Clausewitz in the 21st Century

Written by: Phua Seng Yoong Singapore Armed Forces, 2011

Question 1: Do the insights provided by Clausewitz who died 180 years ago – friction in war, the culmination of the attack, the roles of chance, uncertainty, and irrational elements in war, and the center of gravity – offer anything worthwhile for 21st Century strategists and war-fighters?

Introduction The work of Carl von Clausewitz continues to bring about heated debate in the 21st Century. While many scholars see Clausewitz’s On War as an indispensible military thought in the modern times, others view it as an obsolete or morally repellent argument for unlimited, unrestrained and brutal warfare.[1] Notwithstanding the opposition of present times, this renowned work is considered incomplete and its lack of prescriptive contents has subjected it to interpretations and discourses. Facing this encumbrance, the study of On War has to go beyond textual analysis to an appreciation of the historical context which influenced the author’s thinking and the evolution of the book over time. Fortunately, with the enduring efforts of numerous historians, we now know that Clausewitz’s experiences in the Napoleonic Wars and his study in the age of Frederick the Great (and beyond) allowed him to create a unified, all encompassing theory of war.[2] To date, much literature has been written to attest to the relevance of Clausewitz’s theories in modern warfare and assert the timelessness of On War.[3] This paper examines the insights gained from the great studies on Clausewitz’s works and re-confirm the continued relevance of his theories by: (1) identifying the character of 21st Century warfare, followed by (2) an interpretation of Clausewitz’s theories and his underlying thinking, and finally (3) examining the relevance of the theories concerned and determine how they can be applied in the 21st Century.

The 21st Century Warfare The character of warfare has evolved since the passing of Carl von Clausewitz 180 years ago. The likelihood of massive clashes between conventional forces seems to be diminishing and the world has seen the dawn of non-state actors challenging established states with asymmetric warfare[4] techniques. William Lind aptly chronicled the evolution of warfare in four generations, which began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. He described present day warfare as fourth-generation warfare (4GW) that is characterized by a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, where militaries had to fight against threats that are transnational in nature and are very difficult to deal with.[5] The capabilities of these threat entities stem from the effects of globalisation that have enabled further, faster, deeper and cheaper means to reach around the world.[6] In addition to the physical reach, today’s information technology has also brought about various modern communication avenues that allow collaboration and ready access to information. Consequently, this also allowed rapid access to media pipelines enabling belligerents to exploit them to further their cause. These have bestowed transnational terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, and the more sophisticated Hezbollah[7], with the abilities to acquire equipment, knowledge and instruments that rival those of the traditional state to wage wars. According to Lind, 4GW also brings together the relevance of mass firepower dominated by artillery in the second-generation warfare and manoeuvre concepts of third-generation warfare, making it more complex than ever before. Therefore, we can conclude at this point that 21st Century strategists and war-fighters have to contend with both conventional threats from traditional states and unconventional threats from non-state actors, both whom are capable of waging wars.

Intricacies of Clausewitz’s Work To grasp how Clausewitz’s theories can be applied in 4GW, it is necessary to decipher the underlying thinking of the author’s work. Many of Clausewitz’s theories articulated in On War are remarkably well integrated despite the fact that On War is an unfinished book. Without going into details, this can be illustrated using Clausewitz’s famous paradoxical trinity. The constructs of the trinity comprises three interrelated components of war, namely “the commander and his army”, “the people” and “the government.”[8] Clausewitz connected each of these human actors to three sets of forces: (1) The commander and his army are paired mainly with non-rational forces of friction, chance and probability, (2) the people are paired mainly with irrational forces that refers to the emotions of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, and (3) the government, which is less of a concern in this paper, is paired mainly with the rational force of calculation and reasoning.[9] As illustrated, Clausewitz has unified many ideas and concepts he developed over the period of study in his own youth and middle age. The following discussion will examine the specific ideas and theories concerned.

The Irrational Elements “Irrational forces” is one of the three forces that were interpreted by Bassford to provide a symmetrical representation of dominant tendencies in Clausewitz’s trinity.[10] While the three sets of forces were paired with each component of the trinity, it must be stressed that Clausewitz actually used the word “mehr…zugewendet” in his original German manuscript, which means “mainly,” in the associations.[11] Thus, it is clear that the author did not rule out that any one of the forces can be present in all components to some variable extent, and that this is the reason behind dialectical relationships between components. Indeed, looking at the real world, military men and politicians are also members of “the people,” given that they may belong to different parts of society. In that sense, irrational forces are linked to all human actors and therefore its dominant beliefs will provide the fuel for political decisions[12]. This in turn may shape the outcome of a military campaign, which is consequential based on Clausewitz’s argument that “war is an instrument of policy.” In his book, Clausewitz contended that the “[population is] an integral element among the factors at work in war”[13] and conceived the idea of “People’s War,” defining it as a state-sponsored insurrection by armed civilians against an invader in support of action by army and the regular forces of allies.[14] This phenomenon was observed during the Napoleonic period where enormous armies that were raised using conscripts led to overwhelmed defending states to adopt “another means of war” by arming their people.[15] When a state has to wage a People’s War, the significance of irrational forces heightens and the interplay amongst the three components of Clausewitz’s trinity become more distinct. In the light of this discussion, it implies that the irrational elements in war can be referred to both the human actors of Clausewitz’s trinity, predominantly “the people”, and also, what Clausewitz called it, the “blind natural force” of primordial violence, hatred and enmity.[16]

Friction, Chance and Uncertainty The concepts of chance, uncertainty and friction can hardly be examined independent of each other. When Clausewitz himself introduced friction, he brought in chance as the key subject to friction in war: “This tremendous friction cannot…be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance.”[17] For Clausewitz, friction is neither extrinsic nor abnormal[18]; it is the reflection of the effects in the real world. Friction can be generation internally within the military “machine”[19], as in physics, and externally by the collision of two opposing armies.[20] Thus with the concept of friction, Clausewitz conveyed that one can never fully anticipate how the battle will unfold, and it is only through a good military system and the strong will of the commander that friction in war can be counteracted.[21] Throughout On War, apart from Clausewitz’s pervasive mention of chance, its definition can nowhere be found. Beyerchen aptly brought in the three forms of chance conceived by the late nineteenth-century mathematician, Henri Poincaré, to explain Clausewitz’s interpretation of chance. The first form is a statistical random phenomenon whereby Clausewitz referred to the role of possibility in a commander’s assessment. While some statistical analysis can be used, this form of chance requires the judgment of an experienced commander in war. The second form is the amplification of a microcause, where Poincaré explained on a system point of view that certain deterministic system can cause disproportionately large effects at later time. Clausewitz work has embedded this idea in his very articulation on uncertainty and friction where the various contact of chance at the micro level, which may be concealed, can develop and produce effects at the macro level. The third form is the function of analytical blindness which is a result of simplifying the real world phenomena by people and making war seems like a linear concept instead of a complex and nonlinear state of affairs[22]. With all the complexities involved, Clausewitz stressed that the play of chance goes beyond the commander’s simple calculation of probability to a need for an intuition that allows him to exploit chance to his advantage.

Culmination of the Attack Clausewitz defined culminating point of the attack as “the point where [the attacker’s] remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defence and wait for peace.” Moving beyond that point exposes the attacker to counterattack from the enemy “with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack.”[23] According to Clausewitz, losses will usually be greater than the gains in an attack. As the army advanced, its lines of communication will be stretched, forces will be pulled aside to control areas and other situations may be developed which will turn against the attacker.[24] As a result, the attacker has to stop at some point to rest and adopt a defensive posture for a period of time before proceeding. This is the point where the commander has to decide and exercise his imagination, as Clausewitz concluded, “what matters therefore is to detect the culminating point with discriminative judgement.”[25]

