John Smart's Identity Theory
Australian philosopher John Smart was one of the originators of the identity theory, in which he states that particular states and processes of the mind are identical to particular states and processes of the brain. However, strictly speaking the identity theory does not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. In our day-to-day lives we may use the phrases “He/she has a good mind” and “He/she has a good brain” interchangeably, but we would never say “His/her mind weighs 50 ounces”. Consider an experience of feeling pain, the identity theory of mind says that these experiences are not merely correlated with brain processes, but that they are actually brain processes.
An objection to Smart’s view is that even if sensations are identical …show more content…
In his paper, he refers to the term “sense datum,” which covers the case of seeing or seeming to see something of a specific colour. In the case of his example, Smart says that we have a yellow, green, and purple sense datum. Now, Smart supposes that there is nothing yellow, green, and purple striped in the brain. For identity theorists, it is important to say that the sense data and images are not a part of the physical world. When one says “I have a red sense datum,” they are saying that they see or seem to see something that really is red. Some philosophers believe that even though experiences are brain processes, they also hold fundamentally non-physical, physical properties that are sometimes called …show more content…
The first is a story of Mary, a brilliant scientist that has been forced to investigate the world from a black and white room. Mary specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all physical information about sight and colour by examining wavelength combinations and how they react with the retina and central nervous system. Then, Jackson supposes that Mary is released from her black and white room into a world of colour and asks if Mary will learn anything. Jackson argues that she will learn something because she will have a new visual experience that she never had before, and in this way Jackson says that physicalism is false. We can present Jackson’s argument as
An objection to Smart’s view is that even if sensations are identical …show more content…
In his paper, he refers to the term “sense datum,” which covers the case of seeing or seeming to see something of a specific colour. In the case of his example, Smart says that we have a yellow, green, and purple sense datum. Now, Smart supposes that there is nothing yellow, green, and purple striped in the brain. For identity theorists, it is important to say that the sense data and images are not a part of the physical world. When one says “I have a red sense datum,” they are saying that they see or seem to see something that really is red. Some philosophers believe that even though experiences are brain processes, they also hold fundamentally non-physical, physical properties that are sometimes called …show more content…
The first is a story of Mary, a brilliant scientist that has been forced to investigate the world from a black and white room. Mary specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all physical information about sight and colour by examining wavelength combinations and how they react with the retina and central nervous system. Then, Jackson supposes that Mary is released from her black and white room into a world of colour and asks if Mary will learn anything. Jackson argues that she will learn something because she will have a new visual experience that she never had before, and in this way Jackson says that physicalism is false. We can present Jackson’s argument as