What Is Hobbes Definition Of Punishment

Hobbes’s definition of punishment clearly asserts that a punishable offense must constitute a “transgression of the law.” This short, seemingly banal, provision forms the central tenet of Hobbes’s punishment theory—a tenet from which various subsidiary conclusions can be drawn. Contrary to notions of sovereign omnipotence, a careful analysis of Hobbes’s conception of law as it pertains to punishment reveals limitations to sovereign authority in the form of a ‘positive legal order’ (Cattaneo 1965; Hüning 2007). Hobbes’s characterization of civil law, offered in Chapter 26, can serve as an ideal starting point for this line of inquiry:
Civill Law, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing,
Contrary to sovereign-made civil law, the Laws of Nature are simply, “qualities that dispose rational men to peace and obedience” (Hobbes, Leviathan, xxvi). Although Hobbes dedicates considerable time to systematically cataloging nineteen distinct laws of nature, he distills them all into a single, universally comprehensible maxim, “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe” (Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xv). Every man that has sufficiently cultivated his reasoning faculties should, in Hobbes’ appraisal, be well aware of the Laws of Nature and inclined to obey them. Although the Laws of Nature are said to be rational and self-evident in man’s natural state, they are (in the state of nature) only binding to man’s own conscience (i.e., in foro interno) and can be violated as he judges necessary for his self-preservation. However, once man enters into civil society via submission to sovereign command (i.e., civil law), “then are they [the Natural Laws] actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the Commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes:” (Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxvi). Thus, the Laws of Nature become self-evident appendages of the civil law that are now bound to the external coercive authority of the sovereign (i.e., in foro externo). Thus, each subject is obligated
(Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxvi).
By establishing a distinct legal category for penalties, Hobbes distinguishes between laws that direct subjects (i.e., civil laws) and laws that enforce these directives by establishing punishments for their violation (Goldsmith 1996). Furthermore, penal laws (unlike civil laws) are directly addressed “to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution” (Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxvi). Thus, the sovereign is not obligated to fully promulgate penal laws or provide adequate proof that they stem from his will. Rather, Hobbes contends that “Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man (Hobbes, Leviathan,