Argument Against Prenatal Genetic Screening

Argument Against Prenatal Genetic Screening In this essay, I will argue that prenatal screening for disabilities for the intent of actively choosing to have a child without a disability is immoral. By disability, I mean the definition provided in a medical dictionary: “A disadvantage or deficiency, especially a physical or mental impairment that prevents or restricts normal achievement”. This does not include diseases that are considered inevitably and irreversibly fatal, nor does it include birth situations that are considered detrimental to the mother. I will use the term “possible child” hereafter to avoid loaded and biased terms such as “fetus” or “baby”. My argument is this: First, when one makes a conscious decision to have a child, the philosophical theory of ethical voluntarism applies. Second, the defiance to this theory does not include prenatal genetic screening, unless abortion or termination is included. Third, genetic screening is an unreliable way to judge one’s quality of life. My argument against the morality of prenatal genetic screening in order to avoid having children could be refuted if it was proven unethical. The two methods by which to judge the ethics of prenatal genetic screening in order to avoid having a disabled possible child are: the basic principals of medical ethics, and the quality of life for the possible child. However, the argument of prenatal genetic screening with the intent of not having a possible child with a disability does not fall under a principal of medical ethics, and the quality of life for the possible child is not consistent enough to be proven. Thus, my argument—that it is immoral to use prenatal genetic screening for disabilities as a means of deciding whether to terminate a possible child—holds. First, when one makes a conscious decision to have a child, the philosophical theory of voluntarism apples. According to a quick reference to The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ethical voluntarism is the