Center of Gravity Antulio J. Echevarria II, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, observed that center of gravity (CoG) appeared more than fifty times in On War, and explained Clausewitz’s conceptualization of the centre of gravity as being based on mechanical sciences, just as he had conceived his theory on friction.[26] Clausewitz described CoG as a focal point, “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”[27] By this, which is often misunderstood, he does not mean that the CoG is the source of power. In fact, it is the centralizing function that holds power system together, and in some cases give them purpose and direction.[28] Clausewitz qualified that CoG is valid only when the enemy, “whether a single state or an alliance of states, have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion.”[29] When the enemy’s CoG is identified, Clausewitz advocates that all “energies should be directed” at this point to defeat the enemy.[30]

Relevance of Clausewitz’s Theories in the 21st Century Thus far, the paper has briefly built a foundational understanding on present day warfare and some of Clausewitz’s brilliant ideas. Already it is quite obvious that many of Clausewitz’s thoughts still stand in present day context and are potentially applicable in 4GW. This proposition is contrary to what many critics have suggested; On War as bloodthirsty, misguided and obsolete.[31] These comments can easily be dispelled because they are often made on the superficial understanding that went little beyond the textual analysis of the book, and often built upon erroneous readings from others. Nevertheless, the fact remains that On War was written almost two centuries ago where the political, social, economic and technological evolutions of today could not be foreseen by Clausewitz. Therefore, in order to render Clausewitz his deserved place in the today’s modern age of technology, the following discussion on his ideas and concepts will not be critical towards the material changes in the 21st Century.

Significance of Irrational Elements in 4GW It is axiomatic that conflicts nation-states engage in today relate closely the effects from irrational elements. Following the September 11 attacks, the world saw invasions into Afghanistan in 2001 followed by Iraq in 2003 by coalition forces. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom (the war in Afghanistan), the cause of war stemmed from worldwide public uproar and support to root-out terror. Given the mandate by the people, the governments gain legitimacy and political will to commit their armed forces to the enduring global war on terror (GWOT). On the other hand, Operation Iraqi Freedom presented a case of “unconvincing” invasion of Iraq. As seen from how the operation unfolded, the war lost its popularity amongst the populace due to controversies that were presented as a result of the prolonged and seemingly unending war. Pressures began to be exerted by the public on their governments to draw down their armed forces’ involvement. After three years of coalition occupation in Iraq, it was found that majority of the British and Canadian people believed that the war in Iraq was unjustified.[32] A poll conducted on by the BBC World Service in January 2007 had also shown that 73% of the world population was against the handling of the Iraq War by the U.S.[33] It is thus arguable that the large-scale withdrawal of coalition forces which followed in 2009 was largely a result of public disapproval. Therein, it aptly demonstrated the significance of irrational elements, even in the context of the GWOT. Another noteworthy case in the GWOT will be the utility of “force” by terrorists. Their strategy resembles the “People’s War” which Clausewitz described. Despite being technologically and numerically inferior, Taliban operatives in Afghanistan are able to capitalize on the people, the natives of the land, to solicit like-mindedness through provocation and propaganda of the deed.[34] Until the NATO coalition is able to sever linkages between the terrorists and the natives, a repeat of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam War remains in prospect. This is an arduous task but nevertheless is in progress. It is thus clear that irrational elements of both sides (own and the native population) have to be part of the strategic and operational considerations in the 4GW. Without due considerations to pacify and buy-over the irrational elements will result in an unbalance trinity and ultimate defeat.

