not sacrifice manpower. One Corp would pin down the enemies front while the second Corp under the screening of cavalry would move around utilizing the terrain as much as possible to hide the Corps advance on the flanks of the enemy; with the goal of cutting of the lines of communication and reinforcements and at the same time attacking the enemy from the rear ("French Army : Military : History : Wars," n.d.) While the principle doctrine of the Russian army is traced to Alexander Suvorov as noted in some of his maxims. “The offensive is the main weapon of war”, “Achieve Rabidity in attack, use the bayonet”, “fight in the field, not in fortifications; confuse the enemy.” This principled approach translated into a Russian soldier that was reluctant to give ground and indoctrinated to press the attack ("Russian Military History: The Origins of Russian Military Doctrine,"