The Bay Of Pigs Invasion And The Operation's Failure
This study will investigate the communicative intelligence errors and miscalculations of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the operation’s failure. Specifically, the analysis will address the inefficient and substantively distant relationship between President John F. Kennedy and the senior intelligence officials tasked with informing leadership of the operation’s intended course, contingency plans and expectations.
Summary:
The Bay of Pigs is considered an intelligence failure of massive scale. Its failure is attributed to a substantive distance present in the interactions of intelligence officials and executive policymakers. Substantive distance is defined as a distinguished gap among motives and intended methods, values and expectations with …show more content…
Self-appointed Premier Fidel Castro, and his new government seized U.S. economic assets and capital. His brazen behavior forced the U.S. to sever diplomatic relations. Castro marched into Havana as a revolutionary victor on January 1, 1959 and by February 1960, finalized an oil deal with the Soviets. In the same year, Castro and Former Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, negotiated military and economic aid programs as Communist allies. By March 1960, the concerned Eisenhower administration, in collaboration with the CIA and National Security Council (NSC), authorized a ‘program of covert action against the Castro regime’, also known as The Bay of …show more content…
Two days later, they suffered defeat and survivors of the tactical embarrassment were taken into Castro’s custody. Against the CIA’s prescription, Kennedy did not supply air support to the outnumbered forces. Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles trusted Kennedy would prevent failure with intervention. However, as stated by National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, it “was simply a misreading of Kennedy.” The CIA gambled with the unstated assumption and failed to fully inform and persuade Kennedy of Phase Two. According to CIA official Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., “all of us committed the error of saying ‘there is always the guerilla option’, without [actually] planning
Summary:
The Bay of Pigs is considered an intelligence failure of massive scale. Its failure is attributed to a substantive distance present in the interactions of intelligence officials and executive policymakers. Substantive distance is defined as a distinguished gap among motives and intended methods, values and expectations with …show more content…
Self-appointed Premier Fidel Castro, and his new government seized U.S. economic assets and capital. His brazen behavior forced the U.S. to sever diplomatic relations. Castro marched into Havana as a revolutionary victor on January 1, 1959 and by February 1960, finalized an oil deal with the Soviets. In the same year, Castro and Former Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, negotiated military and economic aid programs as Communist allies. By March 1960, the concerned Eisenhower administration, in collaboration with the CIA and National Security Council (NSC), authorized a ‘program of covert action against the Castro regime’, also known as The Bay of …show more content…
Two days later, they suffered defeat and survivors of the tactical embarrassment were taken into Castro’s custody. Against the CIA’s prescription, Kennedy did not supply air support to the outnumbered forces. Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles trusted Kennedy would prevent failure with intervention. However, as stated by National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, it “was simply a misreading of Kennedy.” The CIA gambled with the unstated assumption and failed to fully inform and persuade Kennedy of Phase Two. According to CIA official Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., “all of us committed the error of saying ‘there is always the guerilla option’, without [actually] planning