Influence of the CoG in 4GW The wide recognition and various adaptations by various militaries of the CoG concept allow this paper to further examine on how this concept influenced the conduct of modern wars. If the current war in Afghanistan is a People’s War, like the paper has suggested, the native population becomes a logical focus. Indeed, the new strategy adopted by NATO since 2010 has placed the Afghan people as the CoG in this conflict.[35] Two of the main thrusts announced by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis include the protection of the Afghan people and to conduct effective strategic communication to win their hearts and minds.[36] Correspondingly, the U.S.’s Af-Pak strategy that is in effect since early 2009 also focuses on the protection of Afghan people as a top agenda.[37] Over the past one year, U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts have been more deliberate in their intelligence gathering and analysis to ensure that the most appropriate actions are taken, even at the lowest tactical level. In essence, the enhanced intelligence work effectively supports the traditional hunt-the-enemy role and at the same time, prevents unnecessary collateral damage thereby keeping the population safe.[38] With this brief account of the coalition effort in Afghanistan, it suffices to show that tremendous energies from all levels are directed at the CoG. Therefore, it can be concluded that the CoG concept remains relevant in 4GW and once it is identified, it produces consequential downstream effects that influences operations at the operational and tactical levels.

Relevance of Friction, Chance and Uncertainty in the Technological World While it was earlier noted that Clausewitz would not have envisaged the technological development of today, his arguments on the variables of war – friction, chance and uncertainty – had not been altered. In fact, the element of uncertainty has now been compounded by the introduction of a new dynamic variable – technology itself. The advancement of technology has brought about chain of effects, impacting the social, political, bureaucratic, managerial and psychological systems. All these caused a quantum jump in the complexity of warfare.[39] Correspondingly, this led to the increased specialization and compartmentalization of the military which in turn create internal friction. If the contact with chance creates friction, like what Clausewitz suggested, with the existing military technologies today that enable longer range communication and observation capabilities, the amount of contact with chance increases and hence friction from external sources. Take for instance, intelligence collection – with so much information that can be acquired with the use of today’s technology, that is far from being unreliable as during Clausewitz’s time, the commander may be overwhelmed and become paralyzed just by trying to sift the relevant data from the trivial ones.[40] As Clausewitz put it, “We now know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain.”[41] While technology today may have eradicated many of the old-time difficulties, it created new problems. Among the problems, include a tendency of over-reliance on technology which may hinder the development of intuition and readiness to accept risk,[42] the qualities of commander that are necessary to exploit chance and counter friction. Hence, in today’s military context, friction that arises from both external and internal sources should be dealt with.

The Culminating Point as seen in Old Light Clausewitz’s idea of culminating point can be viewed in the same light today. While technologies have enabled the brilliance of today’s battlefield systems, it came with weaknesses that could cause an army to halt its advance. During the 2003 Iraq invasion, there was a point where major combat operations almost came to a halt due to shortage of batteries.[43] Even with superior mobility offered by tanks and armoured personnel carriers, there must be a point where petrol will be depleted and supply trains need to catch up with the frontline. However superior its technologies may be, an army cannot be advancing forever and bound to arrive at a culminating point in which the ground tactical command has to be cognizant with. Therefore, in the formulation of land campaigns, it is critical to plan for deliberate halts and break up the advance into phases, to enable both combat support and combat service support elements to provide continuous support to the maneouvre force. Besides the tactical level, Clausewitz’s idea of the culminating point can be applied at the strategic perspective. Turning to the Iraq War again, one question that can be asked on the announcement of coalition withdrawal would be, “have they reached their culminating point?” Global public support for coalition states seemed to have been exhausted in this case and thus the political will to wage the long war. Realising the culminating point is near might well be the underlying reason for the hastened political reform in Iraq and premature withdrawal of forces.

Conclusion 180 years after his death, Clausewitz’s On War remains as one of the greatest book to understand war, with many arguing that it is unsurpassed by any theoretical work till today. The close examination to discover the intricacies of Clausewitz’s works in tandem with an appreciation on the type of warfare facing strategists and war-fighter in the 21st Century has enabled this paper to re-confirm the relevance and application of the author’s most acclaimed ideas and theories. The growing significance of irrational elements in today’s 4GW amplifies the interplay of Clausewitz’s trinity components even more prominently. At the strategic and national levels, the trinity serves as an evaluation tool for a complete account of the war effort which encompasses the balance between the three forces. The ability to conceptualise chance, uncertainty and friction allows one to deal with the constraints and opportunities to tackle modern military problems. Finally, the concepts of culmination of the attack and CoG can be incorporated into the campaign planning process to derive effective war plans to defeat the enemy. Although these theories are still valid today as this paper suggests, they would require periodic reviews and adapted accordingly, along with the increased complexities of the modern world and the evolving nature of warfare.
Bibliography

1. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992) [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/ readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm [2 June 2011].

2. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!,” The Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002.

3. “World View of U.S. Role Goes from Bad to Worse,” BBC World Service. 23 January 2007 [Online], Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_ poll.pdf [20 June 2011].

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds./trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

5. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995 [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/ Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm [11 May 2011].

6. Colin S. Gray, “Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context,” Monograph, Stategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006.

7. Dann Sheridan, “Asymmetric Warfare: An Overview,” 2003 [Online], Available: http://radio-weblogs.com/ 0001134/stories/2003/01/11/asymmetricWarfareAnOverview.html [30 June 2011].

8. “Battery Lack Almost Pulled Plug on Iraq War”, Defence Tech [Online], Available: http://defensetech.org/ 2003/09/03/battery-lack-almost-pulled-plug-on-iraq-war/ [20 June 2011].

9. Dictionary.com [Online], Available: http://dictionary.reference.com/ [30 June 2011].

10. “The new Af-Pak strategy,” Report, Huffington Post, 1 April 2009.

11. “Guardian July Poll,” ICM Research, July 2006 [Online], Avaliable: http://www. icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_july_guardian_july_poll.pdf [20 June 2011].

12. James Stavridis, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: The Way Ahead for the Alliance,” Transcript, 19 May 2010 [Online], Available: http://www.acus.org/event/natos-new-strategic-concept-way-ahead-alliance/transcript [1 July 2011]

13. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, University Press of Kansas, 2008.

14. Jorge Benitez, “NATO’s Centre of Gravity: Political Will,” 21 May 2010 [Online], Avaliable: http://www. acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato%E2%80%99s-center-gravity-political-will [1 July 2011].

15. Kimberly Dozier, “Shift in US military intelligence in Afghanistan means pursing Taliban, al-Qaida is priority,” 26 Jun 2011 [Online], Available: http://www.newser.com/ article/d9o3m6dg2/shift-in-us-military-intelligence-in-afghanistan-means-pursuing-taliban-al -qaida-is-priority.html [1 July 2011].

16. Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,” Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1986).

17. Nikolas Gardner, “Resurrecting the “Icon” – The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz’s On War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009).

18. Paul Cornish, “Clausewitz and the Ethics of Armed Force: Five Proposition,” Journal of Military Ethics (2003).

19. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Vintage Book, New York, U.S., February 2008.

20. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), pp. 7-8 [Online], Available: http:// www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/glossary.html [12 January 2008].

21. William S. Lind, “Understanding Forth Generation War” [Online], Avaliable: http://antiwar.com/lind/index. php? articleid=1702 [21 June 2011].

-----------------------
[1] Paul Cornish, “Clausewitz and the Ethics of Armed Force: Five Proposition,” Journal of Military Ethics (2003), p. 213.

[2] Nikolas Gardner, “Resurrecting the “Icon” – The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz’s On War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009), pp. 121-22.

[3] Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815 – 1945 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994), pp. 3-8.

[4] Asymmetric warfare can be defined as war in which opposing groups or nations have unequal military resources, and the weaker opponent uses unconventional weapons and tactics, such as terrorism, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy; adapted from Dictionary.com [Online], Available: http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/asymmetric+warfare [30 June 2011]. For an overview, refer to Dann Sheridan, “Asymmetric Warfare: An Overview,” 2003 [Online], Available: http://radio-weblogs.com/0001134/stories/2003/01/11/asymmetric WarfareAn Overview.html [30 June 2011].

[5] William S. Lind, “Understanding Forth Generation War” [Online], Available: http://antiwar.com/lind/index. php? articleid=1702 [21 June 2011].

[6] Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), pp. 7-8 [Online], Available: http:// www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/glossary.html [12 January 2008].

[7] Hezbollah is not only a militant group; it also occupies seats in the Lebanese government and commands significant influence in Lebanon. In addition, the Hezbollah has political and financial support from neighboring states.

[8] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds./trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 89.

[9] Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995 [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/ Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm [11 May 2011].
[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Colin S. Gray, “Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context,” Monograph, Stategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006, p. 20.

[13] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 79.

[14] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, University Press of Kansas, 2008, p. 125.

[15] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 479.

[16] Ibid., p. 89.

[17] Ibid., p. 120.

[18] Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992) [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm [2 June 2011].

[19] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 119.

[20] Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,” Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1986), p.77.

[21] Beyerchen, 1992.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 528.

[24] Ibid., pp. 566-73.

[25] Ibid., p. 528.

[26] Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!,” The Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002, p. 6.

[27] Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 595-96

[28] Echevarria II, 2002, p. 12.

[29] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 485.

[30] Ibid., p. 596.

[31] Gardner, 2009, p. 119.

[32] Based on the Poll: “Guardian July Poll,” ICM Research, July 2006 [Online], Available: http://www. icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_july_guardian_july_poll.pdf [20 June 2011].

[33] Based on the Poll: “World View of U.S. Role Goes from Bad to Worse,”. BBC World Service. 23 January 2007 [Online], Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf [20 June 2011].

[34] Smith, 2008, p. 286.

[35] Jorge Benitez, “NATO’s Centre of Gravity: Political Will,” 21 May 2010 [Online], Avaliable: http://www. acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato%E2%80%99s-center-gravity-political-will [1 July 2011].

[36] James Stavridis, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: The Way Ahead for the Alliance,” Transcript, 19 May 2010 [Online], Available: http://www.acus.org/event/natos-new-strategic-concept-way-ahead-alliance/transcript [1 July 2011]

[37] “The new Af-Pak strategy,” Report, Huffington Post, 1 April 2009.

[38] Kimberly Dozier, “Shift in US military intelligence in Afghanistan means pursing Taliban, al-Qaida is priority,” 26 Jun 2011 [Online], Available: http://www.newser.com/article/d9o3m6dg2/shift-in-us-military-intelligence-in-afghanistan-means-pursuing-taliban-al-qaida-is-priority.html [1 July 2011].

[39] Handel, 1986, p. 54.

[40] Ibid., p. 69.

[41] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 102.

[42] Handel, 1986, p. 69.

[43] “Battery Lack Almost Pulled Plug on Iraq War”, Defence Tech [Online], Available: http://defensetech.org/ 2003/09/03/battery-lack-almost-pulled-plug-on-iraq-war/ [20 June 2011].

Bibliography: 1. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992) [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/ readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm [2 June 2011]. 4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds./trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 13. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, University Press of Kansas, 2008. 16. Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,” Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1986). 17. Nikolas Gardner, “Resurrecting the “Icon” – The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz’s On War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009). 18. Paul Cornish, “Clausewitz and the Ethics of Armed Force: Five Proposition,” Journal of Military Ethics (2003). 20. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), pp. 7-8 [Online], Available: http:// www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/glossary.html [12 January 2008]. ----------------------- [1] Paul Cornish, “Clausewitz and the Ethics of Armed Force: Five Proposition,” Journal of Military Ethics (2003), p [2] Nikolas Gardner, “Resurrecting the “Icon” – The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz’s On War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009), pp. 121-22. [3] Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815 – 1945 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994), pp. 3-8. [6] Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999), pp. 7-8 [Online], Available: http:// www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/glossary.html [12 January 2008]. [8] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds./trans. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 89. [13] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 79. [14] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, University Press of Kansas, 2008, p. 125. [15] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 479. [18] Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992) [Online], Available: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm [2 June 2011]. [19] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 119. [20] Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,” Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1986), p.77. [21] Beyerchen, 1992. [23] Clausewitz, 1989, p. 528. [27] Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 595-96 [28] Echevarria II, 2002